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 CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More than ever, the “perennial gale of creative destruction” blows forcefully in our 
industry, whichever way we look. There is no hiding place from the forces of change, not 
in markets in which we operate, not in the institutional work that surrounds us nor in the 
technologies that we employ. The world has already changed so much, that I have stopped 
thinking of banking as an industry in its own right. In 1997 and onwards, we are in the 
financial services industry (Godfried van der Lugt, chairman of the Executive Board of 
ING at that time)1.  
 
Our big challenge is in what we call JENA business –sophisticated corporate banking and 
market intermediation in the interlinked economies of Japan, Europe, and North America. 
That’s where the competition has become the most fierce. That’s where everything has 
changed. That’s where the world keeps score, and that’s where success requires global 
coordination across markets (John Reed, CEO of Citicorp at that time)2.   
 
1.1 Introduction 
The banking industry is one among numerous industries that feature considerable changes 
in business conditions. Technological advances and regulatory changes have posed 
challenges to bank managers across the world trying to ensure continuous success of their 
organizations. As the above quotes indicate, top managers have developed new beliefs 
about the nature of the banking business and how to succeed in it. Aiming for the 
translation of these beliefs into organizational practice, they have engaged in adaptation 
efforts, devising new strategies and organization forms. Scholars working in the areas of 
strategy and organizational design are keeping a close watch on the increasingly ongoing 
renewal in banks and the driving forces behind these organizational processes (e.g., Van 
Wijk and Van den Bosch, 2000; Volberda et al., 2001).   
This thesis deals with organizational adaptation processes. Adaptation refers to 
“change that obtains as a result of aligning organizational capabilities with environmental 
                                                           
1 Source: The Banker, January 1997: 16-17.  
2 Source: Interview by Tichy and Charan published in Harvard Business Review, 
November-December, 1990: 135-144. 
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contingencies” (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985: 337) and thence touches the core of strategic 
management (Chakravarthy, 1982). Adaptive processes comprise both reactive and 
proactive behavior triggered by external developments. The work presented here 
specifically deals with the role of cognition in organizational adaptation processes. Defined 
as “the action or faculty of knowing taken in its widest sense” (Oxford English Dictionary, 
1971: 596), cognition mediates between environmental stimuli and organizational action, 
and is as such central to understanding adaptive behavior (Mezias, Grinyer and Guth, 
2001). Various forms of cognition have been discussed in organization literature. 
Simplified representations (perceptions) of the information environment and beliefs 
emerging from experience are among the most influential concepts of cognition in 
organizational change studies (e.g., Bettis and Prahalad, 1995; Isabella, 1990; Tripsas and 
Gavetti, 2000).  
Perceptions and beliefs of top managers are in the forefront of the study, as the 
strategic decisions and actions that adaptation involves are generally their province. The 
emergence of new perceptions and beliefs at the decision-making level has been 
considered a key element of adaptation (Mezias et al., 2001). As suggested, it sets the stage 
for changes in strategy and organization form (Bettis and Prahalad, 1995), as well as for 
changes in underlying cognitive elements at the organizational level (Bate, Khan and Pye, 
2000). At the same time, significant shifts in cognition have proven difficult to achieve 
(Mezias et al., 2001; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). How decision-makers develop new 
perceptions and beliefs, and change the form and functioning of their organizations 
accordingly are therefore critical issues for both academics and practitioners.  
From the study emerges a notion of intelligent adaptation based on the explicit 
consideration of interaction between cognition and action. As is suggested, understanding 
the way in which the deep layer of cognition and the surface layer of action are connected 
over time and across different organizational levels contributes to effective adaptation. 
Introducing the research, this chapter deals with the background of the study, its aim and 
main questions, and its research methodology and setting. It concludes with an overview of 
the structure of the study.  
  
1.2 Background of the study 
Its focus on adaptation positions the current research in one of the most fundamental 
debates in organization theory. This debate addresses to what extent and how managers 
can influence the results of their organizations. Despite a ubiquity of research, how 
organizational adaptation occurs is not at all well understood. Change dynamics are 
difficult to study, and the different labels to denote change constructs have been 
inconsistent, hampering knowledge accumulation.  
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Besides adaptation, concepts such as strategic change and strategic renewal have been 
employed to indicate efforts within firms to align strategy with changing environmental 
circumstances (e.g., Floyd and Lane, 2000; Volberda, Baden-Fuller and Van den Bosch, 
2001). Scholars have used these terms to denote gradual, long-continued change (Koberg, 
1987; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985), discontinuous change (Grinyer and McKiernan, 
1990), and both (Miller and Friesen, 1980). Also, first- (e.g., Wolfgramm et al., 1998) as 
well as second-order change (e.g., Grinyer and McKiernan, 1990) have been discussed in 
the scope of organizational alignment processes. First-order change is generally defined as 
the modification of variables within a system. Second-order change refers to a shift from 
one system to another. Shifts in firms’ strategic orientations (Greenwood and Hinings, 
1988; Miller and Friesen, 1980) and top-level managers’ cognitions (Bogner and Barr, 
2000; McKinley and Scherer, 2000) are frequently discussed examples of second-order 
change.  
In the present study, adaptation is the label for denoting organizational alignment 
processes.  The term connotes an image of organizations as open systems (Scott, 1998). 
Adaptation is not specified here in terms of the pace of change (i.e. incremental-radical). 
Existing literature lacks insight into whether and how pace of change influences the role of 
cognition. Therefore, no a priori specification is made in favor of low or high pace. This is 
different for the distinction between first- and second-order change. Specifying the scope 
of the research, second-order adaptation is key in the current study. A continuous and 
widespread interest of both scholars and practitioners in this type of change indicates its 
importance and complexity. Second-order change confronts organization members with 
the need to change the fundamental rules they use to interact with the world around them 
(Mezias et al., 2001). A focus on the rules underlying actions and results sets the stage for 
a cognitive perspective on organizational adaptation.  
Scholars probing second-order adaptation have shown considerable interest in the 
role of top-level managers’ cognition. Because top managers generally have the formal 
authority to make strategic decisions, their cognitions are assumed to be significant and 
instrumental (Bettis and Prahalad, 1995; Daft and Weick, 1984; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 
1993). Decision-makers’ cognition has been examined for its impact on strategic decisions 
(e.g., Anderson and Paine, 1975), strategic actions (e.g., Meyer, 1982; Yasai-Ardekani, 
1986), and performance outcomes (e.g., Barr, Stimpert and Huff, 1992; Thomas, Clark and 
Gioia, 1993). Moreover, cognition has been portrayed as embodied in individuals (e.g., 
CEO studies), as shared between individuals (e.g., top management team studies), and as 
lodged in organizational repositories (e.g., structures, cultures, resource allocation 
systems). Various studies have indicated that when environmental conditions change 
drastically, managers need to change their cognitions accordingly in order to determine the 
appropriate response for their firm (Barr et al., 1992; Bogner and Barr, 2000; Weick, 
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1979). The difficulty of such change appears from the examples of failures the literature is 
sprinkled with (e.g., Barr et al., 1992; Mezias et al., 2001; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).  
The growing interest in the way decision-makers’ cognition evolves in adaptation 
has advanced a process perspective. Substantiating this perspective, researchers have 
started to explore the link between decision-makers’ cognition and changes in 
organizations’ forms and functioning (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Lyles and Schwenk, 
1992; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Two key observations from this work are used as 
building blocks in the present study. First, an explanation of adaptation processes and 
outcomes benefits from the consideration of cognition beyond the decision-maker level in 
addition to decision-makers’ cognition. Schneider and Angelmar argue that “the ‘thinking 
organization’ need not be taken as a metaphor, but as a systems’ property which enables 
organizational learning and renewal at a time when routines, or ‘mindless behaviour’, need 
to be reevaluated” (1993: 365). Several studies support this argument. For example, in 
Labianca, Gray and Brass (2000)’s analysis of an organizational change project, 
employees’ cognition is a critical success factor. Heracleous and Barrett (2001) have 
shown the importance of different stakeholders’ cognitions in adaptation. Secondly, a good 
understanding of adaptation requires the consideration of cognition over time. Studies 
applying a process view on cognition in adaptation have reached interesting conclusions. 
For example, Isabella (1990) has found different stages in the evolvement of managerial 
interpretations. Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) portray adaptation as iterations of 
sensemaking and sensegiving efforts. Finally, MacIntosh and MacLean (1999) discuss 
surfacing, reframing, and enacting of organizing principles and business logic as a key part 
of organizational transformation.  
 
1.3 Research aim & question 
The present study aims to contribute to the understanding of how organizational 
adaptation takes place. It does so by examining the role of cognition in such processes. 
The overall research question pertaining to this aim and focus is: 
 
How are cognition and adaptation related? 
 
Two issues are specifically considered for answering this question. The first issue  regards 
the way in which decision-makers’ perceptions and beliefs evolve in adaptation. In the 
present research, decision-makers are treated as a single entity in terms of their cognition. 
Underlying is the assumption that individuals can and will share their cognition within a 
collectivity (Bettenhausen and Murnighan, 1985; Bougon, Weick and Binkhorst, 1977). It 
is the dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) or dominant reality (Gephart, 1984) of 
the collectivity that provides the basis for coordinated action (Barr and Huff, 1997). A 
conception of perceptions and beliefs will be developed which is then used to examine 
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how decision-makers’ cognition evolves in times of environmental change. The second 
issue is the way in which shifts in decision-makers’ perceptions and beliefs influence the 
form and functioning of organizations. Key to this issue is the assumption that managers 
are purposeful in the sense that they wish to secure their cognitions within the very 
structure and working of their organizations (Ranson, Hinings and Greenwood, 1980). 
Building on prior research, a multi-level and processual perspective is applied to address 
this issue. The multi-level perspective is reflected in the investigation of organization-level 
cognition in addition to decision-makers’ cognition. The processual approach is 
substantiated by the focus on how cognition and action interact, across decision-maker and 
organizational levels.  
Having selected second-order adaptation as the type of alignment process under 
consideration, dynamics at the deep level of cognition play an important role, in both the 
issues (cf. MacIntosh and MacLean, 1999). Considering how cognitive dynamics interact 
with action rather than zooming in on merely the deep or the surface level allows for a 
comprehensive account of second-order change. The cognition-action relation will be 
conceptualized and used to design the theoretical framework of the study (see Chapter 2). 
Dealing with the research question, the study should lead to an enhanced understanding of 
the cognitive bases for responding to environmental change. From a managerial point of 
view, the study’s objective holds the promise of an increased effectiveness of 
organizational responses to changed environmental conditions (see MacIntosh and 
MacLean, 1999).  
To address the research question, the research pivots on three bodies of literature: 
strategic choice theory, structuration theory, and cognitive theory (see Figure 1.1).  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Theoretical domain of the adaptation study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Structuration theory 
Interactive nature of 
structure-action link; 
structure enables & 
constrains actions
Cognitive theory 
Managerial cognition 
Organizational cognition
Theoretical 
domain 
Strategic choice theory
Managerial choice as 
primary link between 
organization and 
environment 
Intelligent adaptation 
 
6
Strategic choice theory “(1) views managerial and strategic choice as the primary link 
between organization and environment; (2) focuses on management’s ability to create, 
learn about, and manage the organization’s environment; and (3) encompasses the multiple 
ways that organizations respond to environmental conditions” (Miles and Snow, 1978: 
263). A strategic choice perspective acknowledges the influence of the external 
environment but focuses on adaptive responses to the environment that are proactive and 
opportunistic (Bourgeois, 1984; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). Because of this stance, 
strategic choice is consistent with a dynamic perspective on organization-environment 
relations. It indicates the possibility of continuing adaptive learning cycles in dealing with 
matters of importance to an organization (Child, 1997; Miles and Snow, 1978). Strategic 
choice theorists admit of a role for cognition, viewing the environment as information 
flows which can be observed and interpreted. Strategic choice theory also advocates the 
interactive connection between cognition and action. Action is considered on the one hand 
to be bounded by cognitive (as well as material and relational) structures existing within 
organizations and their environments, and to shape these structures on the other (Child, 
1997). In this vein, strategic choice theory supports the softened distinction between action 
and structure that is characteristic of structuration theory (Giddens, 1984; Ranson, Hinings 
and Greenwood, 1980), the second theoretical well of this research.  
Structuration theorists argue that structures may constrain action in as much as 
actors rely on prior cognitive framing while they are at the same time the very basis of 
human power and self-understanding. As Chesley and Huff put it, “actors have at all times 
the power to act otherwise and change structural properties of systems” (1998: 179), which 
emphasizes these actors’ knowledgeability. They also gain discretion by the selective 
mobilization of existing structural properties (Whittington, 1992). Structuration theory 
offers a concept of structure that fits the particular purpose of the present study. The 
concept contains a strong cognitive component and allows for the two basic positions on 
the role of cognition in adaptation to be covered. Cognition is both considered an enabler 
and a constraint of action and, thus, of action representing organizational change.  
This chapter started out with two quotes of top managers operating in the banking 
industry. Environmental developments fundamentally changed their beliefs regarding the 
business. In keeping with strategic choice theory, environmental factors are merely 
considered triggers for adaptation in the current research. As such, they influence when 
adaptive efforts occur. To understand how adaptation takes place, cognitive theory is the 
third body of knowledge being tapped. In this theory, information-processing dynamics are 
central in the explanations of organizational behavior. Organization members, managers 
and employees alike, actively create the reality they inhabit, thereby defining and creating 
their own opportunities and constraints (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Weick, 1979). In 
adaptive efforts, managers can challenge cognitive limits. However, exogenous constraints 
and path dependencies at times compromise managers’ ability to recognize and act on their 
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interests (Roberts and Greenwood, 1997). These assumptions reflect the convergent 
interaction between enabling and constraining features of cognition and are therefore 
central to the argument developed here. By subscribing the dual nature of cognition, the 
present study emphasizes the presence of both voluntaristic and deterministic elements in 
adaptation. 
 
1.4 Research methodology & setting 
To explore the pervasive influence of cognition in adaptation processes, a theoretical 
framework is developed in Chapter 2. This framework, which is grounded in the 
theoretical domain, is accompanied by a set of research propositions. The propositions are 
explored in case studies.  
The case study methodology allows for a thorough understanding of complex 
phenomena (Yin, 1984). Phenomena can be studied over time and in their contexts, an 
approach which has been strongly advocated in the domain of organizational change 
(Pettigrew, Woodman and Cameron, 2001). Two key analytical issues when conducting 
processual and multi-level analysis are (1) which processes to include; and (2) which levels 
to study. Portraying adaptations as “sequences of individual and collective events, actions, 
and activities” (Pettigrew et al., 2001: 700), three main types of processes are distinguished 
in the current research. Firstly, changes in decision-makers’ and organizational cognition 
are being investigated. Secondly, the focus is on strategic action, which is a fairly 
comprehensive term referring to actions that are complex and of major significance to the 
organization. The third type of process is change in organizational action. Organizational 
action is said to be recurrent and to possess a kind of distinctive quality that makes it 
reasonable to call it organizational (cf. Weick, 1979: 34). With regard to the levels of 
analysis, the study stretches over the decision-making and organizational level within the 
firm to include key environmental developments.  
The decision was made to reduce the number of sites to enhance comparability, 
depth and quality of data collected as recommended by Berg and Smith (1988) and 
Eisenhardt (1989a). At each site, a critical incident in the form of an adaptive effort was 
chosen (cf. Pettigrew, 1990). The key actors involved in the adaptive efforts were a 
primary source of information. To counteract retrospective sensemaking biases in the data, 
documents were used as a complementary information source. A careful selection was 
made of milestone documents representing key decisions and actions in the trajectories.  
To minimize the impact of confounding effects, the decision was made to study 
adaptation in a single industry, with firms facing similar events (cf. Barr, 1998). The 
current research focuses on the banking industry. From the introductory quotes emerged an 
image of this industry based on fast-paced changes. Several studies support this 
observation. For example, Flier et al. (2001) report that the European financial services 
landscape has become increasingly dynamic. The pace of diffusion of technological 
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innovations and regulatory changes are leading indicators in this study. Berger, Kashyap 
and Scalise (1995) reach a similar conclusion for the U.S. banking industry. Prior to the 
1980s, however, banking was a protected and highly regulated industry in most developed 
countries. Interest rates were fixed and the degree of competition was controlled. However, 
the passage of a number of acts which varied between national contexts significantly 
changed the competitive conditions in the industry. Technical and financial innovations 
have also been a central driving force behind the transformation (Flier et al., 2001). The 
banking industry has been said to represent “an important and interesting case study in 
how changes in technology and regulation influence business strategy and organizational 
architecture” (James and Houston, 1996: 23). The industry is specifically interesting from 
a cognitive perspective as its transformation from a stable environment to a more dynamic 
and uncertain business landscape has confronted managers with the need to increase their 
cognitive adaptability (cf. Bogner and Barr, 2000; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).  
The Dutch and U.S. banking industries are the focus in the investigation. These 
contexts provide ample example of adaptive efforts over the past decade. Dutch financial 
corporations have been at the forefront of rationalization and cost-cutting in continental 
Europe (White, 1998). Their managers have reduced the number of branches significantly 
(Flier et al., 2001) and centralized services. The changes that occurred in financial services 
also triggered managers in most big American banks to change their strategies and 
structures in a fundamental way (Davis and Mizruchi, 1999). The case material hinges on 
adaptive efforts that took place within banking units of two financial conglomerates in the 
mid 1990s. In these specific adaptation processes, divisional executives proclaimed their 
dedication to new strategies and initiated changes in organizational forms and functioning 
for its support.  
 
1.5 Structure of the study 
Figure 1.2 displays the way in which the book is structured.  
 
Introduction 
 
9
Figure 1.2: Structure of the study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second chapter returns to the theoretical debate in which the present research is 
grounded. The tenets of strategic choice theory and structuration theory are elaborated on 
and their connection to adaptation is explicated. It is explained why and how a cognitive 
perspective converges elements of both theories. An overview of relevant literature results 
in a cognitively anchored framework of adaptation which provides the theoretical 
foundation for the empirical research. The third chapter then deals in more detail with the 
methodology employed in the study. Research design, data collection methods, data 
analysis methods, and research criteria are discussed. Chapter 4 is the first empirical 
chapter. It provides a tour d’horizon of the financial services sector in the Netherlands and 
then zooms in on a particular bank to explore how the managers of its home banking 
division anticipated changed environmental conditions in the mid 1990s. The adaptation 
process is framed in terms of the interaction between cognition and action over time and 
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across levels. The fifth chapter applies a similar format to investigate an adaptation process 
around the same time within the corporate banking division of an American conglomerate. 
In the sixth chapter, patterns in adaptation within and across cases are explored. Three 
main themes are identified. Each theme comprises one or more patterns. The first theme 
revolves around changing cognition in times of adaptation. The second one addresses the 
interaction between structure and action. The third theme then deals with the role of middle 
managers in adaptation. The thesis concludes with key findings, managerial implications of 
the study, research limitations, and an agenda for future research in Chapter 7.  
 CHAPTER 2 
A COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE ON ADAPTATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter returns to the theoretical domain in which the present research is grounded. 
The tenets of strategic choice theory and structuration theory are elaborated on and their 
relation with adaptation is explicated. It is explained why and how a cognitive perspective 
converges elements of both theories. An overview of relevant literature results in a 
cognitively anchored framework of adaptation which provides the foundation for the 
empirical  research.  
 
2.1 The fundamental theoretical debate 
Adaptation is of fundamental interest to organizational scholars and practitioners. It 
concerns strategic initiatives aimed at alignment between organization and environment. 
Business landscapes are dynamic and expose their constituents to a multitude of factors 
over time, disturbing the delicate organizational fit with the environment. Managers might 
behave merely reactive, responding to changes in external conditions. They can also be 
more proactive in their adaptive behavior, anticipating environmental changes or even 
stimulating external dynamics favourable to their firms. The introductory chapter touched 
on a primary debate that has unfolded with regard to adaptation. Whether and how 
managers control the destiny of their companies are key questions underlying this debate. 
Up to the early 1980s deterministic views and theories of choice represented mutually 
exclusive explanations of organizational behavior. The former generally assumed that 
organizations are unable to change significantly. In this orientation, adaptation is pictured 
as a forced and severely restricted reaction to environmental developments (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). The latter affirmed the influence of 
managers by stating that firms are malleable and can realign with evolving circumstances 
(Ackoff, 1974; Child, 1972). From the early 1980s on several streams of thought emerged 
occupying middle-of-the-road positions in the debate. Scholars had started to acknowledge 
the limitations of a binary distinction between determinism and voluntarism and expressed 
their desire for a more realistic perspective on adaptation. It was argued that organizational 
adaptation needed to be discussed in terms of the interactions and tensions between 
determinism and voluntarism (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985).   
The current study joins the quest for reconciliation of determinism and 
voluntarism. However, it does not intend to reconcile every aspect of determinism and 
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voluntarism at every level of analysis. The research tries to add value by focusing on a 
micro level, which means that individual organizations are the basic unit of analysis 
(Astley and Van den Ven, 1984). Table 2.1 summarizes the stance of leading micro-level 
organization theories in the determinism-voluntarism discussion. The theories are 
presented in sequence; from relatively deterministic to largely voluntaristic. This sequence 
is arbitrary to a certain extent. Depending on the focus of the researcher the position of a 
theory might vary on the continuum.  
 
Table 2.1: Leading micro-level theories & determinism-voluntarism  
 
Theory Main arguments in determinism-
voluntarism debate 
Key references 
 
Contingency 
theory 
 
Firms respond to the pressure of contingent 
factors by modifying or elaborating their 
structures to retain alignment 
 
Burns & Stalker 
(1961); Lawrence 
& Lorsch (1967); 
Woodward (1965) 
 
Behavioral 
theory of the 
firm 
 
Complex decisions are largely an outcome of 
behavioral factors rather than a mechanical 
quest for economic optimization. Firms have 
some degree of control over their environment 
and they adapt through learning. However, 
bounded rationality put constraints on search 
and evaluation. 
 
Cyert & March 
(1963); March & 
Simon (1958) 
 
Micro-
institutional 
theory 
 
The prevailing nature of change is one of 
constant reproduction and affirmation of 
existing modes of thought and organization. 
Actions reflect broad institutional scripts rather 
than autonomous choice and purposefulness   
 
Hinings & 
Greenwood 
(1996); Oliver 
(1991) 
 
Micro-
evolutionary 
theory 
 
Managerial actions are bounded by external 
constraints as well as by factors arising over 
organizational history such as initial conditions 
and organizational routines. Routines are 
carriers of knowledge and expertise 
 
Nelson & Winter 
(1982); Barnett & 
Burgelman (1996) 
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Theory Main arguments in determinism-
voluntarism debate 
Key references 
 
Resource-based 
theory 
 
Managers can build sustainable competitive 
advantages by implementing value-creating 
strategies wrapped around firms’ valuable, rare, 
and inimitable resources. Causal ambiguity and 
path dependency condition the sustainability of 
competitive advantages   
 
Penrose (1959); 
Wernerfelt (1984) 
 
Learning theory 
 
 
Organizations adjust on basis of external 
stimuli. The fundamental learning loop is one 
in which outcomes of organizational action 
either match or mismatch expectations, thence 
confirming or disconfirming the 
appropriateness of the action.  
 
Argyris & Schön 
(1978); Levinthal 
& March; (1993); 
Levitt & March 
(1988); March & 
Olsen (1976) 
 
Coevolutionary 
view 
 
 
Organizational adaptations evolve with changes 
in the environment. Each changes as the other 
changes. Coevolutionary effects occur at 
multiple levels within firms as well as between 
firms and their environments.    
 
Lewin & 
Volberda (1999); 
McKelvey (1997) 
 
Dynamic 
capabilities 
perspective 
 
The ability to build, maintain and renew core 
competencies lies at the heart of sustained 
competitive advantage of firms. This ability 
resides in organizational and strategic routines, 
e.g. product development routines, strategic 
decision-making, alliancing 
 
Eisenhardt & 
Martin (2000); 
Teece, Pisano & 
Shuen (1997) 
 
Strategic choice 
theory 
 
The analysis of the organization-environment 
relationship must recognize the exercise of 
choice by organizational decision-makers. The 
effectiveness of adaptation hinges on the 
dominant coalition’s perceptions of the 
environment and its decisions about how to 
cope with changing conditions.  
 
 
 
Child (1972) 
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Theory Main arguments in determinism-
voluntarism debate 
Key references 
 
Contemporary contribution: Managers are 
capable of generating independent responses to 
the environment. In adaptation processes, 
structures allow for purposeful managerial 
behavior and, in turn, managerial actions 
sustain and modify structures 
 
Child (1997); 
Whittington 
(1988) 
 
Action theory 
 
The environment can be manipulated and 
changed by decision-makers. Organizations are 
continuously constructed, sustained, and 
changed by organization members’ definitions 
 
Berger & 
Luckmann 
(1967); Silverman 
(1970); Weick 
(1979) 
 
Contingency theory, the behavioral theory of the firm, and micro-level institutional theory 
are theories characterized by a deterministic orientation. These theories picture 
organizational behavior as being shaped by a series of constraints on actors. Contingency 
theory hinges on external constraints (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), while behavioral 
theorists zoom in on constraints residing in actors themselves (March and Simon, 1958). In 
both schools the manager’s role is predominantly a reactive one, in the sense that managers 
respond to changing environments by rearranging structures to ensure firms’ continuity. 
Micro-level institutional theory emphasizes the constraining effect of industry-level 
‘templates for organizing’ on organizational behavior (Selznick, 1957; Zucker, 1987). To 
survive, firms must accommodate institutional expectations. The constraining effects are 
twofold. Preconscious effects refer to the ‘taken-for-granted’ character of industry 
templates and are as such lodged in the human mind. Postconscious effects relate to 
institutional rules as external objective constraints (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996).  
From the characterizations of the deterministically oriented theories emerge two 
basic types of constraints: exogenous and endogenous constraints. Environmental 
determinists such as contingency theorists rely largely on the former to elucidate 
adaptation dynamics. In their opinion, objective external factors determine the range of 
feasible adaptive actions available to decision-makers and attainable outcomes of these 
actions. The second type, endogenous constraints, appears predominantly in the behavioral 
theory of the firm. Action determinism, as these constraints have been labeled (Elster, 
1984), refers to the action selection mechanisms lodged in actors themselves. Decision-
makers choose adaptive actions on basis of the cognitions these actors hold (March and 
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Simon, 1958). Beliefs and values have often been considered to influence managers’ 
perceptions of organization and environment, and subsequently their decisions and actions 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984).   
On the determinism-voluntarism continuum, strategic choice theory and action 
theory are key representatives of the voluntaristic perspective. Both streams consider 
actors to have discretion in defining the situation they are in and, thereby, in choosing 
courses of action. Managers’ actions are viewed as energizing forces shaping the 
organizational world (Child, 1972; Weick, 1979). Strategic choice theory has traditionally 
focused on the influence of (top) managers as the key decision-makers in adaptation 
processes. Environments have been portrayed as stimuli which decision-makers interpret 
and act on. The interpretive perspective is even stronger emphasized in action theory. 
Action theorists claim that actors construct their own reality to which they then respond. 
Rather than to external environments, actors adapt to enacted environments (Weick, 1979).    
 Bringing more subtlety to the debate, several theories support a less stark 
distinction between constraints and choice. They combine deterministic and voluntaristic 
dimensions of adaptation in varying compilations. Still quite inclined to the deterministic 
side are evolutionary theory (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and the resource-based theory of 
the firm (Barney, 1991; Teece et al., 1993). Both theories assign priority to the study of 
organizations as repositories of intangible and tangible resources. Restricting exploration 
efforts to those in line with existing organizational practices, resources are also believed to 
endow firms with potential competitive advantages. Evolutionary theory has demonstrated 
its synthesizing capability by incorporating elements from, for example, learning 
perspectives (Doz, 1996), organizational ecology (Barnett and Hansen, 1996), and 
transaction cost economics (Singh and Mitchell, 1996). Emerging as a substream of 
evolutionary theory, coevolutionary research hinges on interdependencies between 
managerial action and environmental forces. Coevolution has been defined as “the joint 
outcome of managerial intentionality, environment, and institutional effects” (Lewin and 
Volberda, 1999). Coevolutionary studies have framed adaptation as firm-specific 
trajectories of strategic change shaped by and shaping environmental dynamics (Lewin, 
Long and Carroll, 1999). While coevolutionary theorists have often adopted a macro 
stance, in the sense that they focus on the mutual relation between organization and 
environment, some work has appeared which addresses coevolutionary effects within firms 
(e.g., Dijksterhuis, Van den Bosch and Volberda, 1999). McKelvey (1997) introduced the 
term microcoevolution to refer to such effects. Resource-based theorizing has also been 
given a stronger voluntaristic flavour by the introduction of dynamic capabilities. These 
capabilities represent a firm’s ability to build, maintain and renew its core competence 
(Teece et al., 1997). Learning theory is another theory that has informed middle-of-the-
road accounts of adaptation (Argyris and Schön, 1978; Levitt and March, 1988). Learning 
sets the stage for change to improve future results. Different types of learning have been 
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identified, reflecting different degrees of change in response to environmental stimuli. 
Effective learning has been associated with a balance between exploitation of past 
learnings and exploration of future ones (March, 1991). 
 Aiming for an integrative perspective on adaptation, the present study holds a 
middle-of-the-road position. Specifically, it builds on a line of research which has emerged 
under the banner of strategic choice theory. According to advocates of this substream, 
many strategic choice studies (1) disregard the enabling effects of managerial and 
organizational cognition on action and (2) neglect factors beyond actors’ experience or 
understanding (Child, 1997; Whittington, 1988). The resulting view on adaptation has been 
said to be neither voluntaristic nor complete. The more comprehensive account that has 
been proposed is reviewed in the next section. Its fit with a structurational notion of 
structure is described and then presented as the foundation for a cognition-based 
exploration of adaptation.   
 
2.2 The theoretical domain of the study 
In the previous section, it was explored where this thesis would try to add value in the 
determinism-voluntarism debate. In this section, the theoretical foundation of the study is 
elaborated by a discussion of the how-question: How does this thesis aim to contribute to 
an micro-level, integrative perspective on adaptation? In this vein, three theoretical 
underpinnings will be discussed separately and in coherence with each other. 
 
Strategic choice theory 
The original notion of strategic choice advanced by John Child in 1972 was supposed to 
redress an imbalance in organization theory caused by the emphasis on contingencies as 
determinants of organizational elements. It was successful in the sense that it sparked 
discussions about the role of managers and about the link between managers and the 
environment among organization scholars. The general idea of decision-makers pursuing 
specific courses of action as a key explanation for organizational outcomes has gained vast 
ground. More so than Child’s interpretation of strategic choice as mainly a political 
process. The basic contribution of strategic choice theory lies in its focus on managers as 
actors formulating responses to environmental change purposefully and opportunistically. 
This focus entails an emphasis on what is unique to firms rather than what can be 
generalized.     
The reconsideration of strategic choice theory has yielded some promising 
premises in the light of the present research. First, contemporary contributions have 
portrayed choice and constraints as two sides of the same coin (Child, 1997). According to 
strategic choice theorists, both need to be included in the analysis for a deep understanding 
of adaptive processes. This premise reflects in an extended notion of exogenous and 
endogenous contextual factors which, rather than mere constraints or enablers, are 
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considered to comprehend both effects on organizational action. Furthermore, a notion of 
managers as actors capable of pursuing unique and independent objectives has been 
advanced in contemporary accounts of strategic choice (Whittington, 1988). This as a 
corrective to the notion of managers as being programmed to respond to environmental 
stimuli in preordained ways, which has prevailed in strategic choice analysis. Secondly, 
besides the effects of exogenous and endogenous factors on action, action in turn has been 
said to mould these structures (Child, 1997). In other words, structure and action are 
mutually related to each other. This premise is in line with the dual notion of structure 
which is key to structuration theory.  
 
Structuration theory 
Originally developed by sociologist Anthony Giddens (1976; 1979), the main goal of 
structuration theory is to connect action with structure. The key idea is that knowledgeable 
actors (e.g. managers) draw on structures for their actions while these very actions produce 
the structures that underlie subsequent actions. In the seminal work on structuration by 
Giddens, structure is not synonymous with constraint. It is the notion of structure as both 
an enabler and a constraint in action that gives way to integration of determinism and 
voluntarism in structuration theory. Structures constrain action in as much as actors rely 
‘mindlessly’ on previously developed structural properties and, at the same time, enable 
purposeful action in as much as actors mobilize structural principles in a knowledgeable 
way. Purposeful action also derives from the power of actors to deviate from and revise 
structures. The dual nature of structure which traditionally refers specifically to its 
interactive relation with action can be stretched to include the two-sided effect of structure 
on action. To explain how the structurational interpretation of structure is used in the 
current research, it should first be made clear of what such a structure consists. The 
definition of structure originally proposed by Giddens is the following: 
 
Structure Rules and resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social 
systems. Structure exists only as memory traces, the organic basis of human 
knowledgeability, and as instantiated in action (Giddens, 1984: 377).  
   
In Giddens’s work, what is implied by the terms ‘rules’ and ‘resources’ remains rather 
obscure. In this vein, Sewell (1992)’s clarification is gratefully acknowledged and serves 
as a basis for the explanation of structure applied here. According to Sewell, rules in 
structurational theory refer to “informal and not always conscious schemas, metaphors, or 
assumptions” (1992: 8). In his opinion, the term ‘rule’ is confusing as it connotes formally 
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stated prescriptions. Sewell therefore replaces it by the label ‘schemas’4. Schemas are the 
memory traces in Giddens’s definition of structure. The second component of structure –
resources- are “anything that can serve as a source of power in social interactions” 
(Sewell, 1992: 9). They are of two types. Human resources include physical strength, 
knowledge, and emotional commitment. Nonhuman resources are objects, both animate 
and inanimate, naturally occurring or manufactured, that might be used to gain or maintain 
power. Resources provide means for converting schemas into action. For example, for a 
manager’s belief in a strategy to get instantiated in action, authority is likely needed as 
well as knowledge of how a formal strategy statement can be translated into day-by-day 
organizational practice. Just as schemas and resources are involved in an interactive 
relation over time, the structures they make up are both the means and outcomes of social 
systems which are defined as “empirically observable, intertwining, and relatively bounded 
social practices that link persons across time and space” (Sewell, 1992: 6).        
To what extent can this structurational concept of structure deepen insight into 
how organizational adaptation takes place? As was already noted, it sets the stage for a 
comprehensive perspective. Framing structure in terms of both enabling and constraining 
elements supersedes the sharp distinction between constraints (determinism) and choice 
(voluntarism). The dual character assigned to the relation between structure and action is 
the second contribution of structurational theory to a reconciliation. For explaining how 
social systems evolve, structurational theorists place great weight on the notion that actors 
are knowledgeable, i.e., they know what they are doing and how to do it. And, “if enough 
people or even a few people who are powerful enough to act in innovative ways, their 
action may have the consequence of transforming the very structures that gave them the 
capacity to act” (Sewell, 1992: 4). In elaborating on how actions may lead to new 
structures, however, Sewell’s most important argument refers to indirect change in 
schemas; he argues that the extension of existing schemas to new contexts may result in a 
modification of these schemas (1992: 18). All other arguments in favour of agency (i.e. the 
ability of actors to formulate unique and independent objectives and pursuing them both 
purposefully and effectively –Whittington, 1988: 522) involve making use of the variety in 
structures rather than deliberately changing those structures.  
Two other critiques are addressed here as well. First, the emphasis on 
knowledgeability has concealed the influence of endogenous constraints. Bounded 
rationality, multiple and conflicting goals, and varying aspiration levels limit the 
knowledgeability of actors (March and Simon, 1958). As is argued in this thesis, a 
comprehensive account of adaptation should explicate the effect of endogenous 
constraints. The second critique concerns the scant consideration of exogenous constraints. 
                                                           
4 A widely used definition of schema derives from cognitive theory: “[A schema is] a 
cognitive structure that represents organized knowledge about a given concept or type of 
stimulus” (Fiske and Taylor, 1984: 140) 
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Insisting on actors’ ability to choose actions deliberately, structurational theorists tend to 
dismiss the impact of environmental and organizational factors limiting the range of 
feasible strategic actions. Although exogenous factors are expected to affect organizational 
outcomes and, thence, the results of adaptive efforts, they have only been assigned a 
supporting role in the present exploration of adaptation processes. Endogenous constraints 
do get incorporated more explicitly as they underlie the very existence of schemas (i.e. 
cognitive structures) (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  
Logically inclined to powerholders as unit of analysis, structuration theory is very 
appropriate for the study of decision-makers’ structures. By definition, decision-makers 
have the means to formulate new rules (i.e. formally stated prescriptions), to name a 
preeminent strategic action5. However, for a change in the actual functioning of an 
organization, new rules need to be practised organization-wide. In terms of structuration 
theory, the new rules are organization-level resources which may or may not be used to put 
the schemas they embody into action. To go beyond an understanding of how new rules 
are proclaimed in organizations to get a grasp of real change in organizational behavior, 
cognitive structures at the organizational level are included in the analysis (cf. Gioia and 
Chittipeddi, 1991). Figure 2.1 shows the conceptualization of adaptation built on 
structurational tenets, as an important step toward a theoretical framework of adaptation. 
 
Figure 2.1: Adaptation conceptualized from a structurational perspective  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
5 The term ‘strategic’ is used to signify matters of importance to an organization (unit) as a 
whole, particularly those bearing on the ability to be successful in its environment (cf. 
Child, 1997). 
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Scholars applying a structurational perspective to organizational matters have 
been criticized for their tendency to reduce structures to the internal characteristics of 
organizations (Whittington, 1992). Strategic choice theory adds value in this respect. In 
keeping with this theory, the current study underlines the pervasiveness of organization 
and environment. Two factors will be considered in this respect. Organization members’ 
perceptions of the environment that are consequential for action amalgamate organization 
and environment. This is also done by the relationships of organization members across a 
firm’s boundaries (Child, 1997) but in a different way. Being involved in (1) cross-
boundary relations deriving from membership of the particular organization; and (2) other 
social systems (e.g. unions, voluntary organizations, family), organization members are 
exposed to external structures. The intersection of structures is included in the study to the 
extent in which it feeds back into dominant cognitive structures at the decision-making and 
organizational level. In other words, the focus is on structures within firms which are 
acknowledged to be the result of processes permeating organizational boundaries.  
 
Cognitive theory 
The discussion shows a good fit between the theories of strategic choice and structuration 
in issues that are relevant to a characterization of organizational adaptation. At the same 
time, however, joining these theories together still leaves some gaps. A few critical ones 
are dealt with by bringing a third theory to the stage: cognitive theory. As is clear from the 
discussion, cognition is an integral part of both strategic choice and structuration analyses. 
To fulfill the promise of a comprehensive account of adaptation inherent in these theories, 
it is suggested here that their cognitive focus needs to be extended in three key areas. The 
first extension has already been discussed for structuration theory. The lopsided view on 
cognition of decision-makers in adaptation research should be supplemented with a 
consideration of organizational cognition, i.e. the cognition of organization members 
throughout the organization. Besides for a deliberation on organizational cognition, the two 
theories also provide little hold for an understanding of change in cognition. In cognitive 
studies, successful adaptation has often been associated with cognitive change rather than 
stability (Barr et al., 1992; Labianca et al., 2000; Walsh, 1995). This body of knowledge 
will be tapped to build a dynamic conception of cognition. The third extension regards a 
more explicit consideration of endogenous factors limiting the knowledgeability of actors. 
As noted, a major criticism of strategic choice theory has been its negiglent attitude toward 
action determinism (Whittington, 1988). Structuration theory has the potential to provide a 
balanced approach to choice and constraints. Also indicated above, more attention should 
be given to endogenous constraints to get to this approach. Cognitive theory hinges on the 
constraining effects of cognitive structures and is thus considered a missing link.  
The idea that managers can act knowledgeably to achieve their goals sets on the 
essential foundations for strategic management (Ansoff, 1965; Schendel and Hofer, 1979) 
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and provides a theoretical linkage to cognitive science (Stubbart and Ramaprasad, 1990). 
Research on the role of cognition in organizations has burgeoned in recent years 
(Schneider and Angelmar, 1993; Walsh, 1995). In the first chapter it was explained that in 
the present study a distinctive role is assigned to the cognitions of decision-makers and of 
‘the organization’ as a whole. To understand the pervasive influence of the cognitive 
structures at both levels on second-order adaptation processes, the research taps from two 
strands of literature: managerial and organizational cognition. A brief review of these 
literatures will clarify how they contribute to the cognitive perspective developed in this 
thesis and, also, how this thesis will contribute to the existing literatures.  
 
Managerial cognition  
The managerial cognition perspective which has emerged in the strategic management 
domain focuses on managers as ‘information workers’ (McCall and Kaplan, 1985: 14). 
That is, “they spend their time absorbing, processing, and disseminating information about 
issues, opportunities, and problems” (Walsh, 1995: 280). Because the human information 
processing apparatus is bounded (Simon, 1958), managers are said to develop cognitive 
structures. These structures serve sensemaking; they create order in the cacophony of 
information inputs. The resulting observations and interpretations are enactments of 
cognitive structures (or schemas, in structurational terms). These observations and 
interpretations may, in turn, get enacted through behavior (Weick, 1979). A significant 
volume of work has developed around the role of managerial cognition in organizational 
adaptation (see Appendix A for an overview of leading studies). As Isabella argues: “[T]he 
views of managers as a collective are especially salient because managers appear to be at 
the heart of the cognitive shifts that occur during organizational change” (1990: 9). When 
considering managerial cognition studies, the lopsided focus on decision-makers’ 
cognition reveals itself quickly. Many studies are addressing the mediating role of top-
level managers in the relation between organization and environment (Barr et al., 1992; 
Bettis and Prahalad, 1995; Fahey and Narayanan, 1989; Ford and Baucus, 1987; Lant, 
Milliken and Batra, 1992; MacIntosh and MacLean, 1999; Meyer, 1982; Siggelkow, 2001; 
Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).  
The present study builds on a number of insights from managerial cognition work 
to get an understanding of cognitive dynamics at the decision-maker level, i.e. at the level 
of the individual(s) who have the authority to initiate strategic actions. The first insight 
concerns the influence of decision-makers’ observations and interpretations, also called 
perceptions (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988). Decision-makers’ perceptions as explanation 
for organizational outcomes has gained substantial support over the years. Perceptions of 
general environmental characteristics such as uncertainty (e.g., Anderson and Paine, 1975) 
and of specific environmental issues or events (e.g., Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Thomas 
and McDaniel, 1990) are the types of perception most often investigated. Several studies 
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bear witness to a relation between executives’ perceptions of environmental issues and the 
likelihood of strategic action (Barr and Huff, 1997; Lant et al., 1992; Thomas et al., 1993). 
Also, the type of action has been related to the way in which decision-makers perceive 
organization and environment (Bartunek, 1984; Dutton and Jackson, 1987).  
A second insight deals with cognitive structures which were said to invigorate 
information processing. Different dimensions of decision-makers’ cognitive structures 
(schemas) have been explored in organizational adaptation research. For example, 
cognitive categorizations have shown to affect observation and interpretation and thereby 
decision-makers’ actions (Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Thomas et al., 1993). Scholars have 
also probed into the impact of cause-effect beliefs on information processing and 
adaptation. Cause-effect beliefs generally relate to “the efficacy of various business tactics 
in achieving organizational effectiveness” (Chattopadhyay et al., 1999: 765). In this 
research domain, a primary set of studies have emerged around how decision-makers’ 
conceptualization of the business(es) they operate in (cause) relates to their 
conceptualization of what the organization should look like (effect). In the strategic 
management field, Bettis and Prahalad have done seminal work on this theme. Exhibit 2.1 
summarizes their concept of dominant logic which is defined as “the way in which 
managers conceptualize the business and make critical resource allocations decisions” 
(1986: 490).  
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Exhibit 2.1: The dominant logic concept of Bettis and Prahalad  
 
  
The dominant logic 
Bettis and Prahalad (1995) argue that dominant logic is a fundamental aspect of
organizations’ intelligence to appropriately interpret and act on the huge amounts of
information available to them. This logic held by the dominant coalition of a firm acts as
an information filter that shapes observations and interpretations. As it is determined by
previous experiences, the dominant logic is considered to put constraints on the ability
of organizations to learn new things. The adaptive ability it entails lasts so long as the
conceptualization of the environment is appropriate. However, if this is no longer the
case, the dominant logic should be changed. Bettis and Prahalad subscribe the problems
many firms have when it comes to change to dominant logic. The conceptualization of
the business(es) and how this influences resource allocations decisions go largely
unrecognized by decision-makers. This is why often substantial crises are needed for
decision-makers to start unlearning an existing logic and developing a new one. Figure
2.2 visualizes Bettis and Prahalad’s notion of strategic change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The development of a new dominant logic 
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The concept of dominant logic is strongly related to the present research. This thesis adopts 
its key premise that decision-makers’ beliefs concerning the nature of the business and 
how to succeed in it influence perceptions and subsequently strategic actions. Such beliefs 
will be referred to here as ‘business beliefs’, as they represent the core assumptions 
regarding the business in which an organization (unit) operates. Business beliefs are the 
focus of attention in the current research rather than dominant logic to allow for a clear 
distinction between thinking and acting. Resource allocation decisions, which are part of 
Prahalad and Bettis (1986)’s notion of dominant logic, are considered in the present study 
only to the extent that they are manifested in strategic actions. This entails a clear 
distinction between thinking and acting, thereby decreasing the chance of confounding 
effects. This study deviates from the work of Prahalad and Bettis (1986; 1995) in yet 
another way. In the discussions of dominant logic, how beliefs translate into organizational 
outcomes remains a black box. Recognizing the need for knowledge building (cf. Lyles 
and Schwenk, 1992; Meindl, Stubbart and Porac, 1994), the focus has been set on this 
relation.  
There is yet to emerge clarity about the distinctive roles of decision-makers’ 
perceptions and business beliefs in adaptation processes. As is suggested here, the 
inconsistent use of these terms has been an important barrier to knowledge accumulation. 
To give an example, the term ‘beliefs’ in some studies is used in reference to 
representations of specific information environments (Barr, 1998) while in others they are 
considered to be an intimate aspect of generic cognitive structures (Prahalad and Bettis, 
1986). The failure to distinguish clearly between cognition essentially bound up in 
time/place (perceptions) and cognition crossing time/place (business beliefs) is considered 
a missed opportunity for a more thorough understanding of cognition in organizational 
processes. The structurational notion of structure, which has proven valuable before (see 
section 2.2) can be used to explicate the difference between both cognitive constructs. 
Business beliefs are closely linked to the concept of schema. Actors are often not 
conscious of the beliefs they hold regarding their business. Beliefs are part of the deep 
cognitive structures which enable and constrain decision-makers’ decisions and actions. 
The time- and place-specific perceptions are, by definition, excluded from the 
structurational concept of structure which is characterized by generalizability.  
As is suggested here, perceptions are a critical lever in the relation between 
structure and action. For as much as decision-makers rely on existing business beliefs, their 
perceptions will trigger actions that are consistent with these beliefs. In this case, business 
beliefs are both the medium and outcome of perceptions and, subsequently, actions. If 
decision-makers apply a more ‘open mind’, and put aside their learnings from the past, 
perceptions become potential levers for change, both in actions and structures. The two 
roles of perception are in line with discussions about belief-driven versus action-led 
adaptation (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Walsh, 1995). Theoretically speaking, the former 
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approach to adaptation “may be a dominant response in all but the most novel situations” 
(Walsh, 1995: 281). However, in practice, all too often decision-makers also rely on 
existing beliefs in unfamiliar settings (Mezias et al., 2001). The consequential failure to 
adapt has received much attention in organization literature (Barr et al., 1992; Huff, Huff 
and Thomas, 1992; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). Adhering to an action-led approach to 
adaptation, some scholars have postulated that new strategies and structures emerge 
essentially from action (Bowman, 1999). Their studies revolve around trial-and-error 
change processes and retrospective sensemaking. Rather than choosing between sides, the 
current research incorporates both approaches, i.e. both roles of perceptions. This allows 
for the revelation of effects of cognitive stability and cognitive change on adaptation. With 
respect to the distinction between perceptions and beliefs and the dual role of cognition in 
adaptation, Weick (1979)’s model of organizing deserves mentioning. Exhibit 2.2 contains 
a description of the key features of this model.  
 
Exhibit 2.2: The Enactment-Selection-Retention model of Weick   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Enactment-Selection-Retention model  
Weick (1979) argues that organizing, which he defines as assembling “ongoing
interdependent actions into sensible sequences that generate sensible outcomes” (1979:
3), comprises four elements. Ecological change –change in the flows of experience that
engage people- provides the raw material for sensemaking. The second component,
enactment, represents the direct engagement of an actor with its external environment.
Information processing constraints lead actors to notice only a certain number of
changes. Enactment also refers to the influence actors have on their external
environment which then feeds back to them as changed flows of experience. Thirdly,
selection involves the imposition of cognitive structures on observations in order to
make sense of them. In the Enactment-Selection-Retention model (Figure 2.3), it is the
selection of cognitive structures and specific interpretation rather than the selection of
individuals or behaviors that is key. Finally, retention concerns the storage of successful
sensemaking. According to Weick, selection is crucial in organizing processes as it is
the means for balancing between old and new beliefs and between perceptions driven by
existing beliefs or by the information environment.  
 
Figure 2.3: Enactment-Selection-Retention model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Weick (1979: 132) 
Ecological change Enactment              Selection                     Retention
+ + +
+/ -
+/ - 
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Weick’s distinction between schemes of representation and specific representations reflects 
the difference between beliefs and perceptions. He considers selection to be a critical 
activity as it “is the means for attempting to accommodate the antithetical pressures 
generated by that which produces adaptation and that which produces adaptability” (1979: 
136). In other words, selection is the act of balancing existing and new beliefs, and of 
balancing perceptions deriving from both. The current research adopts this stance but adds 
an element as well. The balancing act is considered to also apply to enactment. Thus, 
observation is subject to beliefs just as interpretation is. Their beliefs might cause 
managers to ignore counterintuitive developments or events. Rather than in enactment, 
adaptability is therefore suggested to reside in the ability of actors to leverage ecological 
change through observation ánd interpretation. An open mind, which implies a high 
sensitivity for a broad range of ecological changes, is key to such leverage and, therefore, 
to adaptability. In line with Weick (1979), adaptation is considered to be a time- and place-
specific response to ecological change which exposes actors to the risk of rigidity when the 
underlying beliefs become engraved in people’s minds. Such retention developments lower 
sensitivity for environmental dynamics, which is likely to result in disalignment and 
performance downturn.  
 Table 2.2 sums up the key differences between perceptions and beliefs brought 
forward in the present study and grounded in previous research.  
 
Table 2.2: Key features of perceptions and business beliefs 
Perceptions Business beliefs 
 
Directly reflects experience; based on 
current information environments; bound 
up in time/place 
 
Determined by experience, building up over 
time; based on past information 
environments; crossing time/place 
 
Exist at a more superficial level –being 
more easily discussed among actors  
 
Exist at a deep level–being often implicit 
and taken-for-granted 
 
Trigger or hamper adaptation; spurring 
cognitive change or cognitive stability 
 
 
Enable and constrain perceptions & actions 
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Organizational cognition  
In contrast to managerial cognition, the topic of organizational cognition is still in its 
infancy (see Appendix B for an overview of leading studies). Only quite recently, 
discussions have cropped up about “what is organizational about cognition and what is 
cognitive about organizations” (Schneider and Angelmar, 1993: 348). These discussions 
are driven by the desire to advance inquiry into the role of cognition in organizations. A 
key argument brought forward by several theorists is that organizational cognition should 
be perceived as more than the aggregation of individual cognitions (Schneider and 
Angelmar, 1993; Walsh, 1995). In this vein, the effects of social processes on cognition 
have started to attract attention. In Labianca et al. (2000)’s study, continual confirmation of 
proposed new schemas through enacted behavior by management and employees was 
essential to a change in organizational cognition. Bate et al. (2000) focus on the role of 
leadership as a social process in intentional change of design and underlying meanings. 
According to these authors, “leadership is a quality that is spread across the organization 
rather than simply being concentrated at the top” (2000: 199). Adaptation involves lead 
roles across the organization, “active leadership at every level” (Bate et al., 2000: 199). In 
line with this conception, and in response to a call for the study of cross-level cognitive 
dynamics (Schneider and Angelmar, 1993), this thesis includes cognition at decision-
maker as well as organizational level in the analysis of adaptation. For organizational 
cognition, the focus is on business beliefs that possess the distinctive quality that makes it 
reasonable to consider them the basis for concerted organizational action. At the decision-
maker level, business beliefs are considered in conjunction with perceptions as their 
interrelation is expected to be critical for change in beliefs. In second-order adaptive 
efforts, the perceptions of decision-makers have been said to be primary triggers for 
change (Barr et al., 1992; Dijksterhuis et al., 1999; Hambrick and Mason, 1987). Their 
business beliefs are likely to color these perceptions but might as well be changed through 
perceptions. A common belief structure from which organization members beyond 
decision-making level can draw lies at the heart of the basic function of business beliefs: to 
maintain a system of cooperative effort (Bartunek, 1984). Leadership reflects in successful 
attempts to frame and define the reality of others (Smircich and Morgan, 1982). For top 
managers initiating adaptation this would mean trying to re-frame the reality of lower-level 
organization members. The outcomes of adaptation in terms of recurrent actions at the 
organizational level are assumed to depend heavily on these members’ commitment to 
decision-makers’ business beliefs.  
Table 2.3 summarizes the convergent arguments and divergent foci of strategic 
choice theory, structuration theory, and cognitive theory.  
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Table 2.3: The theoretical domain of the study 
 
Issue Convergent 
assumptions 
Divergent foci 
  Strategic choice 
theory 
Child (1972, 
1997); Hambrick 
& Mason (1984); 
Whittington 
(1988) 
Structuration 
theory 
Ranson et al. 
(1980) 
Giddens (1976, 
1979); Sewell 
(1992) 
Cognitive 
theory 
Barr et al. 
(1992); 
Bartunek 
(1984); Daft 
& Weick 
(1984); Walsh 
(1995) 
 
Nature of 
environment 
 
Environments 
are the contexts 
for 
organizational 
action; it both 
constrains and 
enables action   
 
Set of pressures 
on firms, both 
objectively and 
subjectively 
present 
 
Essentially, a 
set of structural 
properties to be 
mobilized. A 
more passive 
environment 
(i.e. set of 
pressures) is 
portrayed in 
some 
organizational 
accounts   
 
Set of 
information 
flows –either 
subjective or 
enacted 
 
Nature of 
organizational 
actors 
 
Actors are 
purposeful and –
if having the 
means at their 
disposal- capable 
of taking action 
 
Actors have 
leeway in 
shaping their 
own fates; focus 
on individuals & 
groups within 
firms; 
managerial 
cognition as key 
constraint on 
strategic choice 
 
Actors are 
knowledgeable 
and ‘enabled’ 
 
Actors are 
intentional in 
their behavior; 
they are 
‘knowledge 
workers’: they 
generally 
observe and 
interpret 
before they act 
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Issue Convergent 
assumptions 
Divergent foci 
 
Nature of 
relation 
between 
environment 
and 
organizational 
actors 
 
Relation is 
essentially an 
interactive one 
 
Strategic choice 
as primary link 
 
Structure-
action duality 
as primary 
focus 
 
The way in 
which issues 
are  
perceived is 
critical for 
the type of 
response; 
both 
managers & 
employees 
are involved 
 
Nature of 
adaptation 
 
Renewal process 
by which 
powerholders 
respond to 
environmental 
developments 
 
Focus on actions 
members take to 
adapt to an 
environment as 
explanation for 
outcomes 
 
Giving equal 
attention to the 
embedded 
structures 
drawn upon in 
action and 
action itself is 
essential 
 
A need for 
adaptation 
reflects in a 
misfit 
between the 
information 
environment 
and actors’ 
cognitive 
structures 
 
Drawing from the theoretical domain, a study is proposed of adaptation as interactions 
between cognition and action over time (processual) and across levels (multi-level) in 
changing environments. In line with the macrocoevolutionary viewpoint, influences of 
organizations on their environments (i.e. organizational changes are a source of 
environmental dynamics) are acknowledged. However, this thesis focuses mainly on how 
adaptation processes emerge and evolve within organizations, and is as such associated 
with a microcoevolutionary perspective. Cognition has shown to be a common thread in 
strategic choice and structuration theory. The former conceives of action “being informed 
by the prior cognitive ‘framing’ of actors and of organizations in the form of embedded 
routines and cultures (Bartunek, 1988)” (Child, 1997: 60). The latter relies in its 
argumentation on the ability of actors to draw on their cognitive structures purposefully 
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and effectively. Cognitive theory has appeared promising for extending and refining 
strategic choice and structuration’s joint contribution to adaptation research.  
 
2.3 An integrative framework of adaptation 
Now that has been explored what it could mean to combine the managerial discretion 
stance of strategic choice theory, the structure-action duality of structuration theory, and 
managerial and organizational cognition principles in the study of adaptation, the insights 
are translated into an integrative framework (see Figure 2.4). The framework fuses these 
building blocks to create a processual and multi-level cognition-based perspective on 
adaptation.    
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Environmental characteristics  
This variable covers a broad range of events and developments in the business 
environment of the organization (unit) going through the adaptation process. Events are 
discrete happenings; their beginning and ending can be indicated relatively easy. 
Developments refer to longer lasting, gradual changes in a particular factor or set of 
factors. Environmental characteristics have been included in many organizational 
adaptation studies as triggers for change in strategy and structure. Scholars have pointed 
out the link between environmental characteristics and perceived environmental 
characteristics as an issue of interest when trying to understand how and why managers 
make certain strategic decisions (e.g., Yasai-Ardekani, 1986). In this vein, a first research 
proposition to be explored within the current study is the following: 
 
P1 Environmental change triggers a change in perceived environmental characteristics at 
the decision-maker level 
 
Perceived environmental characteristics 
To ensure a continuous alignment between their organization and the environment, 
decision-makers need to keep track of the things that are going on and make sense of them. 
Perceptions were defined as observations and interpretations. Building on previous 
research, decision-makers’ perceptions are conceived of as triggers for change in both 
business beliefs. For decision-makers to break with their fundamental beliefs about the 
nature of their business, it is expected that they need to develop new perceptions. This 
expectation is reflected in a second research proposition: 
 
P2 A change in perceived environmental characteristics triggers a change in business 
beliefs at the decision-maker level 
 
Change in decision-makers’ business beliefs 
The framework incorporates a change in decision-makers’ business beliefs as part of top-
down, second-order adaptation processes. It is suggested that a change in decision-makers’ 
business beliefs is needed for decision-makers to aim at fundamental organizational 
changes. Changes in two types of organizational elements are acknowledged, building on a 
structurational conception of adaptation: change in resources and change in organizational 
cognition.   
 
Change in resources 
Resources are the means necessary to undertake action. Prime examples are formal rules 
which reflect the normative system of roles and responsibilities (cf. Scott, 1981: 82) and 
formal systems such as performance evaluation and reward systems. Know-how which for 
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example refers to “knowledge of the means of gaining, retaining, controlling, and 
propagating either human or nonhuman resources” (Sewell, 1992: 9) is another type of 
resource. In the light of the integrative framework, the relation between decision-makers’ 
business beliefs and organizational level resources will be explored in the present study: 
 
P3 A change in decision-makers’ business beliefs triggers a change in resources at the 
organizational level 
 
Change in organizational business beliefs 
Organization members interpret decision-makers’ strategic actions through their existing 
mental models. Successful implementation of the changes requires a fundamental change 
in the set of organization members’ beliefs about the way things are done in the 
organization (unit). A key proposition of the current study is that organization members 
beyond the top management level will need to adopt the new business beliefs to achieve a 
fundamental change in organizational behavior. This will show in top managers’ efforts to 
achieve a change in organization-level business beliefs: 
 
P4 A change in decision-makers’ beliefs triggers a change in business beliefs at the 
organizational level 
 
Change in recurrent actions 
Actions throughout the organization that are repeated over time constitute an important 
part of organizational behavior. Only when these actions undergo significant change, the 
actual functioning of the firm alters which is the outcome of adaptation that is focused on 
in this thesis. As is suggested, changes in both resources and business beliefs at the 
organizational level will result in a change in recurrent action: 
 
P5 A change in resources and business beliefs leads to a change in recurrent actions at the 
organizational level 
 
In the first chapter, the pervasive influence of cognition in adaptation was 
introduced as the focus of the current research. The overall research question pertaining to 
this focus was: How are cognition and adaptation related? Knowledge of (1) the way in 
which decision-makers’ cognition evolves in adaptation and (2) the way in which shifts in 
decision-makers’ cognition influence the form and functioning of organizations was 
expected to deepen understanding of the role of cognition in adaptation. The framework 
allows for the exploration of the research question and issues by focusing attention on a 
number of variables and the relations between them. Before exploring these propositions, 
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the next chapter discusses the research design which was developed to translate the 
theoretical framework into an empirical study. 
 CHAPTER 3  
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter clarifies the research methodology which guides the inquiries. The processual 
and multi-level approach used in the present research sets the stage for a dynamic and 
holistic analysis of adaptation (Pettigrew, 1997). The first section of this chapter offers a 
general description of the research design. The next three sections respectively deal with 
how case data were selected, collected, and analyzed. Section 3.5 provides a brief 
conclusion of the chapter. 
 
3.1 Research design  
In line with an increasing number of adaptation studies, this research adopts the stance that 
a study of change benefits from a processual perspective. What happens today is anchored 
in yesterday’s events and conditions, and both history and present time inform tomorrow’s 
issues (Pettigrew, 1990). A good grasp of the challenges inherent in adaptation necessitates 
insight into the way in which past ideas, decisions, and actions feed into present and future 
change processes. In addition, multi-level analysis is part of the theory of method used in 
this thesis. Involving a response to environmental change, adaptation entails the inclusion 
of circumstances at business landscape and institutional levels. Considering adaptation in 
terms of evolving decision-makers’ and organizational cognition implies the incorporation 
of at least these levels of analysis within the firm. Two analytical choices precede 
processual and multi-level analysis: (1) which phenomena to include, and (2) which levels 
to consider (Pettigrew et al., 2001). These choices are elaborated on in the data selection 
section.  
 A processual and multi-level approach sets the stage for the study of cognition in 
conjunction with action, which is in correspondence with the premises of the theoretical 
underpinnings of the research. The case method suits well to the study of processes as they 
unfold over time and across levels and allows for ‘controlled opportunism’ to respond 
flexibly to discoveries made (Eisenhardt, 1989a: 539). Moreover, case studies can employ 
an embedded design which involves a multi-level approach for a single study (Yin, 1984). 
Case studies are used here to probe the dynamics of cognition in adaptation. To 
interpretive research, the case strategy offers at least three advantages. First of all, case 
study inquiry relies on multiple data sources (Yin, 1984). Being able to deal with a full 
variety of evidence is especially important when studying unobservable variables such as 
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beliefs and perceptions. The combination of various sources in the study of the same 
phenomenon, also called ‘triangulation’ (Denzin, 1978), applied to qualitative methods 
such as case studies illuminates the sensitivity of variables to contextual factors in their 
operation. Thus, case studies potentially generate holistic descriptions of complex 
phenomena (Jick, 1979) which is aimed for in the study at hand. As Weiss concludes, 
“[Q]ualitative data are apt to be superior to quantitative data in density of information, 
vividness, and clarity of meaning –characteristics more important in holistic work, than 
precision and reproducibility” (1968: 344-345). In line with the first advantage, the second 
concerns the ability of case researchers to handle an extensive pool of eclectic data 
including events, variables, interpretations, and interactions. Academics have explicitly 
recognized the value of case study research for grasping the meaning of managerial and 
organizational cognition. For example, Weick (1979) emphasizes the need for detailed case 
studies of the ways in which single thoughts become diffused through organizations. A 
third reason for conducting case studies is their ability to provide insight in dynamics over 
lengthy periods of time. It has been argued in organization literature that investigations of 
second-order organizational change should cover three consecutive years at the least 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996).  
  
3.2 Data selection 
In the previous chapter, a framework was presented which was grounded in existing work. 
Because the purpose of this thesis is to bring insight into adaptation dynamics from a 
relatively new perspective (multi-level cognitive view), the uniqueness of case studies is 
exploited by adding emerging patterns to the original theoretical foundation. While the 
development of theoretical ideas based on previous studies is indicative of deductive 
research, the cases in the present study thus add an inductive approach. Mixing a theory- 
and a data-inspired approach has been said to be fruitful as creative insight can be gained 
from the data without denying or reinventing concepts that have proven useful in previous 
studies (Denis, Lamothe and Langley, 2001). The primary goal of theory is to answer 
questions of how, when, and why, rather then investigating what which is the goal of 
descriptive research (Bacharach, 1989). How, when, and why decision-makers’ and 
organization-level cognition and adaptation are related is key to the explorative efforts in 
this research. As a result, both the research questions and the model were considered 
tentative. A priori specification of constructs and relations between them led to the creation 
of the initial theoretical framework. However, special care was taken not to exclude 
serendipitous findings from the analysis.  At a number of instances, the initial research 
questions and the framework were modified in accordance to such findings.  
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Selection of empirical setting I: Industry & nations 
Searching for conditions under which decision-makers’ and organization-level cognition 
are expected to matter to firms’ adaptive behavior, the financial services sector was 
selected as the context for study6. In recent years, this sector has become more dynamic 
and complex as a variety of factors have led to fundamental changes in its competitive and 
regulatory structure (Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Haveman, 1992; Schneider and Angelmar, 
1993; Vermeulen, 2002). In response to the upset of balance, major changes have taken 
place in the behavior of member organizations. Unleashed by deregulation, boundaries 
between industries within the financial services sector have opened up which has resulted 
in a trend toward mergers and acquisitions involving banks and non-bank providers of 
financial services, in particular insurance companies (Flier et al., 2001; White, 1998). The 
changed regulatory structure has allowed firms to escape the threat of extinction by 
diversifying their product portfolio and changing their domains. At the same time, new 
competitive conditions within and across financial industries have forced managers to 
revise their perceptions and beliefs (Schneider and Angelmar, 1993). Based on these 
considerations, the financial services sector is believed to offer a good forum for studying 
the role of cognition in organizational adaptation.  
Choosing a single sector allows for control of contextual variation (Dijksterhuis et 
al., 1999; Eisenhardt, 1989a). To further reduce confounding effects, the Netherlands and 
the United States were selected as the national contexts under consideration. As was 
noticed in the introductory chapter, over the last decade decision-makers of many Dutch 
and U.S. banking corporations have initiated adaptive efforts. Dutch banks were said to be 
at the forefront of renewal in continental Europe (Flier et al., 2001). U.S. financial services 
providers were also considered to be prime examples of how changed conditions in the 
banking industry affected the forms and functioning of its member organizations.   
 
Selection of empirical setting II: Firms, business units & adaptations 
Researchers are equally confronted with cognitive constraints as managers. Hence, 
observing more firms means observing fewer characteristics of each of them or obtaining 
fewer consecutive observations of variables. The decision was made to reduce the number 
of sites to enhance depth and quality of data (see also Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal and Hunt, 
1998). Aiming for in-depth understanding of real organizational behavior, a small-sample 
study exploring firm idiosyncracies is preferred over a large-sample study which seems 
more suited to reveal the ‘anatomy of conformity’. The complexity and dynamic nature of 
the study reinforces the decision for comparatively few research sites (Starbuck, 1976).  
To constrain variation due to size differences (Eisenhardt, 1989a), the focus is on 
large firms. Research has indicated the tendency of large organizations to focus inward on 
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the efficiency of their operations, thereby hampering innovation (Dougherty, 1996). 
Moreover, it has been stated that as firms get larger, organizational and environmental 
forces become more difficult to distinguish, which leaves managers struggling with the 
convergence of tensions that are only partly structured by firm boundaries (Denis et al., 
2001). Large firms thus pose special challenges to both researchers and managers. Two 
financial corporations were ultimately chosen. ING and Citigroup are among the biggest 
financial services providers in the world, the first originating from the Netherlands and the 
second from the U.S. Table 3.1 displays some key data for the case companies. Not only 
were these companies chosen for their size, they were also selected on basis of their 
innovativeness relative to competitor firms. In their study of strategic renewal processes in 
leading Dutch and U.K. financial services firms, Volberda et al. (2001) find that ING has a 
significantly higher than average exploration/exploitation ratio. In other words, ING 
executives were much more aimed toward renewal actions adding new activities to the 
firm’s repertoir or increasing the geographic scope than their competitors. Similarly, 
Citigroup has frequently been praised for its innovative capability (Baron and Besanko, 
2001; Charan and Tichy, 1998; Malnight, 1996). Innovation is generally associated with 
frame-breaking change. In this vein, innovators are expected to provide an interesting 
sample for studying shifts in decision-makers’ and organizational cognition in second-
order adaptation processes.  
 
Table 3.1: Case companies 
 
ING Revenues: 82,999.1 $ mil.  
Profit: 4,098.7 $ mil.  
Assets: 627,816.0 $ mil.  
Equity: 19,155.4 $ mil. 
Employees: 113,143 
Global ranking: 20 
 
 
Citigroup 
 
Revenues: 112,022 $ mil. 
Profit: 14,126 $ mil. 
Assets: 1,051,450 $ mil. 
Equity: 81,247 $ mil. 
Employees: 268,000 
 
Global ranking: 11 
 
 
Source: Fortune, 22 July 2002 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
6 The financial services sector is considered to include the following industries: banking, 
savings and loan, insurance, brokerage, and credit unions (see also Haveman, 1992: 54). 
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Deliberately creating a category from which to choose the final cases is indicative 
of theoretical sampling. The goal of theoretical sampling is to select cases which are likely 
to replicate or extend the theoretical ideas underlying empirical work (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
As mentioned above, innovativeness was the first criterium used for sampling in the 
present research. The second is related to level of analysis. The case material derives from 
adaptation processes at the business unit level as these are expected to entail greater 
transparency than the comparatively complex corporate-level processes (cf. Pettigrew, 
1990). The dominant belief system at the corporate level is usually more abstract as it is 
focused on the firm as a whole rather than on individual businesses (Whitley, 1987). As it 
turned out, corporate managers did have a hand in both the adaptation trajectories selected, 
bringing additional convergence between the cases. The third sampling criterium has been 
the type of response. Both cases involve a strive for stronger customer focus and a major 
restructuring to attain this. Besides criteria that set the stage for replication of the 
theoretical ideas, some criteria were applied to spur extension. While in the case of 
Citigroup a performance crisis precipitated adaptive action, the adaptation process at ING 
did not emerge out of a crisis situation. Rather, general environmental changes increased 
awareness of decision-makers, giving way to the change effort. From the case data, another 
important difference emerged. Whereas the Citigroup managers redefined the customer set, 
decision-makers at ING left the target market untouched. Emphasis in this change process 
was on restructuring of the division. Finally, extension opportunities are present in the 
distinct national backgrounds of the companies. Both of the adaptation processes selected 
were largely completed when the research started. This selection criterium was used to 
increase the chance of full access to data.  
The adaptation processes were chosen on basis of the transparency criterium 
(Pettigrew, 1990). Selecting cases where the process of interest is transparently observable 
is especially important when complexity is high, for example when studying dynamics 
over multiple levels of analysis. Because the study aims at relating changes in managerial 
perceptions and beliefs to changes in formal and actual organizational functioning, 
trajectories were picked that reflected clear shifts in strategic orientation. This was 
assessed, first, by taking notice of publicly available accounts of change processes and, 
second, by contacting the company to check the assessment. Focusing on a particular 
strategic trajectory is consistent with Burgelman (1983)’s and Quinn (1980)’s observations 
that the logic of a change process is dealt with largely on its own merits and usually with a 
different subset of people. The identification of starting and ending points of the analysis is 
relatively simple for distinct trajectories. Choosing a single adaptation process as the unit 
of analysis seems to contradict a conceptualization of change based on continuity. This is 
not believed to be the case. Applying a processual and multi-level mode of analysis, the 
change trajectory is delineated as a series of events related through time and place and 
embedded in a broader temporal context. The entire set of processes that constitute firms 
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over time include the discontinuous change episodes (Pettigrew et al., 2001) and those 
changes that are incremental, ongoing, and cumulative (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). 
Even though change episodes are the main focus in this research, they are not treated 
without consideration of the overall sequence of processes.  
The complexity of processual and multi-level analysis entails practical problems 
related to time and resources. To overcome these problems, the phenomena and levels of 
analysis of interest should be specified a priori (see section 3.1). Three types of phenomena 
are investigated: cognitive, behavioral, and contextual. The cognitive variables under 
consideration are beliefs and perceptions. As was noted in the previous chapter, the beliefs 
that are of particular interest to the present study are the ones regarding the nature of the 
business and the appropriate means of organizing within this business. The perceptions 
included in the study concern organizational and environmental characteristics. Behavioral 
factors include strategic and recurrent actions. Finally, context refers to the factors that lie 
outside of the subject system and have an impact on it.  
 
3.3 Data collection 
A difficulty in cognitive research, especially beyond the individual level, involves the 
development of valid measures. Cognition is confined to actors’ minds. Some scholars 
have used external individual characteristics such as age and tenure as proxies for 
cognition (Hambrick and Mason, 1987; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). However, evidence 
for a relationship between cognitive bases and external characteristics seems equivocal at 
best (Markóczy, 1997). An appeal has been made to construct more direct measures of 
cognition (Meindl et al., 1994; Walsh, 1995). In studies responding to this call, two 
assumptions are primary. Decisions and actions are often assumed to be reflections of 
perceptions and beliefs (Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller, 1989; Schneider and Angelmar, 
1993). Under this assumption, the investigation of cognitive patterns implies looking for 
their manifestations in behavior or statements (Barr, 1998). For example, scholars have 
focused on the extraction of decision-makers’ cognition from annual reports (Barr et al., 
1992; Bettman and Weitz, 1983). In line with this first assumption, the presumption that 
individuals are able to verbalize their perceptions and/or beliefs has been widely accepted. 
This second assumption sets the stage for interviews as a key source of information.  
 Going beyond the individual level of analysis also poses specific challenges. 
Scholars have been criticized for their inclination toward aggregated measures of collective 
cognition (Schneider and Angelmar, 1993). Adding up individuals’ perceptions and beliefs 
to get to collective cognition leaves the role of, for example, social processes unattended. 
Schneider and Angelmar (1993) advocate the use of global over aggregated measures of 
cognition when investigating emergent properties of collectives (cf. Bettis and Prahalad, 
1995). Aggregated measures are deemed appropriate when examining how individual 
contributions combine to create collective cognition. What distinguishes global measures 
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from aggregated ones is mainly the assignment of data directly to the collective, rather than 
first to its members or to relations between them (Lazarsfeld and Menazel, 1961). Potential 
sources of information are key informants reporting on a collective’s cognition, cognitions 
of leaders of the collective, and collective products such as minutes of meetings and 
internal reports (Schneider and Angelmar, 1993: 358). Aiming for insight in decision-
makers’ and middle managers’ cognition as emergent properties in adaptation processes, 
the present study uses global measures of perceptions and business beliefs. It builds on 
previous research by inferring perceptions and beliefs from milestone documents and the 
recollections of key informants.  
 
Data sources 
Initial interviews with project managers were conducted to get at the key actors of each 
adaptation trajectory. The first group of interviewees were people directly involved in the 
early stages of the adaptation process. By asking these informants about the process in 
general and their role in specific, a picture was generated of how adaptation had taken 
place and which actors had contributed in what way. Besides the more general questions, a 
second set of questions was asked to find out how decision-makers’ perceptions and beliefs 
had played a role in the change process. Emphasis was on the dominant conception of the 
industry and appropriate organizing principles –if applicable- rather than on individuals’ 
conceptions. The third set of questions presented to this group of respondents aimed at 
revealing how lower-level managers acquired new cognitions and behaviors in line with 
the changes initiated by decision-makers.  
From the interviews emerged the need for interviewing an additional group of 
people, i.e. those directly involved in change initiation efforts at levels below the overall 
divisional  level. As it turned out, these middle managers played an important role in 
diffusing key beliefs and perceptions throughout the divisions. The interviews with middle 
managers contained two sections; one addressing change process issues and the other 
covering cognition contents. In both first-level and second-level interviews, the questions 
were elaborated with follow-up questions. The protocol that was used to guide the 
interviews is displayed in Appendix C. The interviews, averaging one to two hours in 
length, were transcribed verbatim from tape recordings. Interviewees were explicitly 
informed about the fact that their statements would be used anonymously. For accuracy, 
notes were reviewed immediately after the interviews and before transcription. In total, 
over 40 interviews were conducted for the set of case studies. The interview samples of 
ING and Citigroup are presented in Table 3.2.   
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Table 3.2: Interview samples  
ING 
Interviewees:  
Divisional board members (3) 
Project managers (3) 
Project team members (2) 
Strategy consultants (3) 
Advisory staff members (3) 
District chairmen (3) 
Segment managers (2) 
Change management consultant (1)  
 
Citigroup 
Interviewees: 
Corporate-level managers (1) 
Divisional head/project leader (1) 
Project managers (2)  
Project team members (2)  
Chiefs of staff (2) 
Country/market managers (2) 
Global Industry Heads (4) 
Managers in industry groups (2) 
Parent account managers (1) 
 
Interview period: 
January 2000-July 2001 
 
Interview period: 
Maart 2000-August 2002 
 
Number of interviews: 
22 
 
Number of interviews: 
20 
 
Number of pages text yielded: 
167 (double-spaced) 
 
Number of pages text yielded: 
187 (double-spaced) 
 
Individual recollections are subject to retrospective rationalizing. To minimize a 
bias in the data, cross-checks for inconsistent findings were conducted. The interview data 
were also triangulated with information from internal documents and secondary industry 
data (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4). The use of archival data is based on the assumption that 
decision-makers exchange perceptions and beliefs which are objectified via decisions and 
actions. Analysis of written communications has been considered useful for reconstructing 
perceptions and beliefs of their authors (Holsti, 1968; D’Aveni & MacMillan, 1990). 
Using interviews and documentary records as partly overlapping and partly 
complementary data sources increases the quality and richness of the findings.  
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Table 3.3: Document sample IBN 
Source Evidence 
Visionary statement  
(Nov 1996) 
New strategic direction and planned changes 
Board minutes  
(Jan 1995-June 1998) 
Segmentation-related discussions; formal 
decision-making  
Work council reports  
Outlines of Segmentation (Nov 1996) 
Blueprint (May 1997) 
Market management HQ (May 1997) 
District organization (May 1997) 
 
Planned and implemented changes in strategy 
and structure 
Evaluation report 
(Nov 1999) 
 
Post-reorientation evaluation  
Organizational charts Structure of ING and structure of IBN pre- and 
post-Segmentation 
Annual reports  
(1991-1998) 
Financial standing 
Scope of activities 
Environmental perceptions at firm level 
Strategic plans  
Banking textbooks General information on industry developments 
between 1970-2000 
Banking journals  
(The Banker, National Westminster 
Bank Quarterly Review) 
Real-time information on technological and 
regulatory developments 
IMF reports Real-time information on regional trends 
BIS reports Real-time information on industry trends 
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Table 3.4: Document sample Citibank 
Source Evidence 
Visionary statement 
(18 April 1995) 
New strategy, organizing principles and steps to 
be taken 
Change report 
 (1997) 
Detailed account of the change process, content, 
and context written by external consultant 
 
Various client presentations 
(1998-1999) 
Systematic explanations of GRB business model: 
organizing principles, performance measures 
Annual reports  
(1991-1998) 
Financial standing 
Scope of activities 
Environmental perceptions at firm level 
Strategic plans  
Books and articles about Citigroup in 
general and the GRB in specific 
Company history 
Company culture 
Managerial perceptions and beliefs 
Changes in formal and actual functioning of 
corporate bank 
Banking textbooks General information on industry developments 
between 1970-2000 
Banking journals  
(The Banker, National Westminster 
Bank Quarterly Review) 
Real-time information on technological and 
regulatory developments 
IMF reports Real-time information on regional trends 
BIS reports Real-time information on industry trends 
 
Access was gained to the minutes of IBN board meetings. These real-time 
documentary records served as an important check to retrospective sensemaking. Between 
January 1995 and June 1998, 90 regular board meetings and 10 strategy meetings resulted 
in 61 pages of double-spaced text on the adaptation process. No minutes were available in 
the Citigroup case, indicating a difference in decision-making style. However, there were 
various other documentary sources giving an in-depth understanding of adaptive actions 
and underlying ideas and assumptions. Over 1500 pages of archival material were 
collected for both cases. 
 
Data validity and reliability 
The quality of any empirical social research can be assessed in terms of data validity and 
reliability. Construct validity derives from the establishment of correct operational 
measures for the concepts being studied (Yin, 1984). Due to beliefs’ inherently abstract 
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nature, construct validity is here of special concern. It is not easy to reveal taken-for-
granted assumptions and discover how they interact with decisions and actions. As a result, 
academics have generally either stayed away from measuring beliefs or have used proxies. 
The use of, for example, demographic characteristics to measure beliefs increases 
reliability because such observable characteristics are easy to measure. However, as was 
noted before, findings have been mixed and have made scholars aware of the need for 
more direct measures (Markózy, 1997; Meindl et al., 1994). The fact that the alternative 
approach applied in the current research relies heavily on recollections of individuals and 
document analysis raises concerns about validity. To increase construct validity, several 
measures were undertaken: (1) what was said in interviews was compared with what was 
written down in milestone documents, (2) follow-up questions were asked that required 
interviewees to demonstrate what statements meant in practice, and (3) key informants 
were consulted to validate the project description once it was completed. In contrast, 
perceptions could be measured pretty straightforward, by asking respondents directly about 
them and by adopting organizational and environmental features brought forward in 
milestone documents as representative of decision-makers’ perceptions.  
 The second criterium, internal validity, relates to the overall problem of making 
inferences. Case studies involve inferences every time a phenomena or event can not be 
directly observed, which in the present research applies to several variables and 
relationships. To establish internal validity, evidence should be convergent and as airtight 
as possible. It was increased by triangulation of data sources and by cross-checking 
interview findings to get to converging evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989a).  
External validity concerns the generalizability of the findings beyond the 
immediate case studies. This case study research relies on analytical generalization; the 
researcher aims at generalizing a particular set of findings to some broader theory (Yin, 
1984). The findings that derived from the analysis of the first case informed the 
preliminary framework. The second case allowed for replication of the findings, thereby 
increasing external validity. It should be noticed, however, that contextual differences 
constrained generalizability.    
 The reliability criterium refers to the likelihood of arriving at the exact same 
findings when replicating an empirical study. To increase the study’s reliability, steps in 
the data collection and analysis process were made as operational as possible (Miles and 
Huberman, 1984). A case study protocol was designed for the first case and then replicated 
in the second one. Appendix D shows the main protocol questions linked to information 
sources and sample strategies (cf. Yin, 1994).  
 
3.4 Data analysis 
The analysis of large amounts of process data requires special care. Which strategy is 
chosen influences which issues are focused on and how they are interpreted. The mass of 
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process data was transformed into blocks related to (1) cognition at the decision-maker 
level; (2) cognition at the organizational level; (3) strategic action; and (4) recurrent action.  
 
Within-case analysis 
Studying multiple cases, preparation of detailed case study write-ups for each site is the 
first step in case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Scholars have employed various techniques 
and formats in case descriptions. Narratives, sequence analysis, pattern-matching, and the 
use of tabular displays and longitudinal graphs are all aimed at generating insight into a 
case as stand-alone entity (Miles and Huberman, 1984). Analyzing the cases separately 
before moving on to cross-case investigation allows the unique patterns of each case to 
emerge (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Four analyses were critical for the purpose of the study: (1) an 
analysis of core business beliefs and perceptions at the decision-making level over time (2) 
a reconstruction of the strategic actions constituting adaptation; (3) an analysis of change 
in recurrent action; and (4) a context analysis to pinpoint relevant organizational and 
environmental factors.  
The analyses derive from a identifiable set of steps. First, central ideas and 
inferences were distilled from the interviews and divisional records. Recurrent and salient 
topics were recorded on contact and document summary forms (Miles and Huberman, 
1984). Secondary company, industry, and country records were used to build a thorough 
understanding of the factors indicated by key informants as pivotal in the adaptation 
process. The third step involved linking themes from interviews and documents to 
understand why and how formal and actual organizational functioning, via the application 
of generative business beliefs, and in its context, changed considerably. From the analyses, 
an in-depth acount emerged of how cognition evolved with action to result in the 
adaptation of the organizations in response to environmental change.   
 
Cross-case analysis 
The cross-case search for patterns begins with listing the similarities and differences 
between the two cases. To counteract the natural tendency to leap to conclusions based on 
limited data, similarities were searched for while bearing in mind the contextual 
differences between the cases and, consecutively, differences with explicit consideration of 
similarities. This approach lowers the risk of being carried away by expectations. From the 
cross-case analysis, certain patterns emerged which were then compared with the extant 
literature. This involved asking where the analysis confirmed and where it contradicted 
findings from previous work in the area of cognition in organizational adaptation. The data 
analysis procedure is summarized in the form of a flow chart in Appendix E.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
The processual and multi-level research design described in this chapter allows for 
exploring the role of cognition in organizational adaptation processes. Conducting case 
studies in one industry and two national contexts helps to control confounding effects 
while warranting diversity. The research process was iterative, in the sense that findings in 
the first case served as input for the second case analysis and the other way around. 
Equally so, findings triggered complementary investigations within each case. By means of 
the various information sources –interviews, company documentation, secondary data 
sources- it was possible to triangulate data, and improve the strength of the main 
conclusions (cf. Denzin, 1978). The next two chapters report on the results of the case 
analyses. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
THE CASE OF ING BANK NEDERLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ING Bank Nederland (IBN) is the home market banking division of ING, the largest Dutch 
financial services provider7. Between 1994 and 1998, IBN’s managers initiated a series of 
changes in response to new environmental conditions. They proclaimed their dedication to 
a market segmentation strategy and implemented new rules to its support. The heart of this 
chapter is the description and analysis of this adaptation effort. First, the case is briefly 
introduced. The second section illuminates the environmental changes that gave way to 
adaptation. Then, in the third section, it will be explored how the structural reordering of 
environmental conditions related to decision-makers’ conception of the business and of 
critical organizing principles and performance measures. The fourth section concerns the 
analysis of decision-makers’ response, in terms of strategic actions. The difference 
between resources and cognitive structures as levers for organizational change is key. 
Fifth, the results of the adaptation process in terms of changes in recurrent actions are 
being discussed. The chapter concludes with a wrap-up of interesting findings.     
 
4.1 Introducing the case 
The financial services provider under consideration in this chapter, ING, is a so called 
‘universal bank’. Basically, this means that the company provides a broad array of client 
segments with an extensive range of financial products (Walter, 1997). ING offers 
banking, insurance, and asset management services to retail and wholesale customers in 
the Netherlands and abroad. The Dutch conglomerate came into being in 1991, as a result 
of the merger between NMB Postbank and Nationale Nederlanden. The overall 
organizational structure has been changed several times over the years. While the various 
ING divisions and subsidiaries have been largely autonomous in the first ten years of the 
firm’s existence, corporate management has recently announced the integration of parts of 
the company to increase synergy (ING Annual Report 2001, Message of the Chairman). A 
tighter coupling between businesses indicates ING’s pursuit of a bancassurance strategy.  
 ING Bank Nederland (IBN) is the division within ING responsible for providing 
banking services to both wholesale and retail customers in the Netherlands. It was founded 
                                                           
7 Source: Fortune, 22 July 2002 
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in 1994 as part of ING Nederland which is one of five executive centres8. Its core consists 
of a branch network. Compared to the other large Dutch banks ABN Amro and Rabobank, 
the size of this network has been limited (Financieele Dagblad, 27 January 2000). Figure 
4.1 shows the position of IBN within the overall corporate structure. Exhibit 4.1 gives a 
profile of the division. 
 
Figure 4.1: Position of IBN within ING (1997)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
8 The original structure chosen for the corporation contained four executive centres (ING 
Nederland, ING Financial services International, ING Corporate & Investment Banking, 
and ING Asset Management) managed by an executive board (Annual Report 1992). Later 
on, ING Belgium was added as a fifth centre. In 1999, the executive centres are 
reorganized into ING Europe, ING North and South America, ING Asia/Pacific, ING 
Corporate & Investment Banking, and ING Asset Management.   
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Exhibit 4.1: Profile of ING Bank Nederland  
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ING Bank Nederland  
IBN employs 10,000 people. The branch network consists of 24 districts, each headed by a
chairman who is supported by two vice-chairmen. Within each district, there are a number of
area offices as well as some smaller, local branches. In total, the network comprises 150 area
offices and 200 local branches. The bank branches sell banking and insurance products of
ING. The branches have long been highly autonomous units, each governed by a branch
manager who held decisional power over many issues concerning the particular unit. The
emergence of new distribution channels in the 1990s (e.g. Internet, call centres, ATMs) has
eroded the hegemony of branch managers. Besides selling banking and insurance products,
IBN offers direct marketing services to wholesale clients of the Postbank, one of the primary
subsidiaries of ING (Interview project manager, 15 November 1999). Besides the branch
network, IBN has a headquarter office. This is where a number of product departments are
located, and supporting staff (e.g. IT, Strategy, Finance), and the divisional board of IBN.
Each divisional board member (in 1998: 5, in 2002: 6) holds responsibility for a particular
portfolio of activities. Strategic issues are decided on collectively. To assess the strategic
importance of the division to ING in the 1990s, operating income from banking activities in
the Netherlands has been presented as a share of operational income from all banking
activities and overall income (Figure 4.2). A substantial part of home market banking
activities is being conducted by IBN, which makes operational income from these activities a
suitable proxy. The figure shows a continuing decline in income from Dutch banking
activities relative to total banking income and total income. 
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In October 1997, the divisional structure was formally changed in the scope of an 
adaptation initiative called Segmentation. The actual change process essentially took place 
between 1994 and 1998. It involved a shift toward a stronger customer orientation, 
entailing substantial alterations in roles and responsibilities. The branch network was 
reorganized and a matrix structure was created with geography and client segments as its 
layers. Decision-makers at the divisional level felt that these actions were necessary to 
cope with the changed environmental conditions. They were encouraged in their attempt 
by corporate management. Segmentation is the subject of study in this chapter. The 
following sections contain an in-depth discussion of the way in which the adaptation 
process unfolded, highlighting the role of cognition.  
 
4.2 At the contextual level: Environmental characteristics 
The financial services revolution is a shorthand expression for a series of changes in 
business practices that have come over the industry in the advanced capitalist world, 
notably since the early 1970s (Whitley, 1998). Although many developments have been 
manifest everywhere, when and how they have taken place often differs substantially 
between countries and regions. Besides contextual variation, external conditions under 
which firms operate reflect country-specific factors such as regulation and political 
structure. In analyzing which environmental changes triggered the particular adaptation at 
IBN, focus is on the Dutch context. This thesis deals in the first place with perceived 
environmental characteristics, building on previous research that has linked the type and 
timing of response to managerial interpretation of the environment (Barr and Huff, 1997; 
Bateman and Zeithaml, 1989; Thomas et al., 1993). Interpretation is inextricably bound up 
with observation. The limited observation scope of actors is also likely to explain part of 
the variance in the response of firms operating in the same surroundings. To put 
managerial perceptions into perspective, an industry frame for the Netherlands was 
constructed on basis of secondary sources (see Exhibit 4.2). To secure reliability, 
developments were only included in the frame if they had been marked as influential by 
various authors. The description of key developments that have characterized the Dutch 
banking industry over the years helps to understand how the industry transformed from a 
relatively stable to a dynamic and more uncertain environment. This transformation has 
confronted bank managers with the need to increase their cognitive adaptability (cf. 
Bogner and Barr, 2000; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). It is this context that the case study 
presented in this chapter should be considered.  
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Exhibit 4.2: The changing face of the Dutch banking industry 
 
 
Environmental changes  
To bring order into the complex bundle of developments that have characterized the 
Dutch banking industry over the last thirty years, the dynamics are divided into broad 
categories: economy, policy & regulation, technology, competitive dynamics, and 
business practices. The industry history covers the period 1970-2000 to reveal the impact 
of the financial services revolution in its entirety.  
 
Economy In the 1970s, economic growth was substantial despite an economic recession 
in 1974-1975. In contrast, the early 1980s were crisis-infested. Both the national and 
international economic arena were subject to recessions in this period. In the 1990s, the 
Netherlands experienced a long and smooth economic recovery. The Dutch government 
withdrew from many areas, leaving people to save more for their pensions and insurance 
schemes. Gross domestic product grew at 3 per cent per year in the 1990s. The Dutch 
banking market turned out to be more lucrative and bigger than a lot of people had 
thought in the 1980s. Demand for financial services expanded by 10 per cent annually. 
Dutch consumers, who traditionally kept their money in savings accounts, started buying 
shares when interest rates dropped (Kuper, 1997).   
 
Policy & regulation In the 1970s, the influential position of Dutch banks came under 
criticism. This led the Dutch government to propose the creation of a new bank by 
combining two governmental financial institutions. After years of discussion and a 
number of adjustments in legislation, the Postbank was finally established as an 
independent organization in 1986 (Van Zanden and Uittenbogaard, 1991). Starting in the 
early 1980s, a gradual process of deregulation and harmonisation took place in the 
European Union. Flier et al. (2001) distinguish three types of regulatory changes shaping 
this process: (1) the elimination of restrictions on domestic competition; (2) the change 
of scale and scope of financial activities; and (3) the improvement of the external 
competitive position of financial firms. International exchange of capital was 
deregulated. Tax law reforms were another regulatory development with a considerable 
effect on the Dutch banking industry. The First and Second Banking Directives triggered 
liberalization and internationalization of the European financial sector. It allows 
European banks, investment firms, and insurance companies to hold unlimited reciprocal 
equity participations, implying that there are no limits on the formation of financial 
conglomerates (Van der Vennet, 2002).   
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Technology Three fundamental technological shifts have taken place over the years. 
First, technological advances have triggered the development of new distribution 
channels and techniques (Flier et al., 2001). Call centres, ATMs, the Internet have 
broadened the possibilities bankers have to deal with their clients. The relatively 
expensive face-to-face technique is no longer necessarily the most appropriate way for 
servicing a client. This has triggered contemplation and recreation of existing business 
models, starting in the 1990s and continuing to date (Hensmans, Van den Bosch and 
Volberda, 2001). The second shift has occurred in the area of management information 
systems, both financial and non-financial (Nolan Norton Institute, 1997). The aim is for 
real-time access to sales and revenue data. Despite large investments in IT, the Dutch 
banks have still not achieved this completely. The third technology-driven change is 
financial engineering. This shift is constituted by the design of new financial instruments 
such as options, futures, and swaps. Compared to traditional banking products, these 
instruments often provide tailor-made services and offer clients the ability to hedge 
against risk.  
 
Competitive dynamics In the 1970s, the Dutch banking landscape had been dominated 
by a few large players, the general banks. The level of competition between these key 
players was established by gentlemen’s agreements. ‘Cash in and prosper’ was a primary 
rule of the game. Loosening regulation of cross-border capital flows increased 
competition in the wholesale banking market in the early 1980s. With the increasing 
openness of financial markets worldwide and also with the rapidly approaching 
integrated European financial market, the conviction grew that even the largest Dutch 
banks were too small to compete successfully against international players. In the 1980s, 
attempts at cross-border mergers proved abortive, forcing Dutch banks to turn to each 
other. Some shake-out and consolidation at the national level was the result. These 
changes in competitive structure were fueled by the abolition of a governmental policy 
dating back to 1974 which had made it impossible for banks and insurance companies to 
merge. Important events were the merger between Postbank and NMB in 1989, the 
subsequent merger between NMB Postbank and Nationale Nederlanden into ING and the 
merger between ABN and Amro in 1991. The affiliated merchant banks of ABN and 
Amro, Pierson, Heldring & Pierson and Bank Mees & Hope followed suit to become 
Bank Mees Pierson in 1992. The consolidation process left the Dutch banking industry 
dominated by three players: ING, ABN Amro and Rabobank. The latter is the central 
organization of the agricultural cooperative banks which was formed in 1972 (Van 
Zanden and Uittenbogaard, 1991). Despite the developments in the 1980s, on the 
threshold of the next decade the financial landscape was still relatively static in terms of 
competition. Minding one’s own business was the creed (Nolan Norton Institute, 1997). 
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Although competition intensified in the 1990s, strategy to date is seldomly carried out 
with the explicit purpose of giving a blow to the competition. The Dutch banking 
landscape is still dominated by Dutch financials. The low margins on banking products 
have proved instrumental in serving as an entrance barrier, curbing the impact of foreign 
competitors on Dutch ground (Bakker, 1996).    
 
Business practices The economic crisis in the early 1980s led to a downswing in the 
performance of Dutch banks. Cost-cutting measures undertaken by bank managers 
marked the beginning of a new era for an industry which up to that point had known 
mostly prosperity (Bakker, 1994). Deregulation of cross-border capital flows in the same 
period encouraged the development of new financial instruments. Product innovation 
was also stimulated by the decreasing margins on traditional bank products, urging 
managers to find new sources of revenues. Traditional functions and client segments 
typically applied by the main Dutch banks in the pre-1975 period deteriorated and cross-
selling and customer ownership became the new buzzwords in the 1980s and early 1990s 
(Bakker, 1996). Despite the changes that had taken place, in the early 1990s continuity 
still prevailed over profit growth. However, intensifying competition due to 
technological advances as well as the entrance of unregulated nonbanks in the financial 
services market triggered the emergence of new business models (Smith and Walter, 
1997). During the 1980s and early 1990s, financial values were not a top priority of bank 
managers. They were generally satisfied with an increase in profit per share of 1-3 % 
(Financieele Dagblad, 4 May 1996). The 1990s showed an increasing concern for 
shareholder value, a concept already common to banking in the U.S. and the U.K. The 
idea that growth should be covered financially by internal sources rather than by the 
issue of shares has received increasing support. Dutch banks reconsidered their strategies 
to deal with the erosion of traditional distribution channels and with the increasing power 
of their buyers and suppliers. Improvements in operational efficiency and a sharper 
strategic mind in assessing the market for financial services became pivotal. In 
continental Europe Dutch financials have been at the forefront of rationalization and cost 
cutting, reducing the number of bank branches and centralizing back office operations 
(Bakker, 1995; Volberda et al., 2001).  
 
4.3 At the decision-maker level: Perceptions, business beliefs & strategic actions 
Up to the mid 1970s, the Dutch banking environment was characterized by stability and 
certainty (see section 4.2). Bankers were powerful in the sense that they decided whom to 
serve and what to offer. For example, ABN and Amro which traditionally aimed for the 
higher end of the wholesale market were reluctant to provide financial services to retailers. 
The financial services revolution which started in the 1970s made bank managers realize 
that they needed to change their conceptualization of the business and adjust strategies and 
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structures accordingly. Dutch banks started to enter each other’s core domains which led to 
an upswing in competitiveness. Awareness of the importance of a strong client focus grew 
which triggered restructurings. An adaptation effort in the late 1980s within NMB, the 
predecessor of IBN, concerned the injection of a stronger customer orientation in the 
branch network. This change process was dictated by a performance downswing. 
Discussions emerged within NMB about customer loyalty and cross-selling. What was 
earned on different products and customers became issues of interest. How complicated 
these issues were and how radical the departure from existing practices and ways of 
thinking appears from a recollection of a NMB executive at that time: 
 
That is a terrible process, a ter-ri-ble process. To find out how much is earned with 
particular products and why. Because we were doing things that made us no money 
at all and we were doing other things which made us a lot of money. […] We had a 
branch which delivered a bag of money. We did not know the various parts, we did 
not know the costs related to a cash transfer. The process is very complicated. All 
kinds of discussions about accountability emerged […] (interview, 16 July 2001).  
 
The call for a stronger customer focus as a response to shifts in business conditions was 
repeated in the mid 1990s when previous adaptation efforts were considered insufficient 
for the bank to remain competitive in the long run. While the branches had been 
redesigned and a separation had been made between wholesale and retail, detailed 
knowledge of revenues and costs for separate product and client groups was still not 
available. Within the wholesale and retail segments, client needs were still assumed to be 
homogeneous. The adaptive effort considered in this chapter, which goes under the name 
of Segmentation, represents a key attempt for alignment between IBN and environment in 
the 1990s. 
 
How it started: Triggers for adaptation 
In the Fall of 1994, the chairman of IBN presented a vision for the year 2005 to ING’s 
executive board at the annual corporate management meeting. The executive board had 
asked for a longer-term outlook regarding the Dutch banking industry as numerous 
environmental changes had been noticed and were expected to have an impact on IBN. The 
vision highlighted the effects of technological advances on consumer behavior and 
industry practices. It contained a broad indication of the way in which the divisional 
management board felt had to be dealt with the changing environmental conditions. A 
project member who was involved in an early stage of adaptation recalls: 
 
Pivotal in this speech was the question how to deal with clients in the future. And: 
Which consequences does the use of new distribution channels have for the IBN 
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organization? [The chairman] gave the following example: In the evening a client 
contacts a call center and the following morning the account manager exactly sees 
what has been discussed and action can be taken. At that time, [this vision] was 
quite revolutionary (interview, 3 February 2000).  
 
How technology could reduce operating costs and improve customer service was a 
question on the top of mind of most corporate and divisional decision-makers of Dutch 
banks in the early and mid 1990s (Bakker, 1991; Nolan Norton Institute, 1997). This was 
encouraged by statements in the popular business press, newspapers, and consultancy 
reports such as the one by a leading strategy consultancy firm indicating that the future 
winners in financial services would be those firms without bank branches (source: 
interview chairman of divisional board IBN). The vision was built on a conceptualization 
of the Dutch banking business for the next ten years to come. Several interviewees 
considered the speech as the key starting point of the adaptive effort under consideration in 
this chapter.  
In creating the vision, divisional management had been supported by the 
particular strategy consultancy firm that had made predictions for the business based on 
their experiences in other countries and equivalent industries. This firm had an established 
reputation in the worldwide financial services sector. Its consultants were also involved in 
strategy exercises in two other large Dutch banks: ABN Amro and Rabobank. One of the 
things the strategy consultants did to support IBN’s chairman in his strive for alignment 
with the changing environment was the arrangement of company visits. They arranged for 
the divisional board, complemented with several staff members, to visit a number of 
American and European financial institutions for understanding where the industry was 
headed to and how other firms were responding. That these visits affected decision-
makers’ thinking is emphasized by the divisional chairman who had taken over this role in 
early 1995: 
 
We spoke with all the main banks. And we generated ideas that we used. What was 
especially noticable there was the click-call-face thing. You have an enormous 
client base and the clients from which you make money, those are the ones that you 
want to provide with a face treatment, an account manager. So you try to segment 
clients in a way that encourages them to use the appropriate distribution channel. 
[…] That is what you saw happening in the United States at that moment. And that 
is what we emphasized (interview, 18 July 2001).     
 
Numerous competitor banks were shifting from a geographically defined structure to one 
designed around customer segments. The strategy consultants advocated a  similar 
restructuring of IBN.  However, seeing other banks shift toward a segment-based structure 
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made IBN’s decision-makers hesitant to do the same thing. Notifying the homogeneity in 
firms’ responses to industry dynamics raised the idea among divisional managers that 
sticking to the existing strategy might prove beneficial to IBN. Doing things differently 
was considered a potential key to success in the Dutch banking industry. This idea did not 
last, however, as insights in the shortcomings of IBN’s existing business model evolved. 
According to the consultant who was closest involved in this early stage of adaptation, his 
firm played an important role in the change of decision-makers’ beliefs about how to 
succeed in the changing Dutch banking industry: 
 
My guess is that [our firm] has been the driving force in the beginning by saying: 
You really have to break through existing frames of mind and you need to get rid of 
the idea that everything is determined locally (interview, 13 June 2001). 
 
The next step: Determining the new direction 
With a preliminary conception of the business and some preliminary beliefs about how to 
succeed in it in place, the divisional board decided to put a project manager in charge of 
elaborating on the ideas with the intention of formulating a new direction for the division. 
This decision that was taken in early 1995 was the starting point of a period of dedicated 
evaluation of IBN’s business model and practices. Figure 4.3 provides an overview of the 
main events taking place during Segmentation at the decision-maker level. To get to this 
overview, the key actors throughout the adaptation processes were interviewed to start 
with. The main events indicated by these actors were cross-checked, for their content as 
well as time line. The interview data on adaptation events were also checked against 
milestone documents. Formal plans proved especially informative with regard to formal 
decisions and actions. Minutes of divisional board meetings provided a lot of insight into 
how new cognitions emerged, and how decisions and actions were initiated based upon 
these cognitions. A formal evaluation report gave information about main bottlenecks in 
the process and key learnings. Showing the dynamics over time and across levels, the 
overview of the main Segmentation events throughout the adaptation process offers a 
sound foundation for processual and multi-level analysis.   
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Figure 4.3: Main Segmentation events at the decision-maker level 
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The analyses conducted by the project team –which consisted of a few IBN staff members 
and the strategy consultants- yielded two important insights. First, they revealed how and 
why IBN’s business model did not meet the demands of the market. The increasing 
transparency of markets and its presumable impact on customers’ knowledge of available 
products and services was pointed out. The advancing automation of financial transactions 
was expected to lift the importance of transaction facilities and bank accessibility. The 
analyses also raised the expectation that professional marketing and market penetration 
would become critical success factors. Emphasizing that customers should be able to make 
their own choices, the project team expressed the perceived need for a stronger customer 
focus. IBN’s business model was shown to be too expansive. Only twenty per cent of the 
customers was generating profits. Second, the analyses indicated the benefits of organizing 
along the lines of customer segments. The insights led the project team to propose a shift 
from the geographically-based structure to one revolving around the customer.  
In the business model evaluation process, the divisional board members were the 
true decision-makers. Frequent meetings with the project team kept them informed about 
the plans and allowed them to come out with ideas, confirm and correct. One of the issues 
emphasized by decision-makers in the evaluation process was the need for holding on to 
the strengths of IBN. The figurehead role of the branch manager in local communities was 
considered one such strength. Some plans proposed by the project team were expected to 
erode this role. Extensive weighing of the pros and cons of geography versus client as 
organizing principle fueled the belief in the appropriateness of a segment-based structure. 
Another key issue in the evaluation and formulation process was how to measure results in 
the new structure:  
 
There was a huge issue with regard to measuring things because the result of a 
branch is completely measurable but the result of a segment is not measurable. 
Because you then need to define who is in that segment. Clients are not divided into 
segments because a lot of clients…you know they are your clients but you do not 
know whether it is a large or a small company (source: strategy consultant).   
 
Table 4.1 summarizes the key shifts in decision-makers’ business beliefs underlying the 
Segmentation project.  
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Table 4.1: Key shifts in IBN decision-makers’ business beliefs  
Old business beliefs  New business beliefs  
 
Banking industry is a stable environment 
 
Banking industry is a dynamic environment 
 
Financial needs of customers are 
homogeneous 
 
Financial needs of customers are 
heterogeneous 
 
To be successful, the division should be 
organized around geographies 
 
To be successful, the division should be 
organized around geographies as well as 
customer segments 
 
Consequently, customers should be served 
by the IBN unit that is geographically 
nearest  
 
Consequently, customers should be served 
by the IBN unit that can meet their specific 
demands the best –in terms of knowledge 
and experience. Knowledge sharing across 
geographical boundaries becomes a key 
organizing principle 
 
To be successful, branches need to be mini-
banks; with a back- and a front-office 
 
To be successful, branches need to be 
service units. Back-office activities need to 
be separated and centralized to increase 
effectiveness of sales operations and 
efficiency of back-office 
Sources: interviews; board meeting minutes; formal project plans 
 
While the vision presented to the executive board in the Fall of 1994 revolved around the 
changing environment and its impact on IBN, by the end of 1995 decision-makers’ 
attention was mostly directed at internal design issues. How to succeed in Dutch banking 
had become mostly a matter of which roles and responsibilities to establish. The assistant 
of the IBN project manager recalls: 
 
Suddenly there was a lot of emphasis on organizational design: Who will be put 
where, what are the relationships? […] Thinking mostly revolved around the 
organization and less in terms of the specific consequences of developments in the 
market for the organization (interview, 3 February 2000). 
 
The IBN project manager himself gives a cultural explanation for the focus on 
organizational design:  
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 Everybody thinks in terms of pyramids of power. Who is the boss, who are 
subordinate to this person, who are the subordinates’ subordinates?[…] It provides 
clarity to look at the organization that way. Disregarding whether such an 
organization also actually functions that way, pyramids of power visualize it 
(interview, 6 June 2001). 
 
The environmental changes that had triggered the top-down adaptive effort submerged into 
the background and so did the initial emphasis on commercial opportunities deriving from 
these changes (source: divisional board minutes).  
 Although the belief in segmentation as an appropriate organizing principle was 
shared among the members of the divisional board, the decision to actually introduce it 
was felt to deserve a stronger basis. In January 1996, a project organization was 
established to develop strategic plans for each client segment that had been defined by the 
initial project team. The steering committees of the project organization consisted of 
organization members from all layers of the division. As interviews and memos indicate, 
the project organization was less effective than expected. A former divisional board 
member described this stage of adaptation as one characterized by “chaos and obscurity”. 
The results had rather limited impact on decision-making. However, the organizational 
blueprint developed at the same time would be used as a pillar of strategic actions.   
 
Toward strategic actions 
Around September 1996, the divisional board appointed six segment managers. They were 
put in charge of the newly created customer segments: Private Banking, Small and 
Medium-sized Businesses, Consumer banking, Companies & Institutions, Corporate 
Clients. One product segment was created, Payment Services, because of its importance to 
the division and the complexity of these type of services. Besides adding the segment 
layer, the replacement of the five regions by twenty-four districts was a primary strategic 
action. Just as the segment managers, the chairmen of these districts were appointed by the 
divisional board in an early stage to enable them to become champions of the changes that 
were about to take place.  
The segment managers were carefully selected. They were mostly young and 
ambitious people, but with a track record within the company. Decision-makers felt that 
this new role which represented a fundamental departure from existing practices had to be 
occupied by people that were not too attached to these practices. They were strongly 
supported in this line of reasoning by the strategy consultants. The consultant directly 
involved in this stage says:  
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The choice of these people was very important, more so than the responsibilities 
they had. We have very much stressed this: […] take heavyweights because then 
automatically the organization will start to take them seriously and this is actually 
much more important than the formal responsibilities. If those people add real 
value to the branches and know more about their segment than those branches, if 
they come up with new product ideas tailor made for their segments, then things 
will start to work (interview, 17 June 2002). 
     
This quote indicates the importance of resources other than formal responsibilities as 
enablers of segment managers’ tasks. Their authority within IBN would allow them to 
initiate valuable actions. While in this stage an attempt was made to specify segment 
managers’ tasks and responsibilities, it took some time as well as the input of several 
stakeholders (e.g., the segment managers themselves) for the initial specification to be 
formalized and communicated throughout the division. Profit responsibility for the 
particular segments, i.e. responsibility over revenues and costs, was not assigned to the 
segment managers but remained within the geographic line. This showed, for example, in 
the fact that each segment would have representatives in districts and branches who had to 
report first and foremost to regional managers. Interestingly enough, the initial plan 
presented by the divisional board to higher-level management provided for equally shared 
responsibility of regional and segment managers. Corporate management rejected the 
notion of dual responsibility, indicating that this was likely to upset and confuse the 
division. According to the project manager of Segmentation in that particular stage, the 
reluctance of corporate decision-makers to approve of a more radical change had much to 
do with existing practices still being prominent in their minds:  
 
[The new model] is difficult to imagine when you are thinking in terms of the model 
in place (interview, 6 June 2001). 
 
The fact that financial performance of IBN was satisfying might well have reinforced the 
existing model in the minds of decision-makers.  
The selection of district chairmen was also done carefully. Possession of 
appropriate skills and expertise was one consideration. As key actors at the geographic 
side, the chairmen needed to understand and be able to deal with sensitivities around the 
new business model. From a change management point of view, the assignments were also 
considered a way to create support for the new structure. Change management 
considerations also showed in the decision to create twenty-four districts rather than 
thirteen, which had been indicated as the optimal number by the project team. A smaller 
number would have forced decision-makers to assign regional managers to lower 
Intelligent adaptation 
 
64
hierarchical levels (e.g., branch manager), a decision that they felt would seriously 
undermine these managers’ motivation for change.  
 The appointment of segment and district managers signalled the beginning of 
adaptive dynamics below the decision-maker level. Section 4.4 will report on these 
dynamics. At the decision-maker level, the wish for strategic action grew stronger. A 
formal advice request on main actions that Segmentation would involve was presented to 
ING’s work council9. The work council lodged a number of objections which delayed 
adaptation. However, no fundamental adjustments were made on basis of those objections. 
Because it was felt the adaptation process entered a new stage, the decision was made to 
replace the first project manager by two other project managers; one responsible for 
implementation of Segmentation in the regional organization and one responsible for the 
development of the new administrative organization. The former who had a background in 
IBN’s branch network organization was expected to make the changes acceptable for 
regional managers (i.e. district & branch managers). The divisional board advocated 
systematic, top-down implementation of the new structure. However, strongly encouraged 
by the project manager responsible, the board members decided to execute two pilots. 
These pilots had to provide insight into the consequences of the new structure and potential 
pitfalls. The first pilot in early 1997, even though it was executed on paper in a single 
district, directly involved regional managers in the adaptation process. This event is 
therefore considered a bridging point between the decision-maker and organizational level. 
Discussions between decision-makers, regional managers, and project members which 
derived from the pilot and other Segmentation-related projects led to adjustments and 
refinements of the original blueprint. The lack of a clear blueprint and vision regarding the 
separation between front- and back-office which was dealt with in early 1997 exemplifies 
this (source: board meeting minutes). In the old organization, internal and external account 
managers’ tasks were blurred. Under Segmentation, back-office activities needed to be 
removed from the task list of external account managers. This strategic action was 
expected to lead to increased sales capacity.  
 Discontent with the pace of adaptation, in mid 1997 the divisional board decided 
to replace the project manager responsible for implementing Segmentation by an external 
interim manager. The board furnished the manager with the assignment to implement 
Segmentation without further delays. The then chairman expresses his thoughts about this 
decision as follows: 
 
                                                           
9 The work council represents an organization’s employees. Strategic decisions are 
generally presented to the council which has an advisory role. The work council does not 
have the authority to block decisions. However, it can challenge decisions thereby delaying 
the adaptation process and undermining decision-makers’ support within the organization. 
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At a certain point in time we say: this is what we want, this is where we go. And 
everybody agrees. But then you have to make sure that everybody goes the same 
way. For this purpose, I hired the interim manager, to make sure everybody would 
go in the same direction. It is just a matter of knowing the organization. Everybody 
has his own interpretation and at that point it was important that we went in that 
direction (interview, 18 July 2001).  
 
Until the end of 1997, while the interim manager was developing action plans for full-scale 
implementation, preparations were made for the implementation of the new structure in 
one particular district. The purpose of having a pilot for real in addition to the one on paper 
was to further insight into how the plans would translate into practice. In this vein, an 
extensive evaluation of the learnings from this pilot were considered a key part of the 
exercise. In this stage, there was also a decision made about the change management 
trajectory. An external change management consultant was hired to accomplish the 
necessary cultural change. A programme was developed which contained several 
components directed at different stakeholder groups within the division. The programme 
cascaded down the division from the top, involving an increasingly wide audience.  
 During the first half of 1998, the pilot was executed. As it proved successful, the 
divisional board decided to implement the new structure in all other districts. According to 
the chairman, knowing when to end small-scale try-outs and move on to full-scale 
implementation is a matter of: 
 
having the feeling that the risks you are taking are within certain limits. And 
assuming that you have the right people. At key positions you need people who can 
deal with that. This is just a matter of knowing the people. […] Having the guts to 
stick out your neck (interview, 18 July 2001).   
 
The formal evaluation of the Segmentation project might be considered the concluding 
event in this adaptation process. A team consisting of organization members from various 
levels and units was created to assess key learnings. One of the main issues raised in the 
evaluation report was the lack of an integrated approach to adaptation. Attention had long 
been focused primarily on the administrative organization: Who would report to whom 
about what? In the eyes of the evaluators, this focus had retarded development of the 
commercial dimension. Also, delays and inefficiencies were attributed to the 
understatement of resources such as the information infrastructure and accommodation in 
the change process.  
 This section has shed light on dynamics of cognition and action at the decision-
maker level. The following section revolves around such dynamics at the organizational 
level.  
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4.4 At the organizational level: Resources, business beliefs & recurrent actions 
As was noted in the previous section, two events marked the beginning of adaptive 
dynamics below the decision-maker level: the assignment of segment managers and of 
district managers. These managers would play an key role in the new structure and it was 
deemed necessary that they were actively involved in planning and preparation. The 
participation of the key players in the adaptation process set the stage for small-scale and, 
subsequently, full-scale implementation. Figure 4.4 provides an overview of main events 
of Segmentation at the organizational level from the assignments on.  
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Figure 4.4: Main Segmentation events beyond the decision-making level 
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Segment managers 
The segment managers had to start from scratch. Not only did they need to be introduced 
to the Segmentation plans, which had not yet been formally communicated to the division, 
the managers also had to build their own segment management units. Getting acquainted 
with the plans, some segment managers raised questions. The dual responsibility concept 
inherent in the matrix structure proposal was one of their main worries. However, as one of 
the then segment managers recalls, decision-makers held on to their plans: 
 
It was clearly fixed. […] We were conceived of as the young, eager guys who 
thought they knew it better. So we were told off: “this is the way we are going to do 
it, if you don’t like it, too bad” (interview, 19 June 2002).  
  
The first thing the segment managers did was pulling together a team of people for creating 
the segment business plans. The formation of these segment teams signalled a period of 
strategy-making at the segment level. Key issues were (1) giving substance to the notion of 
segmentation per segment; (2) developing plans for increasing effectiveness of the sales 
organization; and (3) planning the use of different distribution channels to lower costs and 
improve customer focus  In their effort, the segment managers were supported by the 
strategy consultancy firm that had been involved in Segmentation from the beginning. 
Depending on the preexistence of a segment in IBN’s customer domain before 
Segmentation, segment strategies had to be evaluated and revised or developed from nil. 
Product-Market Combinations (PMCs) had to be defined. Client bases were mapped out. 
Customer marketing databases were designed and built. An overarching financial 
information system lacked. This forced segment managers to think creatively about how to 
assemble the financial data necessary for their units to operate.  
Segment managers had considerable discretion in this stage of adaptation. This 
made it possible for them to shape the segment business plans according to their 
perceptions of market dynamics and business beliefs. For example, the Private Banking 
business plan focused on entrepreneurs as the key target market for IBN. An examination 
of market dynamics (e.g., ABN Amro as established private banker for ‘old’ money; 
private banking market potential for ‘new’ money) and the recognition of ING’s image as 
the bank for entrepreneurs had fueled the segment manager’s belief in this strategy. By 
approaching the target market with young, highly educated bankers, IBN would be able to 
differentiate itself from established competitors. Bankers were selected and training 
courses were developed for them to get a sense of the strategy, to understand the intended 
customer approach and the rationale behind it. The Private Banking segment manager 
aimed at introducing a performance-based reward system which would support his 
strategy. However, this initiative was aborted by the divisional board as such reward 
systems at that time were still against industry agreements.  
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In their efforts to give substance to segmentation, the segment managers faced some 
difficulties. Primary in this respect were misfits between commercial goals and strategies 
and the back-office infrastructure present within IBN. One of the then segment managers 
indicates how this caused problems: 
 
Our operations could not handle what we sold. So we often sold much prettier 
things than we could actually handle operationally (interview, 19 June 2002). 
 
Financial information systems were still geography-based and customer information was 
incomplete. There were two main ways in which segment managers dealt with the resource 
deficiencies. First, they immediately started to build appropriate infrastructures with the 
means directly available to them: people, money, knowledge. And secondly, they 
challenged and stretched existing limits within IBN by focusing on market opportunities 
rather than resource constraints. As one of them explains: 
 
If you let yourself be constrained by what is possible, you will never get there. Then 
nothing can be done. […] If you let yourself be constrained by that, you will also 
never get a picture of what the market wants from you (interview, 19 June 2002). 
 
Initiatives from the segment managers spurred several changes in back-office processes 
and advances in financial and market information systems. The implementation of the 
necessary operational infrastructure for selling tailor-made financial products for private 
banking clients exemplifies this.  
 
District managers 
A key decision in the Segmentation project was to reshuffle IBN’s branch network 
organization. The five regions were replaced by twenty-four districts to improve customer 
contact. Responsibilities were transferred from local branches to area and district offices to 
bundle specialisms. By pooling expertise, its use and further extension were expected to be 
optimized. The district chairmen played an important role in the preparation and 
management of change in their particular districts. They were appointed in a relatively 
early stage to allow them to do so. Together with their management teams, the chairmen 
developed implementation plans. These plans contained time lines, the actions considered, 
and the planned results. The chairman of the pilot district –the one in which the new 
structure was actually implemented- was in this respect a bit of an exception. The 
implementation in his district was used to adjust and refine the plans and to test their 
sustainability. When he and his team, supported by some HQ project team members, 
started the pilot there was still a lot to be decided on. The segments had been defined, 
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customers had been assigned to them, and the various roles to give substance to 
segmentation had been mapped out as well. However: 
 
the actual implementation: How are the different segments going to be served? 
How do you deal with them? How are employees going to act? […] this had not 
been specified. There was a conceptualization, but this had not yet been translated 
into practice (source: pilot district manager, interview, 13 June 2001).  
 
A steering committee was created, consisting of district managers and some other key 
actors. Underneath this committee, a number of task teams worked on various elements 
(e.g., accommodation, IT, personnel). Employees from different disciplines and layers 
participated in these task teams. The preparation stage confronted district managers with 
the need for practical decisions. When concerning fundamental issues, information was fed 
back to decision-makers at the divisional headquarters. For other issues, there was 
considerable discretion for district managers to design work processes. Making this a team 
effort helped the district manager to create support and a sense of ownership among his 
managers and employees. As he explains: 
 
The positive thing about it is that you work on it together and when you then 
implement it, you have the feeling: this is our product, we support this 100% 
(interview, 13 June 2001). 
  
Actual implementation in the pilot district took place during the first quarter of 1998. One 
of the concrete strategic actions concerned the transfer of customers from branches to area 
and district offices. This happened gradually. Another concrete action was the creation of a 
risk management unit at the district level. This was accompanied by an extension of district 
management’s decisional power. According to the chairman of the pilot district, this 
extension of responsibilities combined with the necessary expertise has led to faster 
decision-making in many cases. This is an example of how organizational behavior has 
changed due to the implementation of new rules. As the example shows, in order for this 
change to happen, the appropriate resources had to be in place (i.e. expertise; decisional 
power).  
 After evaluation of the pilot results, full-scale implementation was approved of. 
Generally, incremental changes continued to take place after implementation in a district 
had been formally concluded. From learnings derived adjustments in new rules and 
infrastructure. Exchange of thoughts and experiences between districts was limited. As one 
of the district chairmen argues, this is indicative of the culture within IBN’s branch 
network: 
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It is the attitude of the chairmen: “we can do it ourselves, we are well able”. So 
using each other’s experiences is minimal (interview, 13 June 2001). 
 
Beyond segment and district management levels 
The case material clearly shows that middle managers played a key role in the 
Segmentation trajectory. These managers (1) gave substance to adaptation by extending 
and refining the plans made by decision-makers; and (2) were catalysts of change in the 
sense that they helped to build the necessary resources and climate for organization 
members to alter their behavior. Segment managers developed beliefs on how IBN could 
succeed in their particular segments and triggered changes in infrastructure to allow for 
recurrent actions in accordance with these beliefs. District managers used their leadership 
in preparing for change and implementation to tailor rules, motivate people for change, and 
feed information back to decision-makers.  
The interviews and documents provide various indications of changes in recurrent 
actions of organization members. For example, the clear distinction between internal and 
external account managers that Segmentation entailed has resulted in a stronger customer 
focus in the front-office and higher efficiency in the back-office. The knowledge pools at 
district and divisional level have improved the service level for wholesale clients. 
However, the evidence also reveals some barriers in the way of change. The lack of a 
financial information system matching the new structure has posed problems for managers 
across the division trying to monitor performance. The embeddedness of branch managers 
in their local communities in some instances interfered with the new division of 
responsibilities.  
Several strategic projects have been initiated in the past five years which build on 
the premises of the Segmentation project. For example, the project Multichanneling is 
focused on how IBN can deploy the various distribution channels (i.e. Internet, call 
centers, direct mail, direct service) in an optimal way. A key factor in the vision that 
announced the Segmentation project, the use of technology became more of a side issue 
during the change process. The Multichanneling project signalled decision-makers’ 
commitment to the issue after roles and responsibilities had been dealt with. Furthermore, 
the number of districts has been reduced considerably. Also, segmentation has been taken a 
step further with a separation along the lines of wholesale, retail, and intermediary 
functions (Financieele Dagblad, 19 April 2002). Some advances have been made in 
financial and marketing information systems.  
The years following the implementation of Segmentation have shown a 
significant increase in IBN’s profits. This has been attributed to exogenous factors such as 
economic growth but also to the strategic actions spurred by Segmentation. From 
interviews derives a positive evaluation of the adaptation process; a series of changes 
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which have improved IBN’s reputation in the market through pooled expertise and a more 
effective sales force.  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
In the case study reported in this chapter, the theoretical framework proved a valuable tool 
for understanding how adaptation took place. Figure 4.5 visualizes the Segmentation 
process in terms of the framework. There was not one particular environmental event or 
development that triggered the initiation of the Segmentation project. More generally, the 
changing nature of the Dutch banking landscape and various developments abroad shaped 
decision-makers’ thinking in this respect. Technological advances appeared as one key 
factor of consideration in the early stages of the change project. Another was the changing 
customer attitude. The visits of IBN top management and staff to financial services 
organizations abroad and industry insights from a top-tier strategy consultancy firm were 
key in the development of decision-makers’ perceptions. Through what decision-makers 
notified and interpreted, some of their core business beliefs changed. Seeing other industry 
constituents change their organizational structure from geography/product-based to 
customer-based, and being aware of a devaluation of branch networks in the industry, the 
divisional board increasingly recognized the obsolescence of some of their basic beliefs 
about IBN’s structure and strategy. New business beliefs led them to initiate a number of 
strategic actions. The actions aimed at the middle management level mostly concerned 
changes in roles and responsibilities. The appointment of segment and district managers 
had an significant impact on adaptation in the sense that these managers initiated spin-off 
strategic actions (segment managers) and helped to implement strategic actions initiated by 
the divisional board (district managers). These new middle management leaders were 
furnished with certain means to conduct their role (i.e. resources). However, from the study 
also appears that various necessary means were lacking and that some key changes 
depended on middle managers’ creativity and persistance. At the same time, not having 
disposal of supporting means fueled resistance among some middle managers less keen on 
big changes.  
In the Segmentation project, there was not so much of a concerted effort by top 
divisional management to change middle managers’ business beliefs. Only toward the end 
of the trajectory a formal change management process was started. The emergence of new 
business beliefs at the middle management level was most evident among segment 
managers. These managers who had to build up an entirely new part of the IBN 
organization had been selected carefully to match the requirements. They generally were 
highly motivated to achieve success and had a strong market sense. Their mindsets were 
aligned with the new business beliefs that had arised at the divisional level. The situation 
for district managers was clearly different. Most of these managers came from positions 
within the branch network, representing the ‘old’ organization. They were assigned the 
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task of championing the organizational changes in the branch network while having to 
adjust business beliefs themselves at the same time. The fact that the change management 
process took place in a late stage left them little time to unlearn old beliefs and adopt the 
new ones.  
Besides strategic actions aimed specifically at the middle management level, 
decision-makers were involved in actions focused on the organizational level. These 
actions affected (1) divisional headquarters; and/or (2) the divisional branch network. The 
bulk of the decisions from the top regarded formal tasks & responsibilities and, 
consequently, procedures and formal systems. The subsequent actions were supplemented 
by actions initiated by middle managers. As these lower-level actions were designed for a 
particular segment or district, they were more specific and as such gave substance to the 
higher-level decisions and actions. As was the case at the middle management level, the 
deeper structure, i.e. business beliefs, received relatively little explicit attention. Change in 
organizational level business beliefs occurred in an ad hoc rather than systemic manner. 
Formal communication of the plans to the organization, as well as any formal change 
preparation happened in a late stage. The strategic actions undertaken at the top and middle 
management levels resulted in some change in recurrent action within the IBN 
organization. However, when comparing the vision statement presented in the Fall of 1994, 
and the original plan of the project team presented in September 1995 to the short term 
effects of the Segmentation process, it is clear that not all the initial intentions were 
translated into organizational practice. The fact that change projects have been pursued 
since, representing extensions of the changes made under the flag of Segmentation, 
indicates decision-makers’ appreciation of the overall path of change. Considering the 
Segmentation process as part of a more encompassing series of strategic change events 
signals the incremental character of change within this division. Zooming in on 
Segmentation, a number of occasions in which partial solutions were chosen over more 
far-reaching ones can be considered one indication of the incremental nature of the 
changes. An example is the decision of the divisional board to implement a matrix 
structure while keeping profit responsibility at the exclusive discretion of district 
managers.  
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in the next chapter, a second adaptation process is examined. This process took place 
around the same time as Segmentation but within the corporate banking division of 
Citicorp, the American financial conglomerate nowadays known as Citigroup. The study of 
a U.S. company was expected to yield supplementary data, thence deepening insight into 
cross-level dynamics of cognition and action in times of adaptation.  
Intelligent adaptation 
 
76
 CHAPTER 5 
THE CASE OF CITIBANK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Citibank is an operating subsidiary of Citigroup, the world’s largest financial services 
provider10. In the mid 1990s, when Citigroup was still named Citicorp and the firm had not 
been merged with Travelers yet, a series of drastic changes took place in the three main 
banking units: the consumer bank, the corporate bank in Japan, Europe, and North 
America (JENA), and the corporate bank in the emergent markets. In response to the 
severe performance crisis that had hit Citibank in the late 1980s and environmental 
changes in the banking industry, a new direction was formulated for the bank as a whole. 
The next step was the development of new strategies for each of the three businesses. In the 
corporate bank in JENA, a new business model was created and implemented between 
early 1995 and late 1996. The outcome of this adaptation process, the Global Relationship 
Bank, still exists today within Citigroup’s Corporate and Investment Bank as “a leading 
provider of financial services to top-tier multinational clients worldwide”11. This chapter 
revolves around the creation of the GRB. A similar structure to the one used in chapter 4 is 
applied. Starting with a brief introduction of the case, attention is then directed at the 
various dimensions of adaptation. A wrap-up of key findings completes the chapter. 
 
5.1 Introducing the case  
Citicorp first incorporated in 1812 as the City bank of New York. Back then, the bank 
functioned as a private treasury for merchants and as a dealer in coal, metal, sugar, and 
cotton. Over the years, it has developed into one of the most important money center banks 
in the U.S. with an international banking network spanning from London to Singapore. 
The brand name ‘Citibank’ was adopted in 1955 following the acquisition of First National 
Bank of New York. Before the merger with Travelers Group in 1998, Citibank, N.A. (for 
National Association) was the largest subsidiary of the bank holding company Citicorp. 
The merger created the world’s largest universal bank with operations in over 100 
countries, operating under the name ‘Citigroup’. Key drivers for melding together Citicorp 
and Travelers Group were synergy through cross-selling, economies of scale, and 
geographic diversification (Citigroup Annual Report 1998). The emerging globe-girdling 
                                                           
10 Source: Fortune, 15 April 2002 
11 Source: www.citigroup.com 
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conglomerate employed 268.000 employees in 2001, attaining $112 billion in 2001 
revenues and $14,1 billion in profits ranking number seven in the Fortune 500. In 2001, the 
consumer business accounted for approximately 50 per cent of Citigroup’s core income 
while corporate and investment banking activities yielded about 40 per cent (before hits 
like restructuring and merger-related charges). The remaining income derived from 
investment management and private banking (around 10 per cent). In terms of geography, 
North American business is making up for a considerable part of the earnings. This is 
reflected in the distribution of employees over the regions; in 2001 Citigroup employed 
145.000 full time and 4.000 part time employees in the United States and 123.000 
employees outside. Before the merger with Travelers, earning were more evenly 
distributed across regions. Due to the broad range of financial services Citigroup offers to 
its retail and wholesale clients, the company has been labeled a diversified financial. As 
such, Citigroup competes with American companies like General Electric, Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, American Express, JP Morgan Chase, and Capital One Financial (Fortune, 
15 April 2002).  
In the late 1980s, Citibank was reeling from one the biggest crises in its two 
hundred year history. The company’s corporate bank wallowed in debt due to default on 
loans to lesser developed countries (LDCs), bad loans on commercial real estate and on 
highly-leveraged buy-outs. The crisis was a severe one. A congressman even referred to 
Citicorp as being “technically insolvent” and “struggling to survive” (quoted in Barth, 
Brumbaugh and Litan, 1992). By 1997, however, the bank’s balance sheet had 
significantly strengthened and the company was one of the most profitable banks in the 
U.S. Within the corporate bank, several major adaptations of the strategy underlay this 
resurrection. Table 5.1 summarizes these changes as well as some preceding actions that 
influenced the change path.  
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Table 5.1: Strategic actions affecting Citibank’s corporate bank  
Time Strategic actions 
 
1982 
 
Diversification into investment activities: creation of worldwide Capital Markets 
Group 12 
 
1985 
[Europe] 
 
The European Bank initiative: a strategy based on establishing a preeminent 
position with selected customers and product markets across the region, creation of 
informal regional units focused on key products and customer groups. So strategy 
increasingly toward geographic units, product units and customer units but 
structure trails significantly behind this vision. Organization still balkanized and 
little dialogue across product, customer, geography staff.13 
 
1988-1989 
[Europe] 
 
The Unique European bank initiative: creating a common vision for all corporate 
banking activities in Europe. The vision described in increasing detail the need for 
a three-dimensional internal partnership. Structure: previously informal regional 
product and customer unints were formalized overlaying the geographic affiliates. 
Establishment of European Policy Committee comprised of geographic, customer 
and product unit executives to promote behavioral changes. Indication of further 
required changes  including modifying management systems to support decision-
making and standardizing administrative activities.  
 
January 1990 
 
Global reorganization: merger of Institutional and Investment Banks; division of 
worldwide corporate banking activities into developed (JENA) and developing 
markets (IBF) 
 
August 1990 
[JENA] 
 
JENA undergoes further reorganization: elimination of two management layers 
(division and group level); installing a structure based on a single sector executive, 
eight senior coordinators, and fifty-three activity centers (trading units, customer 
contact units, sales units, product units). Task forces are formed to reevaluate 
measurement and evaluation systems and culture. 
 
Early 1992 
[JENA] 
 
New executives are appointed in charge of JENA. This reestablishes the regional 
structure although the interdependent activity centers remain.  
 
1992-1994 
 
A strategy emerges: to be the premier provider of cross-border financial services. 
                                                           
12 The new unit resulted in parallel affiliates in major national markets, duplicating the 
traditional geographic-based operating structure –which was of course not the intention but 
showed the strong embedded power structure and culture of the traditional structure.  
13 Adjustments in structure started to take place but largely through informal mechanisms. 
There was a general recognition of the emerging challenges but the firm lacked 
information to enable the development of specific strategic responses.  
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[JENA] Reorganization of the formal management structure, reallocation of specialized 
roles across region, relocation of resources (concentration of product unit staff and 
resources and operational supporting units in London and Frankfurt –concentrating 
product units to build expertise. Changes in performance planning, measurement 
and evaluation –no longer Management Profit Reports representing income 
statements for each geographic unit but grids with each country reporting by both 
customer and product dimensions. Emphasis on teamwork culture. Formation of 
cross-functional senior management committees.  
 
1993 
[JENA] 
 
Introduction of a new measurement and evaluation system (Citibank began to 
evaluate its system in the mid 1980s) 
 
1995 
 
Corporate-wide launch of Balanced Business Scorecard  
 
January 1996 
[JENA] 
 
Global Relationship Bank: launch of a new strategy for corporate banking JENA -
serving global customers globally.  
 
 
1997 
[JENA] 
 
Revision of corporate banking strategy developed in 1995: formation of Global 
Markets Unit, bringing together corporate finance, capital markets and cross-
border financing units. Head reports to both GRB and EM. Covered institutional 
investors. Brought product specialists together in one unit.   
 
Source: Malnight (1996) 
 
This chapter pivots on the creation of a business model known as the Global Relationship 
Bank (GRB) for corporate banking activities aimed at clients primarily headquartered in 
Japan, Europe and North America (JENA). Several organizational precursors guided the 
development of the GRB model, the most prominent one being the World Corporation 
Group (WCG). The WCG, which had existed in the corporate bank since the mid 1970s, 
was built on quite a unique concept of serving the international financial needs of a select 
set of multinational clients. This concept was expanded by means of the GRB business 
model. The GRB case is a clear example of top-down adaptation to a changed 
environment, which makes it particularly suited for exploring the theoretical framework. In 
the JENA region, countries had traditionally been self-sufficient in the sense that activities 
in one country were conducted independently from activities within other countries, even 
when serving subsidiaries of the same company. With the introduction of the GRB in 
January 1996, emphasis shifted from geography to customer as the primary organizing 
principle. Citibank vice chairman Onno Ruding describes the strategy underlying the GRB 
as follows:  
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Citibank’s strategy is to focus on customers who value our global network in the 
broadest sense. With these customers, our global capabilities give us competitive 
advantage. We must deliver high-quality, innovative products that address 
customers’ ever-changing needs. To a significant extent, our developed economies 
business, especially in the U.S.A., serves as a basis from which successful products 
can be developed and transferred to other geographic markets. (Baron and 
Besanko, 2001: 16). 
 
Before the GRB business model was implemented, the corporate bank in JENA consisted 
of four parts: European Global Finance, North America Global Finance, Japan Global 
Finance, and the WCG. The WCG overlaid the geographical units, focusing on around 230 
global corporate customers. Their global operations entailed a need for banking and capital 
market services in many countries as well as for cross-border transactions. The WCG 
provided these financial services for corporations primarily headquartered in the JENA 
region. When the unit was first formed in the mid 1970s, its product line was relatively 
narrow. The key aim of the WCG  was to mobilize resources that Citibank had to offer 
globally on the client’s behalf. One of the ways to do so was by creating teams of global 
and local relationship managers which served particular clients. This way of organizing 
around customers led to a customer base generally characterized by well-established, long- 
term relationships. While the range of products increased over time, the aim of the WCG 
remained basically the same (source: company document). Building on the success of the 
WCG, regional management had started to carry through similar changes in strategy and 
structure for European clients. In North America and Japan, a focus on domestic revenues 
prevailed. With the implementation of the GRB, these regions were also involved in the 
aim for a position as the lead international bank of a select set of global customers. Exhibit 
5.1 offers a profile of the corporate bank in JENA as it exists nowadays.  
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Exhibit 5.1: Profile of the corporate bank in JENA 
 
 
 
 
Citibank’s corporate bank in JENA  
The Global Relationship Bank is a provider of financial services to multinational companies in 
over 100 countries. Global Relationship bankers are resident in 19 developed countries. In 
addition, GRB clients are served by relationship bankers working in emerging markets. The 
division is organized primarily along industry lines. Currently, the industry groups include: 
automotive & industrials; aviation; banks and securities; branded consumer & retail; chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals & forest products; electronics; energy & mining; insurance & investments; media 
& communication; power; shipping & logistics; and technology. The GRB business model is 
believed to “yield a capability which draws on a deep understanding of industry trends, as well as 
market knowledge based on a local presence” (Annual Report 2001). Four broad categories of 
financial services are offered by the GRB: capital raising, structured/corporate finance, risk 
management, and transaction services.  
 The strategic importance of the Global Relationship Bank for Citigroup is quite difficult 
to assess rigorously as no data are published for this division separately. The results of the GRB 
are presented as part of the Corporate and Investment Bank (CIB) which together with Emerging 
Markets and Global Transaction Services makes up Citigroup’s global corporate bank. To give an 
indication of the strategic importance of the CIB, Table 5.2 summarizes the core income figures 
for Citigroup in total, the global corporate bank in total, and the CIB. 
 
Table 5.2: Core income figures 2000-2001 
Core income (mil $) 2000 2001 
Citigroup  8,711 9,997 
Global Corporate Bank 2,226 2,885 
CIB 823 1,241 
 Source: Citigroup Annual Report 2001 
 
In 2001, compared with 2000, the stake in Citigroup’s core income of the Corporate and 
Investment Bank has increased from nine to twelve percent. Besides the income it generates for 
Citigroup, the GRB is of strategic importance because it allows to establish positions in new 
markets in a relatively low risk manner. In the 1997 Annual Report is explained how: “Citibank 
usually enters a country to serve global customers, providing them with cash management, short-
term loans, and foreign exchange services. As the market begins to develop, we offer trade 
services, project finance, and fixed-income issuance and trading. As development progresses, 
securities custody, loan syndications and derivatives services are introduced. At this stage, services 
for locally headquartered companies become significant and consumer banking services are 
introduced” (Citicorp Annual Report 1997: 20).  
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To deal with the performance crisis, a strategy was developed for the emerging markets 
(IBF) as well. The main objective was to become an embedded bank in these markets. 
Such a position would allow Citibank to serve the local needs of its global customers as 
well as of domestic companies that were expected to become increasingly international 
and/or dominate local geographic markets. Figure 5.1 shows the position of the 
corporate bank (shaded units) within the overall company structure at the end of 
implementation of both the JENA and IBF strategies in 1996. 
 
Figure 5.1: Position of the corporate bank within Citicorp (1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Baron and Besanko (2001) 
 
 
5.2 At the contextual level: Environmental characteristics 
At the turn of the twentieth century, commercial banks held substantial economic power in 
the United States. As Woodrow Wilson argued in 1911, “the great monopoly in this 
country is the money monopoly. A great industrial nation is controlled by its system of 
credit” (quoted in Brandeis, 1914: 1). Board interlocks were used as a means of 
domination; bankers occupying directorates were in the position to control the supply of 
new money. By the early 1990s, pronouncements about the extinction of commercial 
banks were commonplace. The dissolution of their core business, corporate lending, had 
seduced the banks into all kind of financial folly, especially high-risk loans to lesser 
developed countries (LDCs) and commercial property developers. To understand how 
commercial banks got into and dealt with this situation, an overview of primary 
environmental developments between 1970 and 2000 is provided in Exhibit 5.2. A shift in 
strategic focus has been mentioned as one of the reponses to the transformation of U.S. 
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banking from a highly regulated, stable environment to a more dynamic one (James and 
Houston, 1995). The industry frame has been created in the same way as was done for the 
Dutch banking landscape (see Chapter 4).  
 
Exhibit 5.2: The changing face of the U.S. banking industry 
 
Environmental changes 
Indications of an industry transformation in U.S. banking are many. As was the case in 
chapter 4, the discussion centers on economic, political & regulatory, technological, 
competitive, and business factors.  
 
Economy 
In the late 1970s and the early 1980s inflation and interest rates kept mounting up. This 
had a significant impact on the financial services markets: demand for nonbanking 
financial services grew substantially, creating an opportunity for new suppliers of 
financial services to enter markets in which they had not previously been competitive. The 
economic crisis also resulted in a sharp reduction of freedom to practice self-regulation. 
For the savings & loan industry competitive pressures shifted dramatically due to the 
interest rate volatility and threatened this population with extinction (Haveman, 1992).  
 
Policy & regulation 
The U.S. apply a capital market-based system, in which corporations rely on relatively 
dispersed securities issuance for capital and commercial banks provide short-term debt 
financing stands in contrast with the credit-based systems more characteristic of many 
continental European economies. Corporate control in the former system tends to be 
exercised through the takeover market on the basis of widely available public information, 
with banks’ function limited mainly to advising and financing bids or defensive 
restructurings. The role of the government is normally arm’s length in nature, with a focus 
on setting ground-rules. In contrast, the credit- or bank-based system centers on close 
bank-industry relationships, with the role of banks carrying well beyond credit-extension 
and monitoring to share ownership, share voting and board memberships. In such systems, 
capital markets tend to be poorly developed (Spiegel, Gart and Gart, 1996). 
The degree to which U.S. financial services are both politicized and fragmented due to the 
federal system versus individual states and the separation of power at the federal level is 
quite unique. There is wide range of competing institutional factors playing overlapping 
and competing roles in the regulatory system. The U.S. financial services landscape is 
governed by several regulatory agencies, some of which are federal and some of which are 
state agencies. The main agencies are: the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the 
Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), state banking commissions, 
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the Office of Thrift Supervision, the National Credit Union Administrator (NCUA) and 
the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF). In the 1920s and the 1930s, a 
number of regulations were implemented by these agencies that severely restricted bank 
managers in their strategic choices. The enactment of the McFadden Act in 1927 put in 
place a barrier against operating bank branches in more than one state. The Glass-Steagall 
Act of 1933 entailed a restriction on asset holdings, preventing commercial bank affiliates 
from dealing in securities. Owning stock in industrial corporations was also restricted. 
During the 1970s and 1980s the U.S. antitrust and anti-branching laws discouraged or 
prohibited mergers of large banks and the creation of nationwide banks while in Europe 
such developments did take place. Higher regulatory costs and geographic restrictions 
made it additionally difficult for U.S. banks to compete effectively with foreign banks. 
Three important pieces of legislation were passed between 1978 and 1982 that loosened 
regulatory constraints on the financial services sector (Table 5.3). These acts created a 
multitude of new markets, providing incumbants with ample opportunities to expand 
beyond their original domain. At the same time, this was a necessity as returns from 
activities which had traditionally been the exclusive domains of banks declined. 
Deregulation has continued since (Berger, Kashyap and Scalise, 1995). The passage of 
federal preemption of interstate banking barriers to interstate ownership of banks by bank 
holding companies in the early 1990s exemplified congressional belief that the U.S. 
banking industry needed aid to build strength. There are also indications, however, of 
reregulation as several laws and regulations have emerged that reach deep into banking 
organizations. Furthermore, the legislation repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, thus allowing 
banks to enter the insurance and securities businesses. Supporters predicted that the 
measure would permit U.S.banks to diversify and compete more effectively on an 
international scale. 
 
Table 5.3: Key legislative contributions to deregulation of U.S. financial services 
Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Act (1978):  
Implications: Created the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. Established 
limits and reporting requirements for bank insider transactions. Created major statutory 
provisions regarding electronic fund transfers. 
 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (1980) 
Implications: Began the phase-out of interest rate ceilings on deposits. Established the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee. Granted new powers to thrift 
institutions. Raised the deposit insurance ceiling to $100.000. This Act applied uniform 
reserve requirements to all depository institutions with certain type of accounts and 
required reports from these institutions.  
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Depository Institutions Act  (also known as Garn-St. Germain) (1982) 
Implications: Expanded FDIC powers to assist troubled banks, permitted in-state and out-
of-state acquisitions of failing banks and thrifts. Established the Net Worth Certificate 
Program. Expanded powers of thrift institutions.  
Sources: Klebaner (1990); Munn and Garcia (1973) 
Technology 
Banking has become an increasingly technology-driven business. Technological 
advancements have not just changed how banks and securities firms do business but also 
what business they are in. Online distribution has exposed the commodity nature of many 
financial products and shifted power to consumers. Where banks and securities firms once 
served as intermediaries with special access to information and markets, their clients now 
enjoy the same access.  Inexpensive information on company credit helped the 
commercial paper market develop and grow which has led to a decline in the importance 
of banks as commercial lenders. Technological change has also increased the speed with 
which information is processed, decreasing firms’ time buffers and thus squeezing their 
profits. On the other side, improved technology has set the stage for a decrease in 
operating costs and improved information systems to boost cross-selling activities (Berger 
et al., 1995). Rapid advances in computer and communications technology have led to the 
development of new bank services (e.g., ATM machines, internet banking) and new 
financial instruments (e.g., derivative securities) (Wheelock and Wilson, 1999).  
 
Competitive dynamics 
Economic, political, regulatory, and technological developments have significantly altered 
the banking industry structure. A big shake-out and numerous mergers reshaped the 
identities of most of the remaining important players. The number of commercial banks 
declined from 12,463 in 1979 to 7,926 in 1994 and loans from U.S. banks dropped from 
20.5 to 14.5 as a percentage of corporate debt among nonfinancial firms over the same 
period. The centrality of banks significantly deminished as executives of major 
corporations joined bank boards at a substantially lower rate (Davis and Mizruchi, 1999). 
The late 1980s showed an unprecedented frequency of bank failures with a peak of 206 
failures in 1989. A major part of these failures was brought about by the collapse of the 
savings and loan industry due to huge loan losses to less developed countries (LDCs), 
highly leveraged borrowers, and commercial real estate investors. Changed regulatory and 
technological conditions opened a variety of alternative methods of financing for U.S. 
corporations and alternative institutions in which households could place their savings. 
From the 1980s on, banks no longer monopolized the ranks of the industry giants. 
Nonbanks were entering the banking realm from all sides. By the mid 1990s, the largest 
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American commercial lender and leaser was not a bank but GE Capital which could 
provide complementary management services to corporations to help prevent loans from 
going bad (Davis and Mizruchi, 1999). IBM has become deeply involved in home-
banking and electronic payment systems and AT&T has started issuing credit cards. 
During the early and mid 1990s, Ford Motor made more money as a banker than as a car 
manufacturer. U.S. commercial banks have not been operating under the same conditions 
as their nonbank counterparts. What made these corporations rugged competitors is their 
top credit ratings, usually far superior to that of the banks, which have enabled them to 
raise capital for expansion at low cost, and under few regulatory restraints. Moreover, 
during the 1980s a number of regional and large community banks had begun to develop 
into superregional powerhouses. This was possible due to lowered regulatory barriers to 
operating across states. Well-capitalized regional banks, with limited LDC exposure and 
heavily leveraged loans on the books, were able to take advantage of the weakened 
position of other regional and community banks to grow at a rapid pace. Superregional 
players have combined a community bank attitude and delivery systems with the breadth 
of product line and sophistication of service associated with large banks which has shown 
to be a competitive advantage (Spiegel et al., 1996). In the 1990s, a wave of mergers 
across industry lines has unfolded to create one-stop financial services conglomerates. 
However, the image of a few financial institutions exercising a chokehold on flows of 
capital still seems remote today.  
 
Business practices 
Historically, banks were perceived as solid and safe institutions. When the pursuit of 
riskier accounts in the 1980s led to large increases in charge-offs due to uncollectable 
loans, banks’ ability to deal with changed environmental conditions became increasingly 
questioned. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the widespread recognition of the industry 
problems created a banking climate more receptive to framebreaking change. Old 
assumptions about financial services offerings were reassessed and entirely new models 
were being fashioned. The performance crisis unleashed a series of efficiency and 
effectiveness improvements which left the remaining financial services providers with 
substantially different strategies and structures. Against the expectations of many, bank 
profits rebounded in the mid 1990s. The upturn resulted largely from a shift away from 
pursuing revenues from lending activities and toward fee-based business (e.g., securities 
underwriting, advisory work, cash management). Bank management recognized that 
relying on old-fashioned large corporate lending as the major source of profitability was a 
thing of the past. By 1995, fee-based business counted for most of the operating revenues 
of banks such as Citicorp and First Chicago. To the extent allowed by law, commercial 
banks were metamorphosing into universal banks. The move toward more profitable off-
balance-sheet activities was most evident among the money center banks that were the 
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traditional lenders to large corporations. Deregulation enabled both money center and 
(super)regional banks to become more universal in scope and engage in investment 
banking activities, as was already common in continental Europe. U.S. banks have 
transformed into ‘relationship’ banks in which the development and maintenance of 
relationships with corporate clients is emphasized (James and Houston, 1996). 
Furthermore, shareholder value, a concept which has only quite recently been adopted by 
Dutch bank managers as a primary goal, has been leading for years in the U.S.   
 
The GRB was designed for a specific organizational unit: the corporate bank serving 
clients headquartered in the JENA region. However, the efforts behind the creation of the 
GRB stretch beyond the divisional level to include corporate-level thinking and acting. The 
analysis of cognition-action dynamics at the decision-maker level presented in the next 
section therefore comprises the contributions of both divisional and corporate decision-
makers.   
 
5.3 At the decision-maker level: Perceptions, business beliefs & strategic actions 
Acknowledging the pressing need for realignment in the late 1980s, Citicorp executives 
concentrated first on short-term corrective measures to reduce costs and strengthen the 
corporation’s capital base. In 1991 and 1992 a five point plan was executed which quickly 
improved the efficiency ratio and increased capital to a level in excess of regulatory 
guidelines (over $ 20 billion). The plan also stated the intention of building on the 
strengths of the core businesses and maintaining a strong customer focus. With the 
emergency plan in place, the next step was the development of a clear direction for the 
company. Being confronted with the immense problems at the corporate side, top 
management had been thinking about what to do with this franchise. John Reed, who had 
become CEO of Citicorp in 1984 after a career in the company’s consumer bank, had 
worked on understanding the nature of the corporate banking business. In a 1990 interview 
in HBR, Reed compares corporate banking with the medical profession: professional 
competence sits down low in the organization, with the people who deal with customers 
(the doctors, the bankers). Letting these people run the organization would result in chaos. 
Rather, corporate bankers should be busy developing new products: “Good corporate 
bankers are walking product development departments”. The CEO had strong beliefs about 
the key strengths of his company: “Our most important advantage is our globality. […] 
This global quality struck me as soon as I joined the bank in 1965” (Tichy and Charan, 
1990).  
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How it started: Corporate managers’ perceived need for change 
Seeing the intensified competition in investment banking and in middle-market 
commercial banking, especially in the U.S., top management decided against these 
conventional options. While a real vision of what the corporate business should be still 
lacked in 1990, executives were already convinced that the division would only succeed if 
organization members could collaborate across borders and disciplines. Japan, Europe, and 
North America had become increasingly interlinked which, in the minds of the executives, 
had made it a truly global market. To eliminate the “psychological notion” of being a 
geographically organized corporate bank, a new structure and management approach were 
introduced in JENA in August 1990. Fifty global activity centers for trading, customer 
contact, placing, and products were created that had to collaborate extensively. Also, 
division and group layers of management were eliminated and, instead, a single executive 
was made responsible for the JENA business. The next step was the formulation of a 
direction for the company, which was summarized in seven key points (the so called 
Business Directions) in the 1994 annual report. With regard to the JENA corporate bank, 
the following was stated in the annual report: 
 
We will build on our banking business in North America, Europe and Japan, but 
shift emphasis to those customers, products, and capital market activities that are 
global rather than domestic in their fundamental orientation. 
 
Offering multinationals the products and services they needed for organizing their 
international operations would allow Citibank to make optimal use of its global reach. 
Executives were come to believe that the existing business model squandered the 
competitive advantage of the bank’s extensive international operations in a time of 
globalization across industries. By focusing on those customers who valued Citicorp for its 
globality, the JENA region could function as an engine for delivering products and 
services in developing countries. Relationships could be build around the financial needs 
originating from international activities. There was a strong sense that a global angle 
would allow for insulation of the corporate bank from intensified competition and low 
margins in JENA. With the memory of the crisis fresh in mind, this was an important 
consideration.     
 The Business Directions implied a radical departure from long-lived practices 
within Citicorp. Top management was well aware of this. A senior executive who was 
closely involved in this stage of change expresses the general feeling among top managers 
as follows:  
 
This has always been a company grown up by letting strategies happen out there 
and holding people to account but everything came out of the ground in this 
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company. Walter Wriston did not decide to have a credit card. These things grew. 
For the first time, we are creating a top-down vision and a top-down strategy for 
the company (interview, 1 June 2001).   
 
According to some critics within and without the organization, corporate managers should 
have created a sense of direction for the corporate bank sooner. The CEO ascribed his late 
intervention to the lack of a perceived need for action: 
 
When I took over in 1984, the units that we now call JENA had operating earnings 
of $ 380 million. Last year, they had operating earnings of $ 719 million, which 
seemed like great progress. As I started sensing problems, I started getting 
involved, but I was slow off the mark (in Tichy and Charan, 1990: 143). 
 
The proclamation of the new direction for the JENA corporate bank in the 1994 annual 
report can be considered a formal starting point of the GRB adaptation process. Figure 5.2 
provides a chronological representation of consecutive adaptive events at the decision-
maker level. As with the Segmentation overview, key events were extracted from 
interviews and milestone documents.   
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Figure 5.2: Main GRB events at the decision-maker level 
GRB is starting to work well   
Sources: interviews; annual reports; internal reports 
Presentation of business 
direction for the JENA corporate
bank in the 1994 annual report; 
development of GRB strategy   
Creation of executive 
team for strategy 
formulation and of 
four tasks teams for 
assistance  
Announcement 
of appointments 
Off-sight with all key 
managers (100-125) to 
discuss roles & 
responsibilities  
Elaboration of GRB business model: specification of
customer relationship processes; specification of 
other key management processes; training courses. 
Decision to install a new MIS: SMART 2. Start of 
full-scale implementation process 
Nov 94 Oct 94 Dec 94  Jan 95 Apr 95  May 95 Feb 95  Mar 95  Apr 95 
Jan 96 Dec 95Sep 95Jun 95   Jul 95 Aug 95 Oct 95  Nov 95 
Jan 96  Feb 96  Mar 96  Apr 96  May 96  Jun 96  Jul 96  Aug 96 Sep 96  Oct 96   
Nov 96  Dec 96  Jan 97  Feb 97 
Senior 
management 
conference  
Approval of 
GRB strategy; 
appointment of 
GRB leaders 
Selection of key 
middle managers of 
GRB by newly 
appointed leaders 
Continued GRB is starting to work well
Intelligent adaptation 
 
92
Having formulated overall business directions, the next step for top management was to 
form three teams that had to create strategies for each of the core franchises: the corporate 
bank in JENA, the corporate bank in IBF, and the consumer bank. This decision was a 
direct outcome of an executive meeting in November 1994. The JENA team to which the 
top management team turned over the charter consisted of heavy-weight divisional 
managers. They were familiar with top managers’ conception of the corporate banking 
business and were expected to develop a strategy within the parameters of the business 
statement. The installation of this team heralded a period of evaluation and recreation of 
the existing business model.  
 
The next step: Toward a new divisional business model  
Between January and mid April 1995, the JENA team worked on the development of a 
new strategy. Before actually moving into strategy formation, however, the team members 
needed time to face the problems they were dealing with. The senior manager who was 
appointed coordinator of team efforts by top management recalls: 
 
People were sitting around the table and talked about anything but the big issue 
which was: we are not admitting to ourselves that the corporate bank is a disaster. 
People were talking about fixing the business but nobody was saying: it is a terrible 
business (interview, 1 June 2001).   
 
Two key factors pushed the team toward a reconsideration of the business. The first was 
the requirement from the top to get a clear strategy in place. The second trigger was the 
belief that the existing strategy would destroy the corporate banking business. Citibank’s 
decision-makers perceived the problems in corporate banking in the JENA region as 
structural. In their opinion, environmental developments such as overcapitalization, 
shrinking margins, and intensifying competition continued to erode the company’s 
corporate banking business model. In the consecutive strategy-making process, the senior 
management team choose to act as a steering committee and to reach out to middle 
managers for support. Four task teams were created with representatives from different 
geographies and disciplines.  
Each of the teams dealt with a specific set of issues. One team was responsible for 
pulling together the account profitability systems of Japan, Europe and North America. 
Cross-country analyses were then conducted to generate insight into customer-based 
revenue flows across geographical boundaries. There was a team conducting 
environmental analyses. This team focused on where the economy was going and on 
unraveling industry developments. There was strong desire to build a business that could 
be attached to so called megatrends, to derive momentum from changing environmental 
conditions. Exhibit 5.3 summarizes the main developments that were identified. 
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Exhibit 5.3: Perceived megatrends in the JENA corporate banking environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: GRB business directions report (April 18, 1995) 
 
The continuing shift from a manufacturing to a service economy was recognized, as well 
as the saturation of developed markets and the consequential expansion of client 
organizations into emerging markets. Besides demand issues, production-related issues 
such as the quest for cost efficiencies were perceived as triggers for the increasing focus on 
developing economies. Other factors adding to cross-geographic financial transactions 
were the emergence of a global capital market, allowing investors to diversify assets across 
geography, currency and risk parameters, and the globalization of consumer tastes. A 
perceived impuls for financial services were demographic changes, e.g. aging of the 
population. The increase in senior citizens has been accompanied by a growing demand for 
pension fund products and services. Finally, a megatrend perceived were the advances in 
technology and information systems, which constrained the intermediary role of banks 
while also enabling banks to lower costs and increase their service level by introducing 
new distribution channels and transaction techniques.  
A third team concentrated on product-related issues such as dependency on particular 
product categories, their revenues and costs, and the product needs of corporate customers. 
Finally, a group of people worked on organizational issues which basically covered design. 
• Manufacturing is declining as a percent of GDP while services, including financial
services, are increasing 
 
• Slow economic growth within the OECD and deregulatory trends are resulting in
companies consolidating their positions across JENA markets and expanding into fast-
growing emerging markets 
 
• Relentless pressure on costs is shifting production to emerging markets countries 
 
• A global capital market is leading investors to diversify assets across geography,
currency, and risk parameters 
 
• Ratio of financial assets-to-GDP is rising as populations age and pressure to fund
pensions increase 
 
• Globalization of consumer tastes is creating demand for OECD products 
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Besides the middle managers, some external consultants provided assistance in the 
strategy-making process.   
 The analyses of the teams revealed several growth opportunities. The financial 
analyses, for example, clearly showed the advantages of data aggregations at the customer 
level. These findings were substantiated in informal meetings that steering committee 
members had with organization members and customers. Globalization emerged from the 
environmental analyses as a solid foundation for the new strategy, enabling Citibank 
executives to exploit their company’s key competitive advantage: its wide international 
network of operations. The product team showed which products should be in the portfolio 
to meet the needs of global customers, as well as the profitability of those products. 
Products yielding an unattractive return on a stand-alone basis would still be included in 
the portfolio if they were center of the plate for internationally operating corporations. 
Loans exemplified this reasoning.  
On April 18, 1995 the JENA steering committee presented corporate management 
with a strategy which was labeled Global Relationship Banking. In the strategy proposal, 
the committee had named itself the ‘Dead Moose Society’, referring to the ‘dead moose 
which had been lying on the table’ in the early stages of the strategy formulation process: 
the horrible state the JENA corporate banking industry was in. To allow the corporate bank 
to survive in the JENA region, the Dead Moose Society proposed a fundamental 
reorientation toward a definition of the business around a specific set of customers. In 
those days, commercial banks were generally organized according to geographies while 
investment banks were mainly product- focused. The strategy was also framebreaking in 
the sense that it would divert attention away from the U.S. middle market, a business that 
was still generating large revenues. In line with the company’s overall business directions, 
corporate banking activities in JENA would revolve around those customers whose 
interests and needs were global. Focus would therefore be on globalizing industries. 
Building and maintaining long-term customer relations was considered crucial. In terms of 
organizational design, this strategy was associated with segmentation of customers by 
industry, information sharing across geographic boundaries, standardization of 
management processes, the use of a balanced business scorecard (BBS)-based performance 
measurement and reward system, and the introduction of a customer-based management 
information system. According to the chief of staff who acted as coordinator between 
steering committee and task teams, 
 
it was common sense as well as the conclusions that we reached from the material, 
the analysis we had done that this was the way for us to go (interview, 26 May 
2000). 
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Table 5.4 summarizes the key changes in business beliefs which were underlying the 
strategy proposal. 
 
Table 5.4: Key shifts in Citibank decision-makers’ business beliefs 
Old business beliefs  New business beliefs  
 
In the business to make money 
 
In the business to serve customers 
 
Short-term horizon 
 
Long-term horizon 
 
Geography, product, customer 
 
Customer, product, geography 
 
Vertical information flows  
 
Lateral information flows 
 
Financial measures are key 
 
Both financial and non-financial measures are key 
Sources: Interviews; GRB business directions; company presentations  
 
From thinking to acting 
Top managers’ approval of the plans ushered in a period of strategic action. Responsibility 
for the overall coordination was assigned to the newly appointed head of the future Global 
Relationship Bank was the first concrete action. This person was at the helm of a group of 
fifteen senior managers who were the key leaders of the future GRB. All of the Dead 
Moose Society members were among these managers. Signalling the emphasis on 
customer focus, a team was formed specifically to deal with the customer side of the GRB 
-the so called C6. The steering committee and the task teams then continued strategy-
making, elaborating on the new business model. With the basic concept in place, it became 
a question how to drive it down. The specification of core management processes was 
defined as a key task. These processes were considered the drivers of the new business 
model. The customer management process was a primary process of interest. Managing the 
customers well was believed to be essential for the success of the business. In deciding 
how customer relations should be managed, the architects of the GRB relied heavily on a 
forerunner organization, the World Corporation Group (WCG). As was indicated in the 
strategy proposal: “the ‘WCG model’ will be the overriding structure”.  
First formed in the 1970s, the WCG represented a unique concept in banking. It 
spanned Citibank’s geographic organizations in the developed and developing markets, 
using a global management approach against a select group of top-tier companies which it 
offered a select product line. The WCG was disbanded in 1983 but re-established by 
popular demand in 1986. The WCG’s client base was generally characterized by well-
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established, long-term relationships. The customer approach hinged on a parent account 
manager (PAM)-subsidiary account manager (SAM) system. Under this system, a 
customer parent organization had a central relationship manager, and its subsidiaries were 
assigned to other bankers for the specific countries in which they were located. The WCG 
was administered separately from the geographic units, but did not have its own P&L 
statement. Key organizing principles and performance measures were extracted from the 
WCG and around this genetic material, the GRB model was built. One of the managers 
directly involved in designing the GRB customer management process says: 
 
this was a critical first stage foundation where many of the systems and processes 
by which we ultimately created a performance management system for our new 
customer organization were learned during those previous twenty years in this 
much smaller organization unit (interview, 6 July 2000).  
 
A core process distilled from the WCG was the Customer Focused Management Process 
(CFMP). The CFMP was a highly structured analytical process for identifying 
opportunities at the customer level. Depending on the share of the customer wallet gained 
by the financial services provider, its relationship with the customer has a certain depth, 
expressed in terms of zones progressing from prospect to strategic partner. The emphases 
on building long-lasting customer relationships and gaining share of wallet were later 
injected in the GRB. Before the WCG model was used as a building block for the GRB, it 
had already been extended beyond its original subunit. In 1988, the newly appointed head 
of Northern Europe implemented the concept in the Nordic countries. The manager spoke 
of ‘natural Citibank customers’ to indicate the target market in these countries. As he 
indicates: “the global customers and natural Citibank customers definition is totally the 
same”. Later on, the strategy was brought to bear on globalization dynamics across the 
whole of North Europe. The experiences gained in these strategy exercises were used as a 
frame of reference for the GRB. Besides the WCG, the Financial Institutions Transaction 
Services unit (FITS) was a precursor of the GRB. While the WCG focused on corporate 
multinationals, FITS was focused primarily on financial institutions. Similar to the WCG, 
the central concept was leveraging Citbank’s global resources by mobilizing them 
according to customer demands.  
From the work of the steering commitee and the task teams derived a number of 
decisions. The JENA corporate bank would have a focused target market. Focus was 
brought in through a number of very strict customer criteria. The decision was made to 
have a window of opportunity for adding clients to the target market list opening once a 
year. Thus, the new business model also included maintenance rules. A structured approval 
process for new customers would be established. The team in charge of organizational 
issues recommended the creation of twelve industries as the basis for customer 
The case of Citibank 
 
97
segmentation. Senior management slightly adjusted the plan by deciding on thirteen 
industries. Although representing a more radical change, segmenting by industry prevailed 
over geography because a better understanding of customer buying behavior was believed 
to be the result. The creation of industry centers of excellence would generate know-how 
spill-overs (cf. Baron and Besanko, 2001). The existing product organization was 
reorganized. The product units of the formerly separate geographic regions were 
centralized largely in three hubs: New York, London and Hong Kong. The shift to a single 
JENA region also gave way to the decision to consolidate back-office, technology and 
decision support functions. The manager who was put in charge of operations and 
technology for the trading activities in JENA recalls: 
 
Suddenly we could start thinking about doing all the processing for foreign 
exchange in one location, not in three locations. We could talk about doing all of 
our processing in technology for derivatives in one location. Suddenly we had the 
ability to rationalize our activities (interview, 30 May 2000). 
 
The creation of the GRB involved the establishment of a clear matrix structure. Industry 
heads would be given profit responsibility for their particular industry groups, across 
regional boundaries. Country or market managers, who traditionally had substantial power 
within the corporate bank (especially in Europe), would become facilitators, a pivotal role 
in extracting client value from the geographic/global product network. In the new business 
model, their primary task would be to serve locally headquartered clients globally as well 
as the local subsidiaries of non-local clients. They also dealt with country- or region-
specific matters (i.e. legal, financial, political) to allow industry heads to operate in the best 
possible way. During the summer of 1995, a group of around twenty managers came 
together in a conference center for a couple of days to specify the roles of the new 
organization. They built a sense of responsibilities and accountabilities, “going through 
who was going to decide on hiring and firing and pay decisions, who is going to decide 
what happens with a customer” (source: a senior HR manager supporting this effort). 
Then, on basis of the specifications, the group started laying out candidates for around 
forty top-level jobs. From the list of people, the best suited market managers (geographic 
dimension) and industry heads (customer dimension) were selected by divisional decision-
makers.  
In September 1995, the names of the market managers and industry heads were 
announced to the organization by the head of the GRB. A few positions still had to be 
filled at that time. In the end, all key positions were occupied by managers from within 
Citibank. There had been a look around in the external market but time was scarce and the 
novelty of the business model made it difficult to explain to external people. Before the 
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announcement, candidates were informed about the new roles and responsibilities. One of 
the candidate-industry heads tells: 
 
They had all these hypothetical situations: if the relationship manager does this or 
that, it is the role of the market manager or the industry head… And I actually 
thought it was a great exercise. It really helped me to understand the strategy and 
the different roles. What is the role of the industry head versus the market 
manager? (interview, 13 June 2001). 
 
As was the case with the Segmentation trajectory within IBN, the appointment of the 
figureheads of the new organization marked the beginning of adaptive dynamics below the 
decision-maker level. Simultaneously, there were more strategic actions undertaken by 
decision-makers. In early 1996, the decision was made to install a new management 
information system to support the client-based GRB structure. The so called SMART 2 
represented an extension of a system which had been built in Europe. The MIS used in the 
WCG (called GAPS) was not considered an option for the GRB. This system was paper-
based and had some credibility and timing problems. Expanding the European system 
globally still took quite some time. However, it then generated framebreaking insights 
through its presentation of revenues by customer. According to the then GRB marketing 
director: 
 
That created a vision: “Wait a second, big global relationships make more money 
than even big domestic relations or single product ones”. We began to see that 
there were big differences by customer that could not be explained by product. And 
that multi-crosshold relationships brought higher customer returns (interview, 1 
June 2001).    
 
The insights provided the basis for a measurement tool that would become a key 
component of the GRB business model: the customer revenue unit (CRU). The CRU is a 
performance yardstick composed of the number of products delivered to a particular 
customer and the number of regions in which these products were delivered. Charan and 
Tichy (1998) illustrate how CRUs work in their GRB case description: 
 
Handling a client’s foreign exchange trading in North America, Asia, and the 
Middle East would add up to three CRUs –one product, three regions. Providing 
foreign exchange trading and cash management in Latin America, Japan, and 
Europe would equal six CRUs.  
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Change agents used this operating mechanism to get people to think in terms of cross-
holdings rather than financial increments. According to the marketing director: 
 
CRUs are not financial, we specifically did not allow them to be financial. Strategic 
measures that keep you away from accountancy and become defining for the focus 
and direction of the company (interview, 1 June 2001). 
 
Adding to the value of CRUs as a change tool was the fact that a law of increasing returns-
effect had become apparent in revenue data. Analyses showed a continued increase in 
revenues with an increase in number of CRUs. Until then, managers had assumed to have 
diminishing returns after a certain threshold which was supposed to be somewhere around 
ten CRUs. This insight strengthened the belief that relationship banking was a knowledge-
based business. Deep knowledge of the client organization gathered across as many 
regions and products as possible was expected to lead to substantial performance 
improvements. Originally emerging at the decision-maker level within the division, these 
business beliefs were then transferred to lower levels. According to the former head of the 
GRB, to get these beliefs adopted: 
 
the trick is to create a view in people’s minds of what their success is coming from. 
Once people get convinced: if I am doing the following three things, I will get 
rewarded and success…Getting them to do it is not the problem. It is getting them 
to have that view, that they can be successful (interview, 10 June 2002). 
 
This insight was translated into practice by introduction of the Balanced Business 
Scorecard (BBS). The BBS, which was considered a reward system reinforcing GRB 
performance measures, directed attention to non-financial goals such as teamwork and 
customer satisfaction in addition to the financial yardsticks it comprised. The desire to go 
beyond financial achievements to include a set of core values in performance evaluation 
and rewards was already expressed in 1990 by John Reed: 
 
I want our people to feel they’re within a band of fairness on financial 
compensation and then to think about other things: their job, the quality of their 
colleagues, the customers they deal with, their sense of organizational pride. Those 
are the values I’d like the compensation system to reflect (in Tichy and Charan, 
1990: 142).   
 
In early 1996, when full-scale implementation started, the new GRB performance 
evaluation and reward systems were not yet in place. From the top down, managers and 
bankers were pushed to behave according to the new rules. The head of the GRB himself 
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demanded that managers reported revenues on a client/industry basis. This executive was 
of the opinion that revenues would come in naturally when having superior knowledge of 
customer organizations. In his opinion, John Reed made his work a bit easier, creating a 
sense of anxiety among divisional members by openly expressing his unfavourable 
disposition toward their unit. From the marketing function also came strong impulses to 
get the GRB concept accepted in the JENA corporate bank. Besides purposefully 
introducing jargon, senior marketing management created a GRB training program. The 
customer management process was a key part of this program. Equipping organization 
members with a single vocabulary and a good understanding of the rules was deemed 
essential for generating uniformity of thought. A milestone event was a management 
meeting on June 10, 1996 at which the industry heads had to present industry group plans 
to the C6. Events like this one proved valuable ways to build understanding and trust. At 
the same time, the June 10 meeting also revealed there was still some resistance and lack 
of understanding among the new leaders of the GRB. 
 Getting people on the GRB track was one thing. Preventing them from reverting 
back into old habits was another. As a primary change agent, the head of the GRB stayed 
very steady on the vision underlying the business model. He made it very clear to 
divisional members that the GRB was first and foremost defined by its customers. A 
product might be disposed of, a badly performing employee might be layed off but the 
customer would always be maintained. The head of the GRB did hardly brook any 
argument against the ideas underlying the new business model. New rules were 
implemented consistently across regions and there was little or no deviation from them 
once they were established. Section 5.3 explores the consequences of this approach to 
adaptation for organization members below the decision-maker level.  
  
 5.4 At the organizational level: Resources, business beliefs & recurrent actions 
Figure 5.3 provides an overview of organization-level events in the GRB adaptation 
process. After they had been appointed, market managers and industry heads gathered in 
Florida for a few days to be formally introduced to the new strategy. A key objective of 
this off-sight was to get the new leaders to understand the rationale behind the business 
model they were going to run. A senior manager involved in the GRB process as change 
agent explains why: 
 
It is not good enough to just give people a title and a broad direction. It is just not 
enough. You have got to explain them how it works. So having communicated to 
them, they have a clear enough understanding of what their role is supposed to be. 
To be able to start doing it (interview, 1 June 2001).  
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Figure 5.3: Main GRB events beyond the decision-maker level 
Sources: interviews; annual reports; internal reports 
Elaboration of GRB business model: specification 
of customer relationship processes; specification of 
other key management processes; training courses. 
Start of full-scale implementation process 
GRB is starting 
to work well   
Announcement 
of appointments 
Off-sight with all key 
managers (100-125) to 
discuss roles & 
responsibilities  
Nov 94 Oct 94 Dec 94  Jan 95 Apr 95  May 95 Feb 95  Mar 95  Apr 95 
Jan 96 Dec 95Sep 95Jun 95   Jul 95 Aug 95 Oct 95  Nov 95 
Jan 96  Feb 96  Mar 96  Apr 96  May 96  Jun 96  Jul 96  Aug 96  
Oct 96  Nov 96  Dec 96  Jan 97  Feb 97
Continued GRB is starting to work well
Presentation 
of industry 
group plans  
Sep 96 
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One of the things considered critical to the success of the GRB was the cooperation 
between market managers and industry heads in the new structure. To set the stage for 
effective cooperation, the off-site was aimed at encouraging dialogue, and developing trust 
and mutual understanding.  
For explaining the GRB business model, senior managers from the marketing 
department of the JENA corporate bank had developed a jargon. Several of the core 
concepts derived from forerunner units (i.e. WCG, FITS). For example, the phrase ‘serving 
global customers globally, and become their lead international bank’ became a mantra. As 
one of its architects argues: “It is as clear and powerful a one-sentence objective function 
for strategy as I know. It’s who, it’s how, and it’s what –what we want to become. No 
extra words.” (source: Charan and Tichy, 1998). Another icon was the S-curve diagram, an 
operating mechanism designed to help managers and bankers visualize the customer 
management process. Exhibit 5.4 provides a brief introduction. 
 
Exhibit 5.4: The S-curve diagram 
 At the heart of the S-curve diagram (Figure 5.4) lies the presumption that relationship
managers need to build share of mind in order to gain share of wallet. The vertical axis of 
the diagram represents the bank’s share of the customer ‘s wallet. The horizontal axis
shows time. The first two years of building a customer relationship require much work
and yield little visible return. This period is labeled ‘the tunnel’. After two years of
consistent effort, a break through is achieved and relationship managers can start to work
towards the key goal: becoming the customer’s lead international bank. 
 
Figure 5.4: The S-curve diagram (Charan & Tichy, 1998) 
 
Share of
wallet
Year 3Year 2:
Share of mind
breakthrough
Year 1
tunnel
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The S-curve diagram underscored a long-term perspective regarding customer relations. 
The rationale behind the development of the S-curve diagram was that bankers would 
become more persistent and patient when understanding the dynamics of such relations. 
The repetitive use of certain concepts and models to explain the basic principles of the 
GRB business model proved powerful in changing middle managers’ business beliefs. 
Having process management professionals preside over discussions among industry heads 
and market managers at the Florida off-sight also had a significant impact on people’s 
understanding of the changes. In some instances, the discussions led to a refinement of the 
new rules.  
A proactive change management approach was necessary as the GRB was 
implemented at once: 
 
We did not say: let’s do a pilot. We said: we do everything at once, the same format 
everywhere. And the reason for that was not that the format fitted everything 
perfectly, but it was to get everybody’s thoughts around: this is the way we are 
going to do things (source: GRB marketing director, interview, 1 June 2001).  
 
GRB executives felt “it was a big enough change that you could not evolve into” (source: 
head of the GRB). The radical change implied there was no structure through which 
organization members could feel their way toward the new business model, testing and 
discovering as they went along how new practices could be realized in everyday activities 
and tasks. The organization was suddenly refocused toward a list of 1400 names, global 
customers that Citibank would serve globally. Due to its radicalness and magnitude, the 
change process posed some major challenges to divisional members. A senior HR 
executive directly involved in the adaptation process sheds light on the situation in the first 
half of 1996: 
 
The first six months were tough because everyone was figuring out 
how to operate in this new model. And if we assumed that people 
were giving it their best efforts, there were still clearly difficulties and 
some people didn’t give it their best efforts (interview, 26 May 2000).   
 
As was the situation within IBN (see previous chapter), the new leaders from the customer 
dimension and from the geographic dimension became involved in different adaptive 
dynamics.   
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Global industry heads 
From September 1995 on, the industry heads were actively involved in the GRB 
development process. One of the first tasks was to set up the target market lists for their 
particular industry group. One of the newly appointed industry heads describes the process: 
 
We just went through an account list and put names in a box. We worked for weeks 
on this. We had to start a business from scratch. But it was kind of fun, because we 
tried to create something (interview, 13 June 2001). 
 
As a consequence of the decision that the focus would be on global(izing) corporations, a 
number of existing clients had to be demarketed and business units closed down. This was 
not an easy process; some of these customers had been served for years and their departure 
caused relationship managers to resist the new rules imposed from the top. In response, 
decision-makers were very strict in implementing these rules. A project coordinator who 
had been directly involved in the strategy-making describes the reaction: 
 
We said ‘no’  to people who came up to us and said: We have been dealing with 
company X and we make an enormous amount of money of that company, but they 
are not on your list. Can we deal with this company? Are you sure you want to give 
this customer to another bank? (interview, 26 May 2000). 
 
Only after the merger with Travelers in 1998, and the introduction of investment bank 
Salomon Smith Barney into the corporate bank unit, the targeting process became 
somewhat more flexible. Besides assembling their customer groups, industry heads had to 
create and maintain an Information Knowledge Advantage Package (IKAP) which 
consisted of two parts. The industry profile covered key issues and trends. A framework of 
fifteen questions was supposed to lead the inquirer to superior industry and customer 
knowledge. The IKAP for a particular industry was made available to all relationship 
managers serving clients in that industry. Encouraging these managers to gain and 
demonstrate their knowledge of global industry trends, IKAP enabled them to be more 
effective in helping clients succeed in their businesses –a key tenet of the GRB business 
model.  
 
Market managers 
Market managers were carefully selected. Despite this, and the purposeful use of levers for 
change (i.e. key concepts and models, compelling evidence, conferences, reinforcing 
performance measures and reward systems) several regional/country managers opposed the 
changes. One of the industry heads recalls: 
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When we first started off, the market managers were tremendously sceptical and 
very protective of their organizations because they were going from an 
organizational structure where there was no industry, where they were the only 
ones who were in charge, to now also having someone else located in some other 
place who had primary responsibility for 80 or 90 % of the business done in their 
country. That tension that started off was very high (interview, 1 June 2001). 
 
Resistance arose across geographies, but the reasons for people to oppose differed between 
them. For example, in Europe, where countries had long been under the reign of corporate 
country managers, anxiety existed among some of these managers about the impact of the 
GRB model. In the U.S., where industry centralization already existed to some extent, it 
initially proved quite difficult to convince people about the need for a cross-border focus. 
Industry heads had been selected who were expected to be sensitive to this conception of 
change among market managers. This helped to reduce tension and focus managers’ 
attention on the positive rather than negative effects of the GRB.  
 
Beyond industry and market levels   
Because the global economy was strong during the new strategy’s formative years, 
compelling financial results started to show quite quickly. Table 5.5 gives an overview of 
total revenue of the JENA corporate bank between 1993-1999. 
 
Table 5.5: Total revenue of the corporate bank JENA (1993-1999) in $ millions  
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 
Total revenue 
 
3,893 
 
3,181 
 
3,587 
 
3,220 
 
3,815 
 
3,914 
 
4,083 
Source: Citicorp annual reports 1993-1999 
 
Before the GRB got established, earnings growth was marginal. Since 1996, the corporate 
bank in JENA has had higher growth from global customers, and a ROA which has 
continued to improve. ROC of the GRB when it was created in 1996 was 11 per cent. In 
1999 -without the benefit of non-capital intensive income from investment banking- ROC 
was around 19 per cent. The credit history between 1996 and 1998 was considered to be 
very good. Besides the advantage of having a strong wind behind the new strategy, the 
booming economy was beneficial to the GRB in a less direct way. The head of the GRB at 
the time explains: 
 
We were afraid that other banks would tumble on [the GRB strategy]. And if the 
markets had not gone the way they went in the late 1990s, they would probably 
Intelligent adaptation 
 
106
have. But they all got so blinded by all this money they could make in investment 
banking that they all went after that (interview, 10 June 2002).  
 
Customers valued the new approach. The GRB model provided them with a ‘gateway’ 
(Parent Account Manager) who would mobilize resources across regions and product areas 
to manage the relationship as effectively as possible. Their positive feedback in customer 
surveys as well as in direct encounters with the organization increased organization 
members’ trust in the new rules. While in the early stage of implementation, employees’ 
struggle to grasp the new rules kept them internally focused, the positive results and 
consistent top-down pressure for a customer orientation slowly turned the organization 
around. According to the senior HR executive involved, “ by the end of 1996, we began to 
see that people figured out how to work together”. Senior management hired a consultancy 
firm to monitor the implementation process. Through the consultants, reactions to the new 
rules and the way they were implemented were fed back to divisional decision-makers.   
After a certain time, decision-makers’ focus shifted from getting the changes 
adopted by organization members to the effectiveness of these changes in terms of the 
initial goals of adaptation. Some new rules created problems. The C6-construction 
exemplified how over-complicated the new structure initially was. In a forceful attempt to 
break with the geographic tradition, the C6 had each been assigned some regions and some 
industries. In practice, the executives spent most of their time travelling between 
geographies. A year and a half after the C6 had been put together, the committee was 
dismantled. As one of the change agents, a marketing director, indicated: 
 
[We] allowed geography to have more of an influence and simplified the 
organizational structure. And we could do that because we had killed geography. It 
was possible to reintroduce it without it breaking out again as the defining 
principle to the organization (interview, 1 June 2001). 
 
Besides adjustments made to remedy the teething troubles of the GRB, corrective action 
was undertaken to optimize the new business model. For example, a ‘rising star’ list was 
added to the original customer base. These rising stars were companies that did not yet 
meet the GRB criteria but were well on their way. Recognizing the importance of building 
a relation with companies well positioned to become global as early as possible, decision-
makers allowed for these companies to be added. A third set of adjustments were made in 
response to opportunities emerging as a consequence of the new rules. Rationalization and 
consolidation efforts were examples of this.  
First and foremost, the GRB model changed which customers were approached 
and how. This boundary-spanning change reflected in changes in the internal organization. 
The role of market managers changed considerably; from the ones basically in charge of 
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activities in their particular regions/countries, they entered a much more facilitating 
function in the matrix structure. In today’s corporate business unit, the market managers 
really carry the business on a day-to-day basis. The industry head leverages the day-to-day 
activities by providing industry and customer expertise. Cooperation across geographical 
and discipline borders has become much more important. To a certain extent, the new rules 
have reinforced behaviors that were beginning to become normal in the corporate bank 
anyhow. Pre-GRB initiatives for a stronger global focus in Europe exemplify this. As the 
evidence indicates, the changed behaviors have persisted over time. Even during and after 
the merger with Travelers, the processes, structure, and vocabulary remained largely intact, 
and even most employees stayed on.  
 
5.5 Conclusion  
The GRB process is visualized along the lines of the integrative framework in Figure 5.5. 
The environmental developments constituting the context of the GRB process covered 
developed as well as developing countries around the world. The severe performance crisis 
in the corporate bank had forced corporate management to get directly involved in this 
business. From corporate management involvement derived a comprehensive view on the 
problems the corporate business was facing and some high-level solutions for these 
problems. Attention of decision-makers was directed at mega trends and how these trends 
related to the corporate bank as part of a wider Citibank organization. This high-level 
approach was reflected in the type of changes taking place in business beliefs at the 
decision-making level. These were high level as well. For example, the corporate banking 
target market was redefined to include those customers who would value Citibank for its 
globality. This high-level statement was then specified to global corporations and their 
cross-border financial needs. These companies were believed to offer Citibank a solid basis 
for short as well as long term success; their need for cross-border financial products would 
fit seamlessly with Citibank’s global scope. As was the case within IBN, one of the first 
actions was the appointment of the managers who would run the customer and geographic 
dimensions in the new matrix structure. Also in line with the approach chosen within IBN, 
these key players were carefully selected. Divisional decision-makers actively involved 
middle managers in building the GRB. These managers were introduced to the new set of 
core business beliefs and were then granted the authorizing power to undertake strategic 
actions in line with the GRB objectives. Decision-makers thus created a structure for 
middle managers to be mobilized in strategic actions. However, they also aimed for a 
change in these managers’ business beliefs and their resources to change recurrent actions. 
Rather than the backbone of adaptation at the middle management level, this type of 
structure represents an outcome of the process. The two structures are interrelated in the 
sense that the latter is partly shaped in strategic actions enabled by the former. Just as in 
the IBN case, middle managers have had some saying in the adaptation process over what 
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their own roles and responsibilities in the new organization were going to be. The 
cognitive bifurcation that emerged from the IBN case is also apparent in the GRB account. 
Middle managers in those positions that were immediate derivatives of the new business 
model generally acted as catalysts of change, while some of the managers in roles already 
existing before the GRB resisted the changes.  
Easy access to learnings that were relevant to the adaptation process allowed 
decision-makers to be swift in devising management processes and other ingredients of the 
new business model. Another resource of importance at the middle management level were 
the formal management systems, such as the performance evaluation and reward system. 
While not yet in place when implementation began, this system later on served as an 
effective tool for redirecting organization members’ attention from geographies to 
customers. Using authorizing power to force changes on organization members proved less 
effective. Changes at the organizational level were fueled by higher-level strategic actions 
from divisional decision-makers as well as by substantiations and extensions of such 
actions from the side of middle managers. Changes in structure regarded mainly the 
introduction of operating procedures, tasks, and decision support tools in line with the 
management processes that had been laid out. For example, a new decision support tool 
was IKAP, a document that captured the key dynamics of a particular industry. The change 
management approach pursued in the implementation of the GRB revolved around a set of 
visualizations and concepts which were consistently and continuously communicated 
throughout the organization by key change agents. The power of these communications 
appears from their persistance over time and across levels as key elements in daily 
practices. Their enactment in day-to-day operations pinpoints the essence of change in 
recurrent actions within Citibank’s corporate banking business.  
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This chapter reported on the second part of the field research: the study of the GRB 
adaptation process within Citibank. After the description of the adaptation processes now 
follows an examination of within- and across-case patterns in the light of the research 
aims.    
 CHAPTER 6 
LAYING OUT ADAPTATION PATTERNS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two cases of adaptation in the increasingly dynamic banking industry were discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5. The present chapter builds on the discussions to reveal insight in the 
pervasive influence of cognition in adaptation. Key empirical findings lead to extension 
and refinement of the original theoretical framework. The chapter is structured around 
three central themes. Section 6.1 introduces these themes and the associated patterns of 
adaptation. The first theme, discussed in section 6.2, regards how cognition changes in 
adaptation. Section 6.3 then focuses attention on the second theme: the structure-action 
dynamics that emerged from the research as a key feature of adaptation. The third theme, 
which is dealt with in section 6.4, regards the role of middle management in adaptive 
efforts. Section 6.5 concludes the chapter with an elaborated cognitive model of 
adaptation.    
 
6.1 Introduction  
In the concluding parts of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 the key findings which emerged from 
the case studies were presented in terms of the integrative framework. Assessing the role of 
cognition in the two adaptation processes under consideration, some interesting within- 
and across-case patterns appeared. In this chapter, these patterns are pinpointed and 
interpreted. They are said to cover three main themes. The first theme hinges on changing 
cognition in times of adaptation. Change in cognition has been framed in terms of the 
interrelation between perceptions and business beliefs. The value of this conceptualization 
is indicated by describing the associated patterns. The second theme captures the essence 
of adaptation from the particular perspective used in this research: the interaction between 
structure and action. The dynamic and multi-level conception of the structure-action 
duality has proven a powerful framework for analyzing adaptation. Finally, the third theme 
deals with the role of middle managers in adaptation processes. In studies on top-down 
radical change, middle managers have traditionally been considered mainly as a source of 
resistance (Balogun, 2003; Huy, 2002). The findings of the current study give way to a 
broader notion of middle management’s influence on adaptation. Middle managers were an 
important source of innovation and framebreaking action. The patterns allow for an 
elaboration of the original theoretical framework (see Figure 6.1). 
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6.2 Theme 1: How cognition changes in adaptation  
A key variable in the theoretical framework has been change in decision-makers’ business 
beliefs. Business beliefs were defined as fundamental assumptions about the nature of 
business and how to succeed in it. Perceived environmental characteristics represented the 
second cognitive construct of interest at the decision-maker level. Perceptions were 
described as the joint product of observations and interpretations. Building on previous 
organizational studies, it was suggested that perceived environmental characteristics are 
the primary trigger for a change in decision-makers’ business beliefs in adaptation 
processes (see framework). Exhibit 6.1 provides an overview of the associated 
propositions.  
 
Exhibit 6.1: Recap of relevant propositions: P1 and P2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The interrelation between decision-makers’ perceptions and business beliefs arises as a 
first matter of interest from these propositions. Part of this section will address the 
dynamics connected to this interrelation. Another part deals with how new business beliefs 
develop and get established. The different activity sets in this process and its multi-level 
nature are two key aspects under consideration. How cognition relates to adaptation is the 
thread running through the current section.  
 
How perceptions and business beliefs interrelate  
The distinction between perceptions and business beliefs proved helpful in analyzing the 
cases. Looking at perceptions made it easier to understand how business beliefs evolved. 
The empirical study supports previous research on the dual role of perceptions (see 
Chapter 2). Perceptions that are predominantly based on the actual information 
environment seem to trigger new beliefs whereas perceptions based largely on past 
experience confirm existing business beliefs. One example for the former derives from the 
IBN case. In the Segmentation project, segment managers formulated a strategic plan for 
their particular segments. Up-to-date information on the business environments of these 
Propositions on change in cognition (see Chapter 2) 
 
P1 Environmental change triggers a change in perceived environmental characteristics
at the decision-maker level 
 
P2 A change in perceived environmental characteristics triggers a change in business 
beliefs at the decision-maker level 
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segments was used to define strategic prescriptions for operating successfully in these 
environments. The following excerpt illustrates this for the Private Banking segment 
within IBN: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A clear example of the impact of perceptions that are shaped by past experience also 
appears in the IBN case. In their interpretation of the challenges IBN was confronted with, 
corporate-level managers relied on the existing belief that profit responsibility should be 
assigned to a particular function rather than be shared between roles.    
 Perceptions influenced how beliefs evolved in yet another way. In some instances, 
in both cases, perceptions served to validate emerging beliefs. Interestingly enough, there 
is a lot of similarity between the validating roles of perceptions in each of the adaptation 
processes. In the Segmentation trajectory, decision-makers developed several preliminary 
beliefs which they then tried to validate: 
 
Together with some other staff members and external strategy consultants, the project 
manager developed an in-depth understanding of the business environment, focusing on 
issues that were already on the decision-makers’ minds. The outcomes of the analyses of 
the project team added to the belief status of preliminary conceptions. In the GRB process, 
task teams were formed by the senior management of the division to conduct an 
environmental analysis as well. Top-level managers had already labeled globalization a 
driving force of the corporate banking industry, but reached validation of this conception 
through this analysis: 
 
  
 
 While perceptions allowed for a better understanding of how business beliefs 
evolved in the adaptation processes under consideration, the opposite holds as well. 
[…] the Private Banking business plan focused on entrepreneurs as the key target market
for IBN. An examination of market dynamics (e.g. ABN Amro as established private bank 
for ‘old’ money; private banking market potential for ‘new’ money) […] had fueled the
segment manager’s belief in this strategy [Segmentation case, Chapter 4, page 68]  
With a preliminary conception of the business and some preliminary beliefs about how to
succeed in it in place, the divisional board decided to put a project manager in charge of
elaborating on the ideas with the intention of formulating a new direction for the division
[Segmentation case, Chapter 4, page 58]  
Globalization emerged from the environmental analyses as a solid foundation for the new
strategy, enabling Citibank executives to exploit their company’s key competitive
advantage: its wide international network of operations [GRB case, Chapter 5, page 94]  
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Considering beliefs advanced insight into how and why certain perceptions emerged in the 
cases. One example of this has just been mentioned: preliminary beliefs channeled 
attention into certain events and issues in the environment. Established beliefs also shaped 
perceptions in various occasions. Citibank’s executives had serious difficulty with facing 
the changes that were taking place in the corporate banking business, as they persisted in 
existing beliefs: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
In sum, the distinction between perceptions and business beliefs advances insights into the 
way in which cognition evolves in adaptation. In this vein, the study of interrelations 
between these variables is key. Depending on their source (current information 
environment vs. past experiences), perceptions act as consolidators or levers of change for 
business beliefs. Close to the former role is the situation in which perceptions serve to 
validate emerging beliefs. In line with existing literature (e.g., Bettis and Prahalad, 1995), 
business beliefs in the current research influenced perceptions by channeling attention and 
shaping interpretation.   
 
How new business beliefs get established 
Four key sets of activities in the development and establishment of business beliefs 
emanate from the case data. These sets of activities are mapped out in Figure 6.2.  
 
Figure 6.2: An empirically-derived notion of changing cognition in adaptation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“People were sitting around the table and talked about anything but the big issue which
was: we are not admitting to ourselves that the corporate bank is a disaster. People were
talking about fixing the business but nobody was saying: it is a terrible business” [GRB
case, Chapter 5, page 92]  
Reality contemplation 
• reassessing beliefs 
• unlearning beliefs 
Reality recreation  
• learning beliefs 
• operationalizing beliefs 
Reality maintenance 
• confirming beliefs 
• updating beliefs 
Reality constitution
• changing resources
• cascading beliefs 
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Reality contemplating and recreating activities concern the development stage, and reality 
constituting and maintaining activities relate to establishment. Each of the sets of activities 
will now be briefly described on basis of the case findings and linked to findings of 
previous adaptation studies.  
 
Reality contemplation 
The set of activities covered by the term reality contemplation involve the evaluation of 
existing business beliefs in the light of external developments. Table 6.1 provides an 
overview of key contemplation activities in both case studies. 
 
Table 6.1: Key contemplation activities in the Segmentation and GRB cases 
Segmentation case GRB case 
 
First act of contemplation. Divisional 
decision-makers with strategy consultant as 
sparring partner. Developing a conception 
of the changed business environment and 
how it affects the division. Outcome: 
vision.  
 
First act of contemplation. Corporate 
decision-makers with strategy consultant as 
sparring partner. Developing a conception 
of the changed business environment and 
how it affects the organization in general 
and the division in specific. Outcome: 
business directions. 
 
Second act of contemplation. Project team 
of divisional staff and strategy consultants. 
Critical evaluation of IBN business model 
based on geography.  
 
Second act of contemplation. Divisional 
decision-makers and task teams evaluate 
Citibank business model based on 
geography. Performance crisis accelerates 
and colors contemplation. 
 
Middle management acts of contemplation: 
Segment managers develop business 
models for their specific domains.  
 
Ad hoc middle management acts of 
contemplation: Global Industry Heads 
consider the new rules for their particular 
industry groups.   
 
Contemplation activities have been discussed in other organizational studies as 
well. A number of strategy studies have engaged in why and how business beliefs -often 
deeply ingrafted in organizations- are articulated and judged on their validity (Bartunek, 
1984; Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; MacIntosh and MacLean, 1999; Mezias et al., 2001; 
Senge, 1990). MacIntosh and MacLean (1999) and Mezias et al. (2001) draw from 
consultancy experiences to provide insight into conditions that nurture the contemplation 
process. Senior managers’ commitment to the process has been identified as a primary 
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condition; it takes time (i.e. resources) to challenge and unlearn old beliefs and develop a 
consensual understanding of the forces shaping the environment. This argument is 
confirmed in the present study. Both adaptive efforts were initiated from the top down. 
Senior management commitment enabled the actors involved (including the senior 
managers themselves) to invest the time and resources needed to engage in contemplation 
activities. An example of this from the IBN case are the company visits that were arranged 
by a strategy consultancy firm: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Segmentation trajectory lasted for more than four years, and has been extended in 
various change processes since. Senior managers’ commitment has allowed for a 
continuing investment of time and resources in the consideration and reconsideration of 
underlying perceptions and business beliefs. Another critical success factor mentioned in 
literature is an open climate. In this vein, the involvement of skilled facilitators has been 
indicated as a means for encouraging individuals to articulate and reflect on their business 
conceptions (Bartunek and Moch, 1987; Mezias et al., 2001). Both cases provide evidence 
for such a role of consultants. In the Segmentation case, the strategy consultant who 
supported senior management of IBN in the early stage of adaptation describes the role of 
his firm as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the excerpt shows, the strategy consultant encouraged decision-makers to unlearn 
certain beliefs that had been at the core of IBN’s strategy for a long time. In the GRB 
process, several consultants engaged in contemplation exercises in different stages of 
adaptation, with regard to different aspects of change. For example, Citicorp’s CEO was 
supported in this thinking about the impact of the changed banking landscape on his 
company by a strategy consultant. One of the managers closely involved in an early stage 
of adaptation refers to this consultant as John Reed’s ‘lubricator’. Also, a consultancy firm 
specialized in organizational design assisted in contemplation on design-related issues.    
“My guess is that [our firm] has been the driving force in the beginning by saying: You
really have to break through existing frames of mind and need to get rid of the idea that
everything is determined locally” [Segmentation case, Chapter 4, page 58]  
They arranged for the divisional board, complemented with several staff members, to
visit a number of American and European financial institutions for understanding where
the industry was headed to and how other firms were responding [Segmentation case,
Chapter 4, page 57]  
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  The literature provides several examples of successful and not so successful 
contemplation efforts in organizations. MacIntosh and MacLean (1999) discuss a 
company-wide survey at the Rover Group undertaken in the late 1980s which allowed 
executives to identify existing attitudes and rules. A less successful effort took place at 
Intel. Its top management failed to question the strategic rhetoric which undermined their 
strategy of being a major player in memory chips and microprocessors (Mezias et al., 
2001). Gavetti and Tripsas (2000) confirmed the importance of ‘deframing skills’, i.e. the 
ability to question existing business beliefs, in their discussion of Polaroid’s inability to 
adapt to radical changes in the imaging business. The current research joins these studies, 
confirming the importance of contemplation in (second-order) adaptation processes.  
 
Reality recreation  
Acknowledgment of the inappropriateness of the existing business model heralded the shift 
from contemplation to recreation in both cases. Reality recreation activities in this research 
regard the construction of a new set of business beliefs based on new insights. Perceiving 
new things, or perceiving things in a new way both seem to trigger these activities. Table 
6.2 summarizes key recreation activities in the Segmentation and GRB trajectories. 
 
Table 6.2: Key recreation activities in the Segmentation and GRB cases 
Segmentation case GRB case 
 
First act of recreation. Divisional decision-
makers supported by strategy consultants 
create a vision. 
 
First act of recreation. Corporate decision-
makers supported by strategy consultants 
create Business Directions. 
 
Second act of recreation. At divisional 
level: Project team and divisional board 
develop new business beliefs. Outcome of 
this process is the Segmentation plan 
indicating how IBN would be able to 
achieve success in the contemporary Dutch 
banking industry. 
 
Second act of recreation. At divisional 
level: Divisional steering committee and 
task teams extend and refine the new 
business beliefs developed at the corporate 
level. Outcome of this process is the GRB 
plan indicating how Citibank’s corporate 
banking division would be able to succeed 
in the JENA region. 
 
Middle management act of recreation: 
Segment managers construct strategies for 
their particular domains. 
 
Ad hoc middle management act of 
recreation: Global industry heads 
operationalize and refine the new rules. 
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Some scholars have suggested that major changes in belief structures occur through 
dialectical processes (Bartunek, 1984; Greenwood and Hinings, 1988; MacIntosh and 
MacLean, 1999). This means that old and new ways of understanding interact, resulting in 
a synthesis. Reality recreation is generally considered a difficult and time-consuming task. 
A new reality is likely to be experienced as threatening (Schein, 1980), and often leaves 
organization members disoriented and paralyzed (Hedberg, 1981). Tripsas and Gavetti 
(2000) found that Polaroid’s senior managers experienced great difficulty with developing 
new beliefs. This showed in the discouragement of any development efforts that were not 
consistent with the business model these managers were familiar with.  
Sewell (1992) gives some indications of where new business beliefs come from 
when discussing how the operations of structure can generate transformation. The author 
mentions the intersection of structures as a potential source of new assumptions and, 
subsequently, of new actions. Managers might borrow beliefs from a structure in their 
neighbourhood. The cases substantiate Sewell’s suggestions. In the Segmentation case, 
decision-makers learned from their competitors as well as from their strategy consultants 
and applied these learnings in their own division. Decision-makers within Citibank copied 
organizing principles from a nearby organizational unit (WCG). Especially in the design of 
the core management processes, which were considered the drivers of the new business 
model, the WCG model provided a valuable source of know-what and know-how: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reality constitution 
The decision to move from formulation to implementation can be considered the transition 
point from recreation to constitution. Table 6.3 gives the main activities in this set. 
 
Table 6.3: Key constitution activities in the Segmentation and GRB cases 
Segmentation case GRB case 
 
First act of constitution. Testing new 
business model through pilots. Active 
involvement of middle managers. 
 
Immediate full-scale implementation of 
GRB plan throughout the different regions 
and industry groups.  
 
 
 
 
In deciding how customer relations should be managed, the architects of the GRB relied
heavily on a forerunner organization, the World Corporation Group (WCG). As was
indicated in the strategy proposal: “the ‘WCG model’ will be the overriding structure”
[GRB case, Chapter 5, page 95]  
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Second act of constitution. Sequential full-
scale implementation in districts. Active 
involvement of middle managers. 
 
Middle management act of constitution: 
Implementation of segment strategies. 
 
Active involvement of middle managers in 
implementation of new rules. 
 
In the present conception, reality constitution refers to activities through which managers 
secure business beliefs within the very structures and workings of organizations. 
 The theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 focuses on two levers for 
constitution: resources and business beliefs. Resources referred to surface level 
organizational means for action such as performance evaluation and reward systems, 
marketing systems, and know-how. Business beliefs were considered the deeper level 
organizational means for concerted action. The cases have yielded interesting differences 
with regard to these two levers for constitution. In the Segmentation process, the emphasis 
was on changing surface level organizational elements from an early stage on:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A focused effort to change the thinking of organization members throughout the division 
took place only toward the end of the trajectory. A change management consultancy firm 
assisted decision-makers in achieving constitution of the new business model in the minds 
and actions of middle and front-end management. The perceived need for such an effort in 
this stage hints at the necessity of managing adaptation at both the surface and deeper 
levels. The GRB case seems to confirm this suspicion. When implementing the GRB 
business model, some managers who were very influential in the change process focused 
explicitly on both levers for constitution: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
“While the vision presented to the executive board in the Fall of 1994 revolved around 
the changing environment and its impact on IBN, by the end of 1995 decision-makers’ 
attention was mostly directed at internal design issues” [Segmentation case, Chapter 4, 
page 61]  
Besides purposefully introducing jargon, senior marketing management created a GRB
training program. The customer management process was a key part of this program.
Equipping organization members with a single vocabulary and a good understanding of
the rules was deemed essential for generating uniformity of thought. [GRB case,
Chapter 5, page 100]  
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The fact that the basic principles of the GRB business model have persisted in organization 
members’ thinking and acting indicates the success of the constitution activities in the 
adaptation process. The present study extends the work of MacIntosh and MacLean 
(1999), who advocate a focus on deep structure in organizational transformation.  
 
Reality maintenance 
New business beliefs need to gain momentum to achieve change in actual functioning of a 
firm. Reality maintenance activities are managerial activities aimed at reinforcing a newly 
constructed reality. As becomes clear from the cases, both positive and negative feedback 
mechanisms provide for such maintenance. Table 6.4 shows the primary reality 
maintenance activities distilled from the case studies. 
 
Table 6.4: Key maintenance activities in the Segmentation and GRB cases 
Segmentation case GRB case 
 
Fine tuning more than reinforcing 
 
Positive feedback from customers 
(qualitative feedback) and from 
performance (quantitative feedback) 
  
Negative feedback from decision-makers: 
Continuous reinforcement of the new rules; 
forcefully imposing the new rules. 
 
 
In the domain of maintenance, managerial activities involve application of positive and 
negative feedback (MacIntosh and MacLean, 1999). Confirmation of behavior consistent 
with the new reality provides a multiplier effect, allowing it to take hold. Negative 
feedback helps to damp actions which belong to the old belief system. In the cases, 
positive feedback mainly derived from customers and from performance outcomes. In the 
GRB process, such feedback was explicitly used as a lever for change. Negative feedback 
in the cases mainly took the form of top-down enforcement of new rules. Especially in the 
implementation of the GRB model, decision-makers strived for discipline and consistency 
in the application of the new rules:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The head of the GRB did hardly brook any argument against the ideas underlying the
new business model. New rules were implemented consistently across regions and there
was little or no deviation from them once they were established [GRB case, Chapter 5,
page 100]  
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A set of business beliefs which are maintained over time offer a stable basis for 
organizational members’ interpretations and actions. The shared background of 
understandings functions as a kind of agreement between members, enabling the orderly 
production of roles and rules (Ranson et al., 1980).  
MacIntosh and MacLean (1999) use the term ‘secondary rules’ to indicate rules 
that determine how organizing principles should be maintained and updated. Their account 
of a strategic change program which was conducted with a Scottish food-manufacturing 
company serves to illustrate the working of such rules. The managing director of this firm 
displayed new rules on the overalls he wore on the shopfloor as a clear signal to employees 
regarding the way the business would be run. There are a few examples of the use of 
secondary rules in the case studies. The creation of a window for the customer list in the 
GRB model is one such example. It allowed for relationship managers to bring in new 
clients.  
So how does the notion of changing cognition relate to the theoretical framework 
presented in Chapter 2. The notion of changing cognition indicates the cognitive bases for 
responding to environmental change (see Chapter 1). Building on the theoretical 
framework, it provides insight in the activities underlying a shift in decision-makers’ 
cognition and the subsequent shift in form and functioning of the organization. While the 
activities are presented sequentially, in the case studies they took place in a more iterative 
fashion. For example, an iteration resided in the occurrence of the various activities at both 
the decision-maker and middle management level within IBN. In this vein, the research 
supports the outcomes of several other studies on adaptation (Bartunek, 1984; Bettis and 
Prahalad, 1995; Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; MacIntosh and MacLean, 1999). In a study 
of strategic change at a public university, Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) portray the change 
process as iterations of sensemaking and sensegiving activities. These activities ‘occurred 
essentially in a sequential and reciprocal fashion that encompassed progressively 
expanding audiences in the strategic change effort’ (1991: 443). Bartunek (1984) reaches a 
similar conclusion in a study of a religious order whose belief system was undergoing 
second-order change.  
 The framework linked a change in decision-makers’ business beliefs to a change 
in organization-level business beliefs and this, in turn, to a change in recurrent action. The 
case studies give way to a refined notion of how new business beliefs emerge beyond the 
decision-maker level. The diffusion of new business beliefs throughout an organization 
(unit) in top-down adaptation processes can be represented as a cascade. A new set of 
dominant beliefs arises as decision-makers share perceptions and ideas regarding the 
environment and the organization. As middle managers get involved in adaptation, the 
diffusion process becomes compartmentalized. Applying the beliefs to specific domains, 
middle managers substantiate their operationalization. Through strategic and recurrent 
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action, these managers then orchestrate the organizational context for the practising of the 
business beliefs. The cases reveal different methods for decision-makers to get middle 
managers to adopt the new business beliefs. The creation of evidence supporting the 
particular beliefs has shown to be an important means. If this evidence is packaged in 
easily accessible visualizations and concepts, this seems to further increase the acceptance 
and incorporation of the new business beliefs. Conferences and workshops aimed at 
building understanding and trust also emerge from the case material as diffusion tools for 
decision-makers. Finally, performance evaluation and reward systems appear as a powerful 
mechanism for redirecting organization members’ attention and efforts.  
 To conclude the first theme, the associated research propositions are evaluated in 
the light of the findings. In this light, P1 was supported in both the case studies (see 
Exhibit 6.2). The introductory quotes were indicative of the effect of environmental change 
in the financial services sector on decision-makers’ perceptions of the developments. Both 
the interviews and archival data clearly showed that top-level managers within IBN and 
Citibank observed and interpreted key changes in their surroundings. P2 has been specified 
on basis of the findings. From the research appears that a change in perceived 
environmental characteristics triggers contemplation and recreation activities at the 
decision-maker level. These activities led to changes in business beliefs. The magnitude 
and type of changes in differed between the cases, however. In the IBN case, the changes 
were partial and from a longer term perspective rather incremental whereas corporate and 
divisional decision-makers within Citibank changed their beliefs more drastically and 
radically. A likely explanation for this difference is the fact that Citibank was faced with a 
severe performance crisis while the performance of IBN in the mid 1990s was satisfying. 
IBN decision-makers merely expected performance to go down due to the changing 
environmental conditions. In strategic change/renewal literature, the necessity of crisis for 
significant organizational change to take place is frequently mentioned (e.g., Huff et al., 
1992; Lant et al., 1992; Mezias et al., 2001).  
  
Exhibit 6.2: Empirically-derived refinement of research propositions P1 and P2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Propositions on change in cognition (see Chapter 2) 
 
P1 Environmental change triggers a change in perceived environmental characteristics at 
the decision-maker level 
 
P2 A change in perceived environmental characteristics is more likely to trigger 
contemplation and recreation activities at the decision-maker level when those 
developments are perceived as having a negative effect on organizational performance.  
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6.3 Theme 2: Top-down adaptation as multi-level dynamics of structure & action   
The theoretical framework developed in the second chapter of this thesis had the 
structurationalist concept of structure at its core. Sewell (1992)’s extension of the original 
concept of Giddens (1976) was used, which meant that schemas and resources were 
distinguished as the key components of structure. In the application of the concept, 
schemas were narrowed down to business beliefs. Resources were described as the means 
for action and examples given were authorizing power, formal management systems, and 
know-how. How structural properties shaped and were shaped by strategic action at the 
decision-maker level and recurrent action at the organizational level was the key question 
implied by the framework. Exhibit 6.3 offers a recap of the associated propositions which 
were presented in Chapter 2. 
 
Exhibit 6.3: Recap of relevant propositions: P3, P4 and P5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two basic patterns emerge from within- and cross-case analysis within the scope of the 
second theme. The first pattern revolves around how business beliefs and resources 
influence strategic and recurrent action. The second dynamic deals with the second part of 
the structure-action duality: the way in which strategic and recurrent action influence 
business beliefs and resources.  
 
How structure affects action 
The cases provide evidence for four basic ways in which structure affects action. First, 
business beliefs constrain strategic and recurrent action. Secondly, these beliefs enable 
Propositions on structure-action dynamics (see Chapter 2) 
 
P3 A change in decision-makers’ business beliefs triggers a change in resources at the 
organizational level. 
 
P4 A change in decision-makers’ business beliefs triggers a change in business beliefs
at the organizational level. 
 
P5 A change in resources and business beliefs at the organizational level leads to a
change in recurrent actions at the organizational level. 
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such action. The same applies to resources; they can constrain or enable action. Figure 6.3 
provides examples from the studies within IBN and Citibank for each of the dynamics.  
 
Figure 6.3: Case examples of the constraining and enabling effects of business beliefs 
and resources on strategic and recurrent action 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The case studies display different ways in which business beliefs constrain action. 
As the following excerpt from Chapter 5 indicates, for a while Citibank executives 
persisted in their beliefs regarding the corporate banking business. The changes going on 
in this environment were not perceived as triggers for adaptation; performance confirmed 
the existing strategy in the eyes of the decision-makers:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even if environmental developments are noticed and interpreted as a trigger for action, 
business beliefs might still hold managers back from initiating action. In the case of 
Segmentation, corporate-level managers were aware of environmental developments and 
perceived the need for IBN to respond. However, their commitment to existing organizing 
Segmentation: Belief in profit 
responsibility residing in a 
single dimension  
GRB: Belief in serving 
global needs of global 
customers 
Segmentation: Lack of 
segment-based performance 
evaluation system 
GRB: WCG know-how 
Business beliefs 
Enabling 
Resources 
Constraining 
According to some critics within and without the organization, corporate managers
should have created a sense of direction for the corporate bank sooner. The CEO
ascribed his late intervention to the lack of a perceived need for action [GRB case,
Chapter 5, page 90]  
Intelligent adaptation 
 
126
principles prevented them from approving the plans proposed by divisional decision-
makers: 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
The failure to notice environmental developments, to interpret them as triggers for 
adaptation, or to be held back from acting on a perceived need for change by existing 
business beliefs are all examples of cognitive inertia. Cognitive inertia has been said to 
“prevent managers from immediately assimilating new information into existing mental 
models” (Reger and Palmer, 1996: 23). Several other studies have shown the impact of 
cognitive inertia on strategic decision-making and action in the increasingly dynamic 
financial services sector (Haveman, 1992; Reger and Palmer, 1996; Wolfgramm et al., 
1998). Their findings generally suggest that managers’ mental models change slowly even 
when environments change rapidly. The constraining effect of business beliefs on action 
which has been distilled from the data thus supports this work.   
 Business beliefs are enabling in the sense that they (1) provide direction and 
energize; (2) put things in a new light; and (3) bring new things to light. The excerpt below 
illustrates the first point. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What decision-makers believed would lead Citibank’s corporate division to success in its 
business was summarized in a single sentence and communicated as such throughout the 
organization. It allowed for a relatively easy transference of a complex change, providing 
direction and giving meaning to managers’ strategic actions. Besides direction and 
leverage, new business beliefs refreshed people’s perspectives on issues. The GRB case 
provides a good example of this: 
 
 
 
 
According to the project manager of Segmentation in that particular stage, the
reluctance of corporate management to pursue a more radical change had much to do
with existing practices still being prominent in their minds [Segmentation case, Chapter
4, page 63]  
[…] the phrase ‘serving global customers globally, and become their lead international
bank’ became a mantra. As one of its architects argues: “It is as clear and powerful a
one-sentence objective function for strategy as I know. It’s who, it’s how, and it’s what
–what we want to become” [GRB case, Chapter 5, page 102]  
“Suddenly we could start thinking about doing all the processing for foreign exchange in
one location, not in three locations. We could talk about doing all our processing in
technology for derivatives in one location. Suddenly we had the ability to rationalize our
activities” [GRB case, Chapter 5, page 97, source: interview]  
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A new perspective on the business thus evoked a new perspective on how to organize 
certain back-office processes. This led to changes in the operational infrastructure of the 
corporate bank. Finally, new beliefs served to ‘increase the bandwidth’ or to ‘tune to a 
different band’ (Bettis and Prahalad, 1995: 8). In the GRB case, the shift toward customers 
as the primary organizing principle led to new insights that became the basis for strategic 
and recurrent action:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The enabling power of business beliefs seems to depend on at least two factors: (1) how 
‘true’ they are in the eyes of the actors involved; and (2) how visible they are in the 
adaptation process. The fit between environmental opportunities and organizational 
strengths made the GRB seem like a viable strategic option among organization members. 
This helped to make them susceptible to change initiatives. While in the GRB case 
business beliefs were visible throughout the adaptation process by the use of jargon and 
visualizations, operationalizations prevailed in the Segmentation process. The drivers for 
change submerged in the background and, instead, discussions revolved mainly around 
administrative issues. The appointment of segment managers brought the original business 
beliefs back into the picture. However, the compartmentalization at this level confined the 
enabling power of the beliefs mostly to the respective segments.    
 Whereas business beliefs usually influence the type of action intended in response 
to environmental change (cf. Bartunek, 1984), resources influence whether intended action 
is actually being initiated. From the cases emerges a distinction between resources needed 
for a change in business beliefs and those required for a change in resources –the two types 
of strategic action considered in this research. A first type of resource, evaluation and 
reward systems, were used to focus organization members’ attention on the performance 
variables driving the new business model. For example, the CRU measure within the GRB 
model stimulated organization members “not to think in terms of making financial 
increments but to think, ‘Am I cross-sold; am I multiproduct, multiregion?” (former senior 
VP and marketing director Ed Holmes quoted in Charan & Tichy, 1998: 113). Reward 
systems can thus be used to align the interests of employees with organizational interests 
based on the business beliefs. For a change in lower-level resources, authorizing power 
seems to be a prime resource. This second type of resource, the power to allocate 
The bottom line of SMART 2, the presentation of revenues by customer, generated
frame-breaking insights. According to the then marketing director: “That created a
vision: Wait a second, big global relationships make more money than even big
domestic relations or single product ones. We began to see that there were big
differences by customer that could not be explained by product” [GRB case, Chapter 5,
page 98]  
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resources, is a prerequisite when orchestrating the rules and systems which constitute the 
formal organizational context. A third type of resource emerging from the data is know-
how –in particular the knowledge of the means of achieving a change in business beliefs 
and resources. Creativity is an important part of this. In the light of the current study, this 
quality can be explained as the ability to select and apply structural properties, to form new 
combinations of such properties, and to extend and dispose of them such that discretion is 
increased (cf. Sewell, 1992; Whittington, 1988).      
 The constraining effect of resources lies mainly in them being absent or 
inappropriate. The following excerpt from the Segmentation case exemplifies this:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both in IBN and Citibank, the middle managers who took up the leadership roles for the 
new part of the division invented ways around the resource deficiencies. Being very 
ambitious and eager to show their ability to build a successful ‘customer business’, they 
acted on basis of their business beliefs rather than their resources. Adding to this dynamic 
seems to have been the fact that the responsibilities of these middle managers were not 
fully defined in the early stages of segment development and that these managers were 
directly involved in the definition process. While the segment/industry managers were 
mostly guided in their thinking and acting by new business beliefs, managers representing 
incumbent organizational dimensions (i.e. geography, product) were generally more 
attached to old beliefs and practices. The following quote from an interview with a district 
managers of IBN illustrates this point: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
At the middle management level, resources were thus constraining in two basic ways: (1) 
by hampering strategic and recurrent action of managers in charge of novel parts of the 
In their efforts to give substance to segmentation, the segment managers faced some
difficulties. Primary in this respect were misfits between commercial goals and
strategies and the back-office infrastructure present within IBN. One of the then
segment managers indicates how this caused problems: “Our operations could not
handle what we sold. So we often sold much prettier things than  we could actually 
handle operationally” [Segmentation case, Chapter 4, page 69]  
“I have to be honest, I have never cared about how segment managers were thinking
about things. They were only talking about fake guilders. I have always said: the profits
are made within the district. […] We were not able to measure profits in terms of
segments” (interview, 5 June 2002).  
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division; and (2) by leveraging incumbent managers’ efforts to persist in old practices and 
beliefs.  
 The opposite holds as well. Resources are enabling action for as much as they are 
available and appropriate. Different resources have been identified as enablers, some of 
which were already briefly mentioned above. Authorizing power seems instrumental when 
deciding on strategic changes in resources (i.e. resource allocation power). When the 
divisional board of IBN was overruled by corporate management with regard to some 
aspects of Segmentation, this showed the influence of authorizing power on strategic 
action. Formal management systems (e.g., performance evaluation & reward systems) 
seem especially appropriate to change lower-level business beliefs. The case data also 
indicate the importance of formal rules and systems for recurrent action. For example, for 
middle managers to conduct their day-to-day activities, i.e. orchestrating and maintaining 
the context for front-end organizational activities, appropriate authority and management 
information systems derived from the studies as key resources.     
 Linking the forementioned dynamics back to existing literature in general and the 
theoretical domain of this study in specific, some key observations can be made. The cases 
reveal a constraining as well as an enabling side of structure. In this regard, the findings 
support work aiming for a reconciliation of determinism and voluntarism in the field of 
adaptation (see Chapter 2). The two-sided notion of structure also confirms the 
structurational conceptualization. However, while structurational theorists have explained 
the constraining effect of structure mainly in terms of ‘mindless’ reliance on previously 
developed structural properties, the constraining side of structure emerging from the 
current study is more comprehensive. Mindless behavior can be explained as automatic 
processing, “unintentional, involuntary, effortless, autonomous, and occurring outside of 
awareness” (Reger and Palmer, 1996: 23). The cases indicate that even if actors are aware, 
they may still be constrained in their action by endogenous factors. For example, 
conflicting goals (aim for stability and aim for change) restrained strategic action at the 
decision-maker as well as the middle management level within IBN. Constraints may also 
arrive from exogenous factors, a category which was considered underdeveloped within 
structurational theory (see Chapter 2). Despite their knowledgeability, actors are still 
confronted with environmental and organizational factors that limit their discretion. Even 
though segment managers in IBN were very eager to explore every opportunity to translate 
their plans into action, there were some constraints they could not erase. The argument 
might be that these managers were just not knowledgeable enough, which brings us back to 
endogenous constraints. However, it seems also reasonable to assume that even the most 
knowledgeable actor is confronted with exogenous factors restraining his/hers actions.  
 Secondly, comparing the two adaptation processes, an interesting difference 
between the cases comes to light. In IBN, decision-makers dedicated most time and effort 
to issues in the realm of resources, especially to the redesign of roles and responsibilities. 
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In the GRB process, business beliefs were proactively used as a lever for change. For 
example, the mantra ‘Serving global customers globally to become their Lead International 
Bank’ provided guidance in the change process, and a stable basis for action over time. 
Years later, this mantra still served as a guiding principle for organization members’ 
decisions and actions. At the same time, roles and responsibilities within IBN have been 
further adjusted, as a result of learning processes and continued environmental change. 
What might be concluded from this observation is that both the deeper level of business 
beliefs and the surface level of resources can be the focus of attention of decision-makers 
during change. Business beliefs are less tangible and therefore more difficult to use as 
lever for change. However, due to their fundamental nature, they represent long-term 
drivers of behavior and might therefore be an important source of stability for organization 
members operating under fastly changing conditions (cf. Bartunek, 1984: 368).       
A third key observation concerns the effect of structure on action across levels in 
top-down adaptation processes. Strategic choice and structuration theories are both 
inclined to decision-makers as the unit of analysis. This research extends this perspective 
by connecting strategic action at the decision-maker level to strategic and recurrent action 
at the middle management level. The data show how structure at one level affects action at 
lower levels. How action in turn affects structure is being discussed in the next part of this 
section.   
 
How action affects structure 
Just as there were four basic ways defined in which structure influences action, four ways 
in which action affects structure can be distilled from the data. Strategic and recurrent 
action confirm both business beliefs and resources but also challenge these structural 
properties. Figure 6.4 gives examples for each of these dynamics.  
 
Figure 6.4: Case examples of the confirming and challenging effects of strategic and 
recurrent action on business beliefs and resources 
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The confirmation of business beliefs and resources through action reflects a tenet of 
structuration theory: structure as medium and outcome of action. The case studies show 
how both old (pre-change process) and new business beliefs were reinforced as they were 
mobilized in action. The confirmation of old beliefs happened in the early stages of the 
change projects, indicating an incubation period in the belief transition process, and also in 
later stages, indicating partial change in the belief set. New beliefs were confirmed through 
strategic actions that altered lower-level resources and business beliefs accordingly. For 
example, the new key belief in the added value of superior industry and customer 
knowledge led to the development of a new resource for all relationship managers: IKAP. 
The underlying business belief was communicated to these managers as well. Drawing on 
the new structural properties in their daily practices, relationship managers re-confirmed 
them. The same applies to pre-existing and newly created resources. The reward system 
within IBN remained largely the same in the Segmentation process. The continued use of 
this system reinforced behavioral patterns in line with the system parameters. The CRU, a 
decision making tool introduced in the GRB process, is an example of a new resource 
which, by proving clear value, reinforced its application in customer management 
processes.  
Challenging effects of action on business beliefs and resources are also evident in 
the cases. Various drivers of such effects were identified in this research. First of all, it 
seems that business beliefs are more often challenged through data-driven action whereas 
the type of action challenging resources is more strongly theory-driven. Data-driven action 
is based primarily on on-the-spot external stimuli, while theory-driven action is inspired by 
previous experiences which have settled in the organization in the form of business beliefs 
GRB: (New) recurrent 
action of relationship 
managers 
GRB: Recurrent 
action of C6 
GRB: Working with CRUs Segmentation: 
Strategic action of 
segment managers 
Business beliefs
Challenged 
Resources 
Confirmed 
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(see also Chapter 2). As the current study indicates, for business beliefs to be challenged, 
new perceptions need to emerge that represent a fundamental and obvious contradiction. 
For example, the perceived environmental developments as well as the organization’s 
performance situation preceded Citibank executives’ reconsideration of their business 
beliefs. Resources were challenged in particular when managers were strongly driven by 
new business beliefs. The efforts of IBN segment managers provide a clear example in this 
respect:  
 
   
 
 
 
Secondly, when actors try to mobilize a structural property which then fails to instantiate in 
action, the very attempt challenges this property. For example, when segment managers 
within IBN tried to exert influence over marketing and sales activities in the branch 
network organization, the trouble to do so in a number of instances decreased the potential 
authorizing power of these managers. Besides this direct effect of strategic and recurrent 
action on structure, the case material also conveys an indirect effect. This effect which is 
related to the perceived successfulness of action seems actually more important. The 
creation of the C6 to give way to a customer-focused business approach in Citibank was 
considered ineffective which led to a reconsideration of the underlying beliefs: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While in the GRB case some measures were considered ineffective because they were too 
complex or too radical, in the case of Segmentation some actions were considered too 
restricted based on their results. In the years following the Segmentation project, several 
strategic actions were initiated on basis of adjusted beliefs. The theoretical framework 
brings an interesting viewpoint to the table. By definition, strategic action will be 
considered successful when the intended change in business beliefs and/or resources is 
actually achieved. Recurrent action will be perceived as successful when it is aligned with 
environmental characteristics. This will presumably lead to satisfying performance. The 
theoretical viewpoint is reflected in the data. To determine the effectiveness of their 
actions, managers focus their attention on the level(s) affected by these actions. The 
perceived results then serve to confirm or challenge the structure that enabled the action in 
the first place. The mediating effect of lower-level structure-action dynamics on the link 
As one of the change agents, a marketing director, indicated: “[We] allowed geography 
to have more of an influence and simplified the organizational structure” [GRB case, 
Chapter 5, page 106]  
[…] they challenged and stretched existing limits within IBN by focusing on market
opportunities rather than resource constraints [Segmentation case, Chapter 4, page 69]  
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between action and structure can only be revealed when applying a multi-level perspective 
on adaptation. Looking from this angle has brought to light the role of middle managers as 
catalysts of change in top-down adaptation, a factor that was not incorporated in the 
original theoretical framework. This role will be discussed in Section 6.4.   
 Structuration theorists, institutionalists, cognitive theorists, and proponents of 
strategic choice have all explored interrelations between structure and action within 
organizations. These studies usually revolve around a single level of analysis, either 
implicitly or explicitly (e.g., Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Sewell, 1992). The current research 
shows the importance of a multi-level perspective for understanding top-down adaptation. 
Cross-level dynamics influence how adaptation takes place. Figure 6.5 visualizes the 
multi-level character of the structure-action duality as it emerged from the evidence.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: The multi-level character of the structure-action duality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the above findings, the research propositions associated with the second theme 
can be reconsidered.  
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Exhibit 6.4: Empirically-derived refinement of research propositions P3, P4 and P5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P3 stated that a change in decision-makers’ business beliefs triggers a change in resources 
at the organizational level. The study presented here gives way to a specification of this 
proposition. In both cases, change in decision-makers’ business beliefs triggered change in 
resources at the middle management level. Certain resources seemed to be more ‘ready-to-
change’ than others. For example, the renewal of management information systems in both 
IBN and Citibank required considerable time whereas physical accommodation and 
facilities were arranged generally easier. The difference in renewal time exposed both 
divisional organizations to resource misfits which caused delays and, thereby reduced 
effectiveness of the change initiative. With regard to P4, a change in decision-makers’ 
business beliefs triggers a change of business beliefs at the organizational level, the 
contribution of middle manager emerges from the case studies as a critical success factor. 
In this vein, P4 is rephrased (middle management level rather than organizational level) 
and conditionalized (if deep level is explicitly focused on). While middle managers in new 
roles seem most important as catalysts of change, managers in existing positions were 
predominantly associated with inertial effects. Finally P5, which stated that a change in 
resources and business beliefs leads to a change in recurrent actions at the organizational 
level, has been further specified on basis of the results. The middle management level is 
added as a key intermediary level (cf. Balogun, 2003).  
 
6.4 Theme 3: How middle managers influence top-down adaptation  
As was stated before, in organizational studies on top-down, second-order change, middle 
managers have often been singled out as the primary source of resistance (Balogun, 2003; 
Huy, 2002; McKinley and Scherer, 2000). While in first-order change processes, middle 
managers have been portrayed in supporting roles, interpolating structures and systems, in 
second-order adaptation they are usually considered to be part of the inertial system 
P3 A change in decision-makers’ business beliefs triggers a change in resources at the 
middle management level. 
 
P4 A change in decision-makers’ business beliefs triggers a change in business beliefs
at the middle management level if the deep level is taken into explicit consideration by
the decision-makers. 
 
P5 A change in resources and business beliefs at the middle management level leads to 
a change in resources and recurrent actions at the organizational level.  
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(Biggart, 1977; Miles, 1997). Recently, some work has appeared that suggests a role for 
middle managers in maintaining continuity during second-order change. Middle managers’ 
attention to employees’ emotions in such change seems to increase the chance of a smooth 
transition (Huy, 2001; 2002). The current research yields a number of interesting findings 
regarding the role of middle managers in top-down, second-order adaptation processes. 
Three basic contributions of middle managers to adaptation can be identified. First, 
supporting the classic view on these managers’ impact on second-order change, both case 
studies reveal resistance at the middle management level. This resistance showed in 
managers’ reluctance to get involved in development processes and enact new rules. The 
second contribution is in line with the more recently considered role as guardian of day-to-
day operations. And, finally, middle managers have shown to leverage second-order 
change as well. For example, within the Segmentation project, the segment managers 
played a key role in moving the division away from existing practices toward new ones.  
 When examining how the different contributions of middle managers relate to 
each other, the distinction between incumbent and novel positions at the middle 
management level appears as an important one. While incumbent positions already existed 
before the adaptation effort, novel functions are those that are newly created in the light of 
realignment with the environment. Managers in incumbent positions, who were often 
veteran managers, caused most resistance in both the Segmentation and GRB processes. 
These managers had the responsibility to keep operations up and running while being 
confronted with fundamental changes in rules imposed from the top. They were formally 
in charge of the implementation of changes in the behavior of their subordinates as well as 
their own behavior while often lacking motivation and means. In contrast, managers in 
new functions were usually newcomer managers who were specifically hired to 
substantiate decision-makers’ plans. They were committed to change rather than to 
existing beliefs and practices.  
 To understand how the different contributions of middle managers come about, 
the structure-action duality again offers an interesting viewpoint. Managers of incumbent 
organizational units (in the cases: district managers, country managers) relied heavily on 
existing business beliefs and resources for recurrent action. However, these managers were 
also expected to undertake strategic action in line with decision-makers’ plans. The 
confrontation between the old and the new structure gave rise to some resistance, both 
within IBN and Citibank. While middle managers in incumbent organizational parts had to 
balance different structural complexes (cf. Sewell, 1992), middle managers in the new 
organizational parts were mainly occupied with extension and refinement of the new 
structural complex. Through strategic action, these managers actively contributed to the 
establishment of new business beliefs and resources. From the data emerge two key ways 
in which these newcomer managers leveraged change. First, they championed decision-
makers’ business beliefs and derivative beliefs developed for specific divisional domains. 
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Second, these managers played an instrumental role in the development of new resources 
(e.g., MIS, authorizing power). In particular their tendency to use the business beliefs 
rather than resources as a starting point seems to have been a significant lever for change.     
 
6.5 Conclusion  
The empirical research has brought in specifications with regard to structure-dynamics 
over time and across levels. Middle managers played an important role in the top-down, 
second-order adaptation processes under consideration. They shaped the adaptation effort 
through (1) resisting change; (2) safegarding continuity; and (3) leveraging change. These 
contributions originated from different parts of the divisions. Managers in incumbent 
positions were more inclined toward resistance. The fact that they were in charge of 
keeping operations running seems to have been instrumental in this respect. Managers in 
newly created positions –positions substantiating new business beliefs- were more inclined 
toward change. In both cases, the managers selected for these roles were relatively young, 
ambitious and had a track record. Their drive and creativity seem to have had a significant 
effect on their strategic actions by which they orchestrated the organizational context. Now 
that the key themes and patterns have been discussed, they will be considered specifically 
in the light of the overall research question and issues posed in the introductory chapter. 
 CHAPTER 7 
LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the impact of cognition in organizational adaptation processes has been widely 
acknowledged, there is still a lot to learn about how it plays a role. The study reported was 
aimed at gaining a better understanding of the pervasive influence of cognition in 
adaptation. A theoretical framework was developed which framed adaptation in terms of 
structure-action dynamics. Through the cognitively anchored framework, adaptive efforts 
in divisions of two financial conglomerates were examined. Based on the findings, the 
original framework was extended and refined. In the current chapter, a number of issues is 
dealt with to conclude the thesis. The first three sections look back on the research. Section 
7.1 summarizes the key outcomes of the theoretical and empirical explorations. Framing 
adaptation as interactions between structure and action over time and across levels 
surfaced several aspects which, as is argued here, deserve more attention in strategy 
research. Section 7.2 revolves around the managerial implications of the study. A number 
of virtues and pitfalls of cognition are discussed, and managers are alerted to the fine line 
between them. The third section is dedicated to the limitations of the research. By 
explicating the study’s boundaries, the generalizability of the findings is assessed. Building 
on the limitations and implications, the fourth section looks forward, containing an agenda 
for future research. The fifth and last part of the chapter concludes the research by 
returning to the title of the thesis –Intelligent Adaptation- to indicate how this concept 
should be interpreted in the light of the current research.     
 
7.1 Summary of key findings 
With regard to the pervasive influence of cognition in adaptation, three main themes were 
discussed in the previous chapter. The key underlying patterns are summarized here and 
embedded in existing strategy literature. 
 
Theme 1: Key findings 
The first theme addressed how cognition changes in adaptation. Table 7.1 presents the 
three patterns on which this theme has been based, their theoretical and empirical 
grounding, and their contribution to the existing body of knowledge in the strategy 
domain.  
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Building on existing literature, change in decision-makers’ and organizational business 
beliefs was defined as a prime focus in the study (see Chapter 2). Besides business beliefs, 
perceptions were included in the research framework to get a deeper understanding of the 
role of cognition. The distinction between beliefs and perceptions, which often tends to 
remain obscure in adaptation studies, provided some interesting insights. The extent to 
which perceptions are influenced by the current information environment versus past 
experiences determines the effect of these perceptions on business beliefs. Business beliefs 
are likely to get altered if significant environmental change has taken place and if 
(expected) organizational performance gives way to such reconsideration. Under these 
conditions, decision-makers are found to be more receptive to the actual developments 
going on in their surroundings. In the adaptation processes under consideration, this 
showed for example in peer company visits by decision-makers (IBN), the hire of strategy 
consultants (IBN/Citibank). In contrast, business beliefs are likely to be confirmed if past 
experiences drive perceptions. In the Citibank case, this led to a delay in action-taking. 
Satisfiying overall performance led corporate-level executives to underestimate the impact 
of changes in especially the corporate banking industry. Performance at time T is an 
indicator of the fit between organizational practices and environmental characteristics at T-
1. However, as also appears from previous work in this field, decision-makers tend to 
attribute performance at T to the current situation as well (Barr et al., 1992). Besides 
triggering change in business beliefs and preserving existing beliefs, perceptions can serve 
to validate emerging beliefs. In both of the cases, environmental analyses were conducted 
to gain a more thorough understanding of dynamics underlying strategic prescriptions that 
were being developed. These analyses helped to build ground for these prescriptions.  
 The findings gave way to a refinement of some of the original research 
propositions (see Chapter 6). The cases indicate the importance of a perceived need for 
change. Changes in external conditions first need to be observed, and then interpreted as an 
actual threat to the organization’s continuity in order to create a sense of emergency (cf. 
Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Jackson and Dutton, 1988). This seemed a condition for 
second-order change in business beliefs. Based on this insight, P2 was extended. From the 
study emerged another insight into how cognition evolves in adaptation. This insight was 
visualized as four sets of activities linked across time. The empirically-derived notion of 
changing cognition in adaptation indicates the entwinedness of deep and surface levels. 
Reality contemplation and recreation activities are about actually changing decision-
makers’ cognition (deep level), whereas reality constitution and maintainance activities 
concern the insertion of changed cognition into deep and surface level organizational 
elements. It thus portrays the evolution of cognition in adaptation as a multi-level process, 
spanning decision-maker and organizational levels of analysis. This finding is in line with 
previous organizational studies that have emphasized the importance of taking into account 
strategy creation processes as well as organizing processes for a comprehensive account of 
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adaptation (Dijksterhuis, Van den Bosch and Volberda, 2003; Whittington and Melin, 
2003).    
 
Theme 2: Key findings 
The second theme involved the conception of adaptation as multi-level dynamics of 
structure and action. In Chapter 6, various adaptive dynamics were explained in terms of 
interactions between business beliefs and resources (structure) and strategic and recurrent 
actions (action). Table 7.2 offers a summary of the main patterns discerned and their 
theoretical and empirical contribution. 
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As evidenced by the cases, the basic dynamics are: (1) business beliefs and resources 
constrain strategic and recurrent actions; (2) business beliefs and resources enable strategic 
and recurrent actions; (3) strategic and recurrent actions confirm business beliefs and 
resources; (4) strategic and recurrent actions challenge business beliefs and resources. 
With regard to these dynamics, some issues of interest were raised. First of all, business 
beliefs and resources constrain/enable action in different ways. Business beliefs usually 
influence whether and what action is being undertaken (see Chapter 6), constraining or 
enabling action in those respects. Resources have been said to influence whether intended 
action is actually been initiated. The availability and appropriateness of resources 
influences the extent to which business beliefs are mobilized. Secondly, in line with the 
first issue, a fit between business beliefs and resources drives adaptation. However, 
misalignments seem quite common as it takes time to define and install the appropriate 
resources, and newly adopted business beliefs are difficult to transfer. As appears from one 
of the cases, decision-makers can be inclined toward changing resources to realign the 
organization. Lacking the right business beliefs for their support, new resources seem only 
effective to a certain extent. The opposite – a lack of appropriate resources- has yielded an 
interesting phenomenon. If managers lack the formal systems to convert their beliefs into 
action, creativity in circumventing these resource constraints may still enable them to do 
so. The fourth and final key finding pertains to the multi-level nature of structure-action 
relations. The empirical study shows how changes in structure at one level affect both 
structure and action at another level. The same applies to the way in which action 
influences structure. Strategic and recurrent action at one level feed back into structure at 
another level. This finding displays the added value of a multi-level perspective on 
adaptation. The findings related to the second theme confirm the basic research 
propositions on structure-action dynamics as presented in Chapter 2. Moreover, they 
specify these propositions in terms of when and how these dynamics come to pass. P4, 
which states that a change in decision-makers’ business beliefs triggers a change in 
business beliefs at the organizational level, touches on a key matter. While more difficult 
to address due to their intangible and, often, subconscious nature, business beliefs seem a 
powerful and necessary lever for change.  
 
Theme 3: Key findings 
 The cross-level dimension of adaptation is also a pillar of the third theme. This particular 
theme pivots on the role of middle managers in second-order adaptation. Table 7.3 shows 
the main results.  
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Existing literature on top-down change processes mostly revolves around inertial effects of 
middle management involvement. From the present study emerge additional roles. In line 
with recent work (Huy, 2001) the stabilizing role of middle managers has been exposed. 
As guardians of day-to-day operations, managers between the decision-making and front-
line levels help to maintain continuity in times of adaptation. However, as appears from the 
present study, middle managers can also serve as catalysts of change. They do so in 
basically two ways. First, they translate high-level business beliefs into lower-level rules 
and procedures. Second, they develop business beliefs for specific domains or disciplines 
which are in accordance with those created at the top level. There seem to be structural 
causes attached to the different middle management roles in adaptation processes. Firstly, 
administrative heritage comes out as a probable cause. Managers in existing roles, in 
existing organizational departments/units are confronted with old structures which need to 
be fundamentally renewed. In contrast, managers in new positions generally start with a 
clean slate. Decision-makers can select managers for such positions who have beliefs 
similar to the ones promoted from the top. This will increase the chance of them actively 
supporting the change effort. A second cause, related to the first, regards responsibilities. If 
it is the responsibility of a manager to keep daily operations running, existing beliefs 
which have proven successful in the past offer more certainty and comfort than new 
business beliefs. If a manager has been hired to give substance to a new role, the new 
business beliefs are part of this role’s rationale. Thirdly, the data hint at the level of 
involvement in the development of business beliefs as a structural reason for a difference 
in contributions among middle managers. Managers closely involved in all four types of 
activities (contemplation, recreation, constitution, maintenance) seem more supportive of 
new business beliefs than managers who are involved in the organizing activities only. 
This finding adds to studies revolving around the strategic role of middle management in 
organizational change processes (e.g., Floyd and Wooldridge, 1997). The different 
contributions of middle management which manifest at the surface level relate to different 
degrees of cognitive adaptability. Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) use this term to explain why 
cognitive dissonance appeared between senior and middle managers in the Polaroid 
Corporation. The authors suggest that differences in cognitive adaptability are caused by 
difference in signals about the market received at these different organizational layers. 
Their idea of hierarchy in cognition is expanded in the current research by the recognition 
of causes linked to specific contributions in adaptation. As the study at hand shows, these 
contributions might well derive from the same hierarchical level.  
 In prior research on adaptation, scholars have focused primarily on actions and 
outcomes. Cognitive accounts of adaptation have mostly been confined to static reports on 
the role of decision-makers’ cognition in the relation between environment and 
organization. By focusing on interaction between cognition and action over time and 
across levels, the research presented here permits a more comprehensive analysis of 
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adaptation. The study suggests how a change in decision-makers’ cognition results in a 
change in organizational action. Perceptions and business beliefs were distinguished to 
understand how cognition changes in adaptation. Business beliefs and resources were 
identified as key structural properties underlying strategic as well as recurrent action. 
Mutual dependencies between structural properties and between structural properties and 
action were discussed to indicate how strategic and recurrent actions emerge. Finally, 
action was considered to feed back into structure, confirming or challenging the very basis 
of its existence. From the empirical study derived the key role of middle managers, both in 
constraining change and enabling it. Differences in cognitive adaptability among these 
managers were attributed to their specific role in adaptation.  
 What are the findings regarding the combination of strategic choice theory, 
structuration theory and cognitive theory? Strategic choice theory sets the outline of the 
study by focusing attention on decision-makers’ proactive and opportunistic responses to 
changing environments. Structuration theory served to frame adaptation in terms of 
interactions between structure and action. Finally, cognitive theory knit together the 
cognitive threads of the former two theories and added organizational cognition as a key 
focus. By integrating insights from these three theories, contributions have been made to 
each of them. Child (1997) points out that strategic choice can be a useful corrective to 
extreme views of determinism and voluntarism as it “ draws attention to the inter-
dependence of choice and constraint in organizational behaviour” (1997: 72). From the 
current research, structuration theory appears as a valuable perspective to substantiate 
strategic choice’s tenets in this respect. In turn, structuration theory’s potential contribution 
to adaptation research increased with the adding of a multi-level dimension to the 
structure-action duality. Cognitive theory gained considerably by the grounding of 
cognitive dynamics in the broader context of action (cf. Meindl et al., 1994; Walsh, 1995). 
Also, knowledge about the connection between decision-makers’ cognition and 
organizational cognition was deepened through strategic choice and structuration theory. In 
sum, the combination of these theories has been fruitful and deserves further exploration in 
future research.   
 
7.2 Managerial implications  
The present study on top-down, second-order adaptation has a number of implications 
from a decision-maker perspective. Framing adaptive efforts in terms of structure-action 
dynamics yields some interesting insights into how decision-makers can achieve 
organizational transformation. The development and establishment of new business beliefs 
throughout the organization seems key in this respect.  
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How decision-makers can develop and establish new business beliefs 
How can executives create a critical distance to existing business beliefs to change them 
fundamentally (cf. Whittington, 1988)? In the GRB case, a severe performance crisis 
helped to renounce core assumptions about the business. However, aiming for a crisis in 
order to change business beliefs is quite an extreme option. In the Segmentation case, 
where performance was still satisfying, the awareness of decision-makers concerning the 
inappropriateness of the IBN business model in the longer run created some distance to 
existing business beliefs. In both cases, the involvement of strategy consultants seems to 
have been instrumental in creating enough distance for change. In contrast with 
organizational actors, strategy consultants are trained in critically evaluating existing 
business models of organizations. In the early stages of adaptation, they challenged deeply 
engrained beliefs, directed decision-makers’ attention toward key environmental 
developments, influenced these managers’ interpretations of the developments, and helped 
to overcome cognitive inertia.  
Creating distance to existing structural properties is associated with 
contemplation. With regard to recreation, there are also some lessons for managers to be 
gained from the research. Defining the right interface between the recreation effort and the 
organizational and environmental context seems critical. Some space between existing 
practices and recreation activities allows for an open mind. In the Segmentation case, this 
happened through the formation of a project team at the decision-maker level and through 
autonomous segment units at the middle management level. In the GRB case, recreation 
took place to some extent at the corporate level which lacked the direct connection with 
divisional practices. Input for recreation also derived from the work of the task teams 
which were in their activities somewhat distanced from daily operations. At the same time, 
completely isolating the recreation effort from the organization would have prohibited 
decision-makers to ‘borrow’ business beliefs from other organizational units. The GRB 
case clearly showed the advantages of such transposition. Serving global customers 
globally had already shown its value in the WCG which decreased the risk of failure for 
the particular set of beliefs in the eyes of decision-makers and increased efficiency in 
implementation. In the case of Segmentation, decision-makers adopted beliefs that had 
proved their validity in competitor firms. Directly through company visits, and indirectly 
through assistance by strategy consultants. Sewell (1992) suggest that managers gain their 
discretion by creating and actively exploiting tensions between structural properties. The 
cases give some insight into how this idea translates into practice. In the strategy-making 
process, IBN’s segment managers were confronted with misfits between their business 
beliefs and the resources available. Rather than adjusting their beliefs to the constraints, in 
several instances they enforced changes in infrastructure to match their ideas about how 
IBN could be successful in the particular client segments.  
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 Constitution in this research referred to the anchoring of a new reality that has 
emerged among decision-makers into the organization (unit)’s very structure and working. 
Two key observations derive from the case studies. Decision-makers are inclined to focus 
on roles and responsibilities when trying to constitute their new business beliefs. Ideas on 
how an organization can be successful in its business tends to be framed in terms of 
functions and how these functions interrelate. Such organizational elements are relatively 
tangible, and changes in them are generally easy to explain. Formal systems tend to lag 
behind for the simple reason that it takes time to change them drastically. Especially in the 
Segmentation trajectory, the complexity and scale of this type of changes seem to have 
caused some delays. This was confirmed in the formal evaluation report on Segmentation. 
The third anchor considered in this research, lower-level business beliefs, emerged from 
the data as a less prominent lever for change within IBN. Only in a late stage of the change 
trajectory, a change management consultancy firm was hired to create division-wide 
understanding of and commitment to the changes. Up to that point, communication to 
divisional members about the plans was largely ad hoc. However, for organization 
members to change their thinking about the business and how to succeed in it in line with 
decision-makers’ business beliefs, they need time to understand these beliefs and commit 
themselves. Both cases indicate the importance of trust in the judgment of higher-level 
management if second-order change is aimed for. Such change often leads to drastic shifts 
in people’s positions and work processes which need to be supported by these people 
themselves. The GRB case shows some mechanisms for changing organization members’ 
business beliefs beyond the decision-making level. A new and consistently, over time and 
place, applied vocabulary, clear and easily accessible visualizations of the rationale behind 
the new business model, compelling evidence in support of the new organizing principles, 
face-to-face encounters of key actors of the new organization in a controlled environment, 
and the continuous confrontation of organization members with the new rules and the 
underlying vision have been mentioned in this respect. Decision-makers should be aware 
of the leveraging effects of mechanisms for second-order change in their organizations.  
 Finally, the data offer some clues about effective maintenance of new realities. 
Both positive and negative feedback mechanisms have been used by decision-makers in 
the adaptation processes under consideration. Effective retention techniques based on 
positive feedback seemed to have been ad hoc customer feedback and increased 
satisfaction among employees themselves. Somewhat later on, formal reward systems 
served as positive feedback mechanisms. Effective retention based on negative feedback 
mainly derived from strict top-down correction of behavior associated with old rules. 
Besides framing adaptive efforts in terms of structure-action dynamics, applying a multi-
level perspective also adds value from a managerial perspective.  
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The practical value of a multi-level perspective on adaptation 
Using a multi-level approach to adaptation offers decision-makers at least two advantages. 
First, it allows them to explicitly consider the role of middle managers in the change 
process. Taking into consideration both the constraining and enabling effects that middle 
managers can have on adaptation, decision-makers may be able to anticipate inertial forces 
as well as optimize middle management’s contribution to change. The distinction between 
incumbent and new positions which has derived from the research gives decision-makers 
insight into different sets of challenges and opportunities at the middle management level. 
In the cases, managers in incumbent roles had to balance continuity and change. 
Representing the existing organization, they were key in keeping operations running. At 
the same time, changes in the way theorganization was run had to be incorporated by these 
same managers. The research confirms the outcomes of several previous studies on 
second-order organizational change which indicated organization members’ preference for 
stability (e.g., Berry, 1994). Managers in incumbent positions emerge from the research as 
a primary locus of resistance. On the other hand, managers in new roles were primarily 
involved in creating change. Although they were still partly operating under the old 
conditions, as some resources were still in the making, many of these managers were 
strongly committed to changing the way business was done. Managers in new positions 
emerge from the study as a primary source of creativity and renewal. Keeping in mind the 
skills and personalities that match each of these fundamentally different positions at the 
middle management level, decision-makers might increase the chance of successful 
adaptation. 
 The second advantage of a multi-level perspective on adaptation resides in the 
hierarchical notion of structure that it entails. Top-down, second-order adaptation has been 
portrayed as a process in which top-level business beliefs were cascaded down the 
organization (unit), enabled by a particular set of resources. While at the decision-maker 
level, business beliefs translate into high-level vision statements and plans, lower down in 
the organization (unit), they are reflected in more concrete rules as well as in formal 
systems. Together, these layers of resources (formal rules, systems) and underlying 
business beliefs (cf. Sewell, 1992) could be imagined as constituting a hierarchy. Once 
implemented, this hierarchy allows for a modular approach to adaptation. This means that 
in case of a misalignment between organization and environment, those business beliefs 
that have run obsolete are traced and replaced by more appropriate ones. This should then 
be reflected in the establishment of new rules and/or systems which realign organization 
and environment. If a belief becomes obsolete and the accompanying rules and systems are 
changed, other layers of the hierarchy of business beliefs and resources may well be 
conserved. The GRB case provides an illuminating example. During the GRB adaptation 
proces, the belief emerged that Citibank should serve global customers advanced in 
financial management. In the business environment of the mid 1990s, this target market 
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would benefit most from the bank’s global reach and expertise. Changing environmental 
conditions partly invalidated this business belief over time. The development of the 
Internet economy led to the rise of companies with an almost instant need for cross-border 
financial products and services. In response to this development, the original GRB 
customer criteria were adjusted to allow for inclusion of the so called ‘rising stars’. At the 
same time, the higher-level beliefs that had given way to the criteria remained in place. 
The belief in ‘serving global customers globally’ was perceived as still being valid.  
 
7.3 Limitations of the study 
The research reported here is subject to a number of limitations. First of all, the use of a 
single industry as research context may have eroded the generalizability of the findings. 
The banking industry is a semi-regulated service industry which has transformed from a 
stable and predictable business environment into one characterized by increasing 
turbulence, intensifying competition, and advances in technology. It remains to be seen 
whether the insights will apply to other kinds of organizational settings. For example, 
decision-makers in sectors with a long history of high-paced changes in conditions might 
have built up a different set of adaptation skills which would be likely to influence their 
thinking and acting in times of adaptation. The same counts for executives of firms 
operating in traditional, stable industries.  
A second limitation concerns the type of adaptation process that has been 
examined. Both of the change processes were top-down, deliberate adaptation efforts. 
Bottom-up initiatives resulting in a new strategy and structure might reflect distinct 
dynamics of cognition and action due to, for example, the fact that information-processing 
and decision-making in such initiatives are likely to take place at different levels within the 
organization. Environmental developments may lead middle and front-level managers to 
invent and experiment with new organizing principles. Formalizing such principles, 
however, requires the involvement of people with the appropriate authorizing power 
(Floyd and Lane, 2000). Also, the fact that this research revolved around top-down change 
processes entailed a strong hierarchical focus. The study was less concerned with 
horizontal information flows which might throw a different light on the role of middle 
managers’ cognition.   
The next limitation concerns the exclusion of financial performance effects of 
adaptation in the present research. Performance effects of organizational changes are 
generally considered a complicated matter. Intervening factors such as economic growth 
and the impact of deregulation obscure sight on such performance effects. In this study, 
performance effects were limited to the changes in employees’ recurrent actions caused by 
the adaptation. This leaves room for improvement. When aiming for financial performance 
measurement, using benchmark analyses to establish a BU’s financial performance in 
relation to the performance of similar BUs might offer a solution. However, this approach 
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requires continuity in the strategy and structure of the reference firms or divisions. Another 
solution might be to correct financial performance data of the particular firm or division 
for the main intervening factors. Even if the main factors could be removed, however, it is 
still difficult to indicate the precise performance consequences of a adaptation trajectory.  
A fourth constraint of the research concerns the method of study. The case study 
methodology limits the number of observations. Because the field of study is still in 
development, instead of searching for generalizable results, the strength of this research is 
in providing contextualized and textured information. The interviews and document 
analyses allowed for the exploration of structure and action over time and across levels. 
Qualitative methods do not provide the accuracy of quantitative techniques. In this vein, 
the merits of quantitative analysis for substantiating our qualitative interpretations are 
discussed in section 7.4.   
Finally, a choice was made regarding the type of perceptions and beliefs under 
consideration. Perceptions were a generic category comprising environmental 
characteristics. In practice, perceived environmental characteristics reflected a broad range 
of issues such as technology, regulation, economic outlook, competitors’ actions, and 
demographic factors. The choice for business beliefs, defined as beliefs about the nature of 
the business and how to succeed in it, was grounded in previous organizational studies. 
Choosing particular contents of cognition directs attention away from other potentially 
relevant categories. Although it is acknowledged that this restricts the generalizability of 
the findings, the case material shows the relevance of these particular types of perceptions 
and beliefs in adaptation processes. The forementioned limitations reveal potentials for 
future research.  
 
7.4 Agenda for future research 
Based on the findings, additional work in the area of cognition in adaptation seems 
warranted. A number of research opportunities can be identified. The current research 
tapped strategic choice theory, structuration theory, and cognitive theory to explore the 
role of cognition in adaptation processes. These theories entailed some specific 
assumptions and emphases. Decision-makers within firms were considered key actors in 
information-processing activities and their behavior was assumed to be purposeful. Their 
schemes (i.e. business beliefs) and resources were assumed to shape their action. Other 
theories might provide different perspectives on the role of cognition in adaptation. An 
interesting viewpoint might derive from institutional theory. Institutionalists have started 
to acknowledge the impact of firm-specific internal organizational dynamics counting for 
within-sector variation (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). They bring into play more 
explicitly existing commitments and interests of organization members to explain how 
adaptation takes place.  
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 The research methodology of the present study also provides opportunities for 
elaborating further research directions. For the purpose of the study, the overall rationale 
behind strategic action was used as a proxy for decision-makers’ business beliefs. Using a 
global rather than an aggregated measure of beliefs, this thesis follows the 
recommendations of several cognitive theorists (Meindl et al., 1994; Schneider and 
Angelmar, 1993). The’depersonalization’ of business beliefs has the consequence of 
excluding individual-level factors influencing the role of cognition in adaptation. It might 
prove valuable to examine such factors to explain why this role varies between 
organizations. The effect of beliefs on action was explored in the research. Focusing on 
actions rather than decisions was a deliberate choice when determining the research design. 
Examining how adaptation takes place, actual rather than intended actions seemed an 
appropriate focus. However, future research might address the cognitive dimension of 
decisions that do not instantiate in practice. Fundamental differences between decision-
makers’ business beliefs and those of middle managers might be revealed as a cause.  
 A third set of recommendations for future adaptation research evident from this 
study relate to the integrative framework. In the current research, emphasis was on the 
influence of structure on action. However, there were some findings regarding the impact 
of action on structure at as well as across organizational levels. An extensive examination 
of how strategic and recurrent action confirms and changes the structural properties 
initially shaping these actions represents an interesting research avenue. Indeed, 
researchers have suggested that organizational restructuring has the consequence of 
confirming business beliefs in the eyes of decision-makers (McKinley and Scherer, 2000). 
The emergence of so called ‘cognitive order’ at the decision-making level is presented as 
an explanation for the chronic nature of adaptation in many contemporary organizations. 
How the influence of action on structure helps to produce self-reinforcing loops of 
adaptation is an interesting question. McKinley and Scherer (2000) also explore the 
contribution of organizational restructuring to long-term environmental turbulence. In 
terms of the integrative framework, this shows in the effect of a change in recurrent action 
at the organizational level on environmental characteristics.  
 Furthermore, investigating bottom-up adaptive efforts was touched on before as a 
potentially interesting topic for research. Such adaptation processes would be expected to 
show different structure-action dynamics. For example, signalling changes in customer 
behavior might lead front-end managers to change their recurrent behavior, triggering 
retrospective rationalizing dynamics at the decision-making level. Bartlett and Ghoshal 
(1993)’s well-known study of Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) reveals such an entrepreneurial 
role of front-line management. While outside the scope of the present study, the explicit 
consideration of this management level in the light of the integrated framework would be a 
logical next step. A last possible extension of the research discussed here concerns the type 
of response to environmental developments. Adaptations aimed at cost reduction might be 
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easier to push through at higher levels while evoking resistance at lower levels. In these 
cases, beliefs are likely to change quicker higher up in the organization while uncertainty 
and agitation at lower levels might hamper a change in deep structure. Revenue-increasing 
processes would be expected to show an opposite pattern. Inertial forces at the decision-
making level are likely to be stronger in such processes whereas the new rules which 
generally allow front-end employees to serve customers better are enacted relatively easy 
and quickly.  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This research was about the role of cognition in organizational adaptation processes. A 
multi-level and processual approach to this theme served to understand how managerial 
and organizational cognition and adaptation were related. Decision-makers’ perceptions 
and business beliefs were identified as both constraints and enablers of strategic actions. 
Middle managers emerged in the study as key actors in top-down, second-order change. 
Depending on a number of issues, they delayed changes by resisting them, they acted as an 
important source of stability in the midst of change, and they actively leveraged change. 
The effect of business beliefs on action was considered to be mediated by resources. 
Resources either turned out to reinforce or erode business beliefs, depending on actors’ 
knowledgeability and the means put at their disposal.  
 From the study emerges a notion of intelligent adaptation that pivots on a 
continous awareness among managers of the fact that decisions and actions are undertaken 
on basis of subjective considerations. This opens the door to proactive thinking for keeping 
pace with environmental developments. Being proactive not necessarily means staying 
ahead of the market. It means staying ahead of obsolete business beliefs and doing so 
efficiently, e.g. by involving managers throughout the organization. Intelligent adaptation 
means understanding when first-order change in beliefs is sufficient and when second-
order change is required. Initiating first-order changes to tackle a problem which cannot 
possibly be solved within the existing business model leads to frustration. Intelligent 
adaptation also demands an awareness of the dynamics of structure and action, both at the 
decision-making level and at levels below. Considering business beliefs and resources as 
structural properties which are mobilized in strategic and recurrent action holds the 
promise of a structured and dynamic approach to adaptation. Framing adaptation as a 
multi-level, cognitively anchored process will not make such top-down, second-order 
change less complex for academics or practitioners. However, it does add to the 
understanding of some key dynamics. It is hoped that this study will spur further interest of 
strategy researchers in a multi-level, processual approach to the role of cognition in 
adaptation. 
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 APPENDIX A 
MANAGERIAL COGNITION IN ADAPTATION 
 
Author(s) Adaptation Cognition Contribution 
Anderson 
& Paine 
(1975) 
Relationship 
between 
environmental 
properties and 
internal traits 
of the firm, 
strategy 
choices 
Boundary spanning 
managers’ 
perception of 
environmental 
uncertainty and 
perception of need 
for change in 
strategic properties 
of the organization 
(e.g. mission, 
strategy, structure) 
in order to meet 
environmental 
demands 
Theoretical: perceptual process: 
selectivity, closure and 
interpretation. Perceived 
uncertainty and perceived need for 
change is assumed to affect a 
number of strategic properties: 
mission, objectives, form, search 
processes   
Kiesler & 
Sproull 
(1982) 
Organizational 
breakpoints, 
crises, extreme 
change and 
chance 
Noticing, 
interpreting and 
incorporating 
stimuli  
Theoretical: review of social 
cognition processes that lead to 
certain kinds of problem-sensing 
behavior and implications 
Starbuck & 
Milliken 
(1988) 
Actions and 
results 
Executives’ 
perceptual filters: 
what they notice and 
how they make 
sense 
Theoretical: influences on 
perceptual filtering processes that 
executives use as they observe and 
try to understand their 
environments 
Ford & 
Hegarty 
(1984) 
Structural 
change 
Decision makers’ 
beliefs about causes 
and effects of 
structures 
Some beliefs influence structure, 
but the nature of that influence 
varies according to the decision 
maker 
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Smircich & 
Stubbart 
(1985) 
Nature of what 
constitutes 
adaptation can 
only be stated 
retrospectively, 
never 
prospectively 
Strategic managers’ 
knowledge of events 
and situations 
Theoretical: objective, subjective 
and enacted model of 
environment; interpretive 
perspective 
Gronhaug 
& 
Falkenberg 
(1989) 
Lack of 
strategic 
change in 
response to 
environmental 
jolts 
Managers’ 
perceptions of own 
and competitors’ 
strategies 
Study in U.S. forest products 
industry shows great discrepancies 
in self-evaluations and 
competitors’ evaluations of the 
firms’ strategies 
Fahey & 
Narayanan 
(1989) 
Strategic 
change –causal 
maps offer not 
only a way of 
critically 
exploring 
strategic 
change but 
may also 
provide a 
means of 
assisting such 
change 
Top managers’ 
belief systems with 
regard to 
macroenvironment, 
industry, strategy, 
strengths and 
objectives 
Study on firm in TV receiver 
industry shows that fit between 
cognitive structures and 
environment was less than perfect, 
and that decision-makers both 
under-identified and over-
identified certain environmental 
factors. Causal maps evolve over 
time. 
Gavetti & 
Levinthal 
(2000) 
Choice of 
action, action, 
outcome 
Beliefs about action-
outcome relations 
Simulation study. An important 
form of adaptation is the shift in 
cognitive representations 
themselves; insight in how beliefs 
versus actions influence search 
processes 
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Barr & 
Huff 
(1997) 
Responses to 
environmental 
change 
Managerial 
perceptions: what is 
notified and how it 
is interpreted 
An exploratory study of six 
pharmaceuticals shows that events 
not interpreted as affecting central 
concepts (performance or well-
being) in the firm’s strategic 
frame do not lead to a change in 
action and change appears to be 
triggered by interpretations that 
link an event to other concurrent 
or prior events 
Bogner & 
Barr 
(2000) 
Organizational 
action  
Idiosyncratic firm-
level sensemaking 
framework & 
industry recipes that 
perpetuate 
hypercompetition 
Theoretical: to cope with 
undermining of cognitive 
frameworks of competition caused 
by environmental changes, 
managers develop new 
sensemaking responses that can 
become institutionalized as SOPs 
and as industry recipes which act 
to perpetuate hypercompetition. 
Bobbitt & 
Ford 
(1980) 
Organization 
structure 
Decision makers’ 
cognitive and 
motivation 
orientations: 
systems for 
organization of 
information, 
observation and 
thought resp. of 
values and 
evaluation in the 
process of 
individual and 
group-problem 
solving 
Theoretical: structure is result of 
interaction of cognitive and 
motivational orientations, 
transformation strategies and 
context 
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Lant, 
Milliken & 
Batra 
(1992) 
Strategic 
reorientation 
Managerial 
interpretation of past 
performance, 
managerial 
awareness of 
environmental 
changes 
Study of furniture industry and 
computer software industry; 
interpretations are important 
predictors of likelihood of 
strategic reorientation 
Thomas, 
Clark & 
Gioia 
(1993) 
Organizational 
adaptation 
entails 3 key 
processes: 
scanning, 
interpreting 
and 
responding; 
strategic 
change in 
terms of 
changes in 
product/service 
Executives’ 
interpretation of 
situation in terms of 
positive-gain and 
controllability 
Data from 156 hospitals indicate 
that high information use 
increases the likelihood that 
managers will interpret issues as 
potential gains and controllable; 
controllability positively related to 
strategic change; change related to 
better performance 
Hambrick 
& Mason 
(1984) 
Strategic 
choice, 
performance 
Top managers’ 
cognitive base 
(assumptions or 
knowledge about 
future events, 
alternatives and 
consequences) and 
values (which 
directly affect 
choices or through 
perceptions) 
Theoretical: organizational 
outcomes –strategic choices and 
performance levels- are partially 
predicted by managerial 
background characteristics 
Dutton & 
Jackson 
(1987) 
Organizational 
response to 
strategic issue 
Cognitive 
categories: threats 
and opportunities 
Theoretical: decision makers’ 
categorization of issues affects the 
processing of issues and the types 
of organizational actions taken in 
response to them  
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Barr 
(1998) 
A firm’s 
strategic 
response to 
unfamiliar 
environmental 
events 
Top managers’ 
cause/effect beliefs 
about external 
events and key firm-
level activities 
Study of 6 pharmaceutical firms 
over 10-year period indicates that 
interpretations of familiar and 
unfamiliar events develop along 
two different patterns; that 
interpretations are related to both 
timing and content of strategic 
change; and that change in 
interpretation and change in 
strategy have a back-and-forth 
relationship 
Child 
(1972) 
Development 
of strategy and 
accompanying 
changes in 
scale of 
operations, 
technology, 
structure and 
HR 
Dominant 
coalition’s 
evaluation of the 
situation informed 
by prior ideology 
Theoretical: strategic choice 
typically included not only the 
establishment of structural forms 
but also the manipulation of 
environmental features and the 
choice of performance standards 
Lewin & 
Stephens 
(1994) 
Choice of 
organizational 
design  
CEO’s need for 
achievement, 
machiavellianism, 
egaliatarism, trust in 
people, locus of 
control, tolerance 
for ambiguity, risk 
propensity, moral 
reasoning 
Theoretical: CEO’s characteristics 
are assumed to influence strategy 
and choice of organizational 
design 
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Roberts & 
Greenwood 
(1997) 
Adopting a 
new 
organizational 
design 
Preconscious 
institutional 
constraints: taken-
for-granted elements 
shape the decision 
making process by 
influencing what is 
and what is not 
perceived. 
Postconscious 
constraints: dynamic 
of legitimacy  
Theoretical: efficiency-seeking 
firms may be biased in favor of 
current designs and those that are 
legitimated within their 
institutional contexts. Enhances 
understanding of how firms adopt 
new organizational designs 
Daft & 
Weick 
(1984) 
Structure Interpretation of 
environment  
Theoretical: management’s beliefs 
about analyzability of 
environment and organizational 
intrusiveness influence firm’s 
interpretation mode 
Calori, 
Johnson & 
Sarnin 
(1994) 
Strategic 
decision 
making 
CEO’s 
understanding of 
environmental 
structure and of 
environmental 
dynamics  
Data on 12 French and 14 British 
companies in four industries 
(brewing, retail banking, car 
manufacturing, book publising) 
indicate a link between 
complexity of tasks and 
complexity of cognitive maps 
Isabella 
(1990) 
NA Managers’ 
interpretations of 
key organizational 
events 
Data from interviews with 40 
managers from a financial services 
institution show that 
interpretations unfold in 4 stages: 
anticipation, confirmation, 
culmination and aftermath 
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Barr, 
Stimpert & 
Huff 
(1992) 
Changes in 
organizational 
action 
Executives’ noticing 
and interpreting of 
environmental 
changes; causal 
attributions 
Study of two U.S. railroad 
companies indicates that renewal 
hinges not so much on noticing 
new conditions, but on being able 
to link environmental change to 
corporate strategy and to modify 
that linkage over time. In the 
successful company, renewal is a 
continuous process of first and 
order changes in cognitive maps. 
Bettis & 
Prahalad 
(1995) 
Environmental-
driven 
organizational 
change 
Dominant logic: the 
way managers 
conceptualize the 
business and make 
critical resource 
allocations 
decisions. It is 
stored via shared 
schemas, cognitive 
maps, or mind sets 
and is determined by 
the managers’ 
previous 
experiences 
Theoretical: organizations are 
complex systems where individual 
behaviors of managers and 
employees interact in complex 
ways with each other and with the 
environment, nonlinear, dominant 
logic is an emergent property of 
complex systems seeking to adapt. 
Tripsas & 
Gavetti 
(2000) 
Adapting to 
radical 
technological 
change 
Managers’ 
understanding of the 
world, cognitive 
representations 
In-depth case study of Polaroid 
clearly illustrates the importance 
of managerial cognitive 
representations in directing search 
processes in a new learning 
environment, the evolutionary 
trajectory of organizational 
capabilities, and ultimately 
processes of organizational 
adaptation 
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MacIntosh 
& 
MacLean 
(1999) 
Organizational 
transformation: 
a relatively 
rapid transition 
from one 
archetype to 
another 
Deep structure: set 
of rules which 
comprise organizing 
principles and 
business logic. 
Process-oriented 
rules: e.g. how 
things are done. 
Content-oriented 
rules: e.g. what kind 
of business is 
conducted 
Two illustrative case studies 
indicate that issues of content are 
important but that they should be 
managed at the level of the rules 
which generate outcomes rather 
than at the level of the outcomes 
themselves 
Ford & 
Baucus 
(1987) 
Organizational 
adaptation to 
performance 
downturns 
Decision makers’ 
collective 
interpretation of a 
situation 
Theoretical: paper is concerned 
not with implementation of 
responses, but with process by 
which decision makers come to 
those responses. Strategy, 
structure and culture might 
influence responses.  
Yasai-
Ardekani 
(1986) 
Structural 
adaptations 
Managers’ 
perceptions of their 
environments 
Theoretical: industry 
environmental traits influence 
structure through managers’ 
perceptions of environment which 
are also influenced by individual 
characteristics (e.g. cognitive 
structures) and existing structure. 
Structural adaptations are also 
affected by managerial choice and 
slack. 
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Meyer 
(1982) 
Organizational 
adaptation to 
an 
environmental 
jolt 
Decision makers’ 
theory of action 
(selection and 
interpretation of 
stimuli); power 
holders’ beliefs; 
organizational 
ideology: perceived 
importance of 
environment; 
number of stories 
about reorientations; 
benefits expected 
from changes; 
subordinates’ 
perceived 
capabilities; benefits 
expected from 
participation 
Study of 3 hospitals experiencing 
jolt suggest that ideology and 
strategy are better predictors of 
adaptations than are structure and 
slack. Jolts offer learning 
opportunities. Outcomes can be 
resiliency (deviation reducing, 
first order) and retention 
(deviation-amplifying, second 
order) 
D’Aveni & 
MacMillan 
(1990) 
NA Top managers’ 
attention to 
environment 
Exploratory study of 57 bankrupt 
firms and 57 matched survivors 
shows that managers of the former 
deny or ignore output factors 
during crisis and pay more 
attention to input and internal 
environments. Managers of 
survivors pay more attention to 
critical aspects of external 
environment. 
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Siggelkow 
(2001) 
Firms’ ability 
to react to three 
types of 
environmental 
changes: fit-
conserving 
change, benign 
fit-destroying 
change and 
detrimental fit-
destroying 
change 
Managers’ mental 
maps 
A longitudinal case study of 
American fashion company 
indicates that fit-conserving 
change which leaves the internal 
fit among a firm’s activities intact 
yet decreases the appropriateness 
of the set of choices as a whole, 
poses a particular difficult 
challenge for managers.  
Thomas & 
McDaniel 
(1990) 
Strategic action CEOs’ interpretation 
of strategic issue 
Study of 151 hospital CEOs 
indicates that both strategy and 
information-processing structure 
of TMT are related to how CEOs 
label strategic situations and the 
range of variables they use during 
interpretation  
Priem 
(1994) 
Strategy-
structure-
environment 
alignment 
decisions 
CEOs’ judgment: 
their beliefs about 
cause/effect 
relationships among 
business-level 
strategy, structure 
and environment 
and performance 
Study of CEOs of 33 
manufacturing firms shows that 
CEO judgment is strongly related 
to actual organizational alignment 
and that judgment policies that are 
similar to those recommended by 
contingency theory produce 
higher performance than other 
policies 
Gioia & 
Chittipeddi 
(1991); 
Gioia et al. 
(1994) 
NA CEO’s sensemaking 
and sensegiving  
Study of a strategic change effort 
in large public university shows 
that four phases of change: 
envisioning, signaling, revisioning 
and energizing. Is interplay 
between cognition and action, 
where first is related to 
sensemaking and second to 
sensegiving 
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Miller, 
Kets de 
Vries & 
Toulouse 
(1982) 
NA Top executives’ 
locus of control 
Study of 33 Canadian firms shows 
that top executives’ locus of 
control strongly affects strategy, 
but only indirectly influences 
environment and structure. 
Lenz 
(1981) 
Co-alignment 
of task 
environment, 
strategy and 
structure 
Strategy-structure 
filter which 
influences cognitive 
map held by 
dominant coalition 
Theoretical: model which shows 
interdependencies among factors 
related to organizational 
performance 
Hambrick 
(1982) 
Organizational 
adaptation to 
the 
environment 
Upper-level 
executives’ 
environmental 
scanning activities 
Survey among 165 executives in 3 
industries (private liberal arts 
colleges, voluntary general 
hospitals, life insurance industry) 
did NOT indicate a consistent, 
concentrated tendency to scan 
according to existing strategy 
 
Intelligent adaptation 
 
180
 APPENDIX B 
ORGANIZATIONAL COGNITION IN ADAPTATION 
 
Author(s) Adaptation Cognition Contribution 
Dutton & 
Dukerich 
(1991) 
Organization’s 
response to a 
nontraditional and 
emotional strategic 
issue 
Organization members’ 
interpretations of 
strategic issue 
A case study of Port 
Authority of NY and 
NJ shows that an 
organization’s image 
and identity guide and 
activate individuals’ 
interpretations of an 
issue and motivations 
for actions on it, and 
those interpretations 
and motivations affect 
patterns of action over 
time 
Ranson, 
Hinings & 
Greenwood 
(1980) 
Restructuring Provinces of meaning 
which incorporate 
interpretive schemes, 
intermittently articulated 
as values and interests, 
that form the basis of 
organizational members’ 
orientation and strategic 
purposes 
Theoretical: structuring 
is a process of 
generating and 
recreating meanings, 
organizational members 
wish to secure their 
provinces of meaning 
within the very 
structure and working 
of their firm 
Greenwood & 
Hinings 
(1996) 
Radical 
organizational 
change in response 
to market and 
institutional 
changes 
Interest dissatisfaction 
and value commitments 
as precipitating 
dynamics; interests and 
values of groups within a 
firm 
Theoretical: hypotheses 
on how firms retain, 
adopt, and discard 
templates for 
organizing from a neo-
institutional perspective 
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Bartunek 
(1984) 
Restructuring Shared interpretive 
schemes, especially 
understanding of mission 
Case study of religious 
order suggests that 
major changes in 
interpretive schemes 
occur through 
dialectical processes. 
Environmental forces 
are likely to initiate 
change, but 
interpretation of 
environment by 
organizational members 
affects type of change. 
Change in schema-
change in structure is 
mediated by the actions 
of organizational 
members and their 
emotional reactions to 
change. 
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Garud & 
Rappa (1994) 
NA Researchers’ beliefs 
about what is and what is 
not technically feasible 
The historical 
development of 
cochlear implants is 
used to illustrate the 
reciprocal interaction 
between beliefs, 
artifacts and routines 
that gives rise to a 
micro-level process of 
inversion and a macro-
level process of 
institutionalization. 
These processes that 
shape individual and 
shared realities place 
paradoxical demands 
on researchers when 
developing a new 
technology. 
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 APPENDIX C 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS  
 
Variable Illustrative questions 
 
Decision-makers’ perceptions 
 
• Which environmental and 
organizational developments & events 
were of importance for the decision to 
change and why? 
 
Decision-makers’ business beliefs 
 
• How was the business conceptualized 
(nature of the business; critical success 
factors) before the adaptation? 
• Was there a significant difference 
between this conceptualization and the 
one dominating directly after the 
adaptation? 
• If so, when did this change take place? 
• Did the conceptualization affect 
strategic actions? If so, how? 
 
Strategic actions 
 
• Which actions were initiated? E.g. 
establishment of new roles, new 
responsibilities, new performance 
measurement & reward systems 
 
Middle managers’ business beliefs 
 
• How was the business conceptualized 
(nature of the business; critical success 
factors) before the adaptation? 
• Was there a significant difference 
between this conceptualization and the 
one dominating directly after the 
adaptation? 
• If so, when did this change take place? 
 
Recurrent actions 
 
• Did the adaptive effort significantly 
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change recurrent actions? 
• To what extent can this change be 
attributed to a change in middle 
managers’ resources? 
• To what extent can this change be 
attributed to a change in middle 
managers’ business beliefs? 
 
 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX D 
CASE STUDY PROTOCOL 
 
Questions, data sources & sample strategies 
 
Q1: Who were the decision-maker(s) with regard to which issues? 
 
Data sources: project manager (contact 
person); project documents  
 
Sample strategies: Who had decision-
making power and why (basis of 
authority)?; Were there different decision-
makers over time? If so, who and when? 
Were there different decision-makers for 
different issues? If so, who and which 
issues?; Construct list of decision-makers, 
feed this back to interviewees until no new 
names arise. 
 
Q2: Why was the top-down adaptive effort initiated; which environmental and 
organizational developments and events triggered decision-makers’ wish for adaptation? 
 
Data sources: decision-makers; annual 
reports, minutes of decision-makers’ 
meetings; strategic plans 
 
Sample strategies: Construct environmental 
profile; List relevant organizational factors; 
Which environmental developments/events 
were the focus of interest?; How were these 
developments/events interpreted? 
 
Q3: Did decision-makers conceptualization of their business change? If so, how? How did 
it affect the adaptation process? If not, how did existing business beliefs affect the 
adaptation process? 
 
Data sources: decision-makers; others 
closely involved in decision-making 
(consultants, supervising managers, lower-
level managers); minutes of decision-
makers’ meetings; strategic plans  
 
Sample strategies: Map out decision-
makers’ business beliefs before adaptation; 
Map out decision-makers’ beliefs in 
adaptation; What does success mean in the 
particular business in the eyes of the 
decision-makers? 
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Q4: Which strategic actions constitute the adaptive effort? (1) Which actions directed at 
the formal functioning of the organization and (2) which actions directed at organizational 
cognition? 
 
 
Data sources: ad (1) formal documents 
(work council proposals; formal plans); 
decision-makers; ad (2) lower-level 
managers; cultural programmes; training 
programmes 
 
Sample strategies: List strategic actions in 
chronological order; Which actions led to 
which subsequent actions?; Which higher-
level actions led to which actions at lower 
levels?  
 
Q5: Did these strategic actions affect recurrent actions? If so, how? If not, why? 
 
Data sources: middle managers; procedures 
 
Sample strategies: What were key routines? 
Did they change? If so, how? 
 
 APPENDIX E  
FLOW CHART FOR DATA ANALYSIS 
 
1 Obtain basic bank information 
2 Conduct interview 
Probe: observation & interpretation (perceived organizational and 
environmental characteristics), dominant conception of nature of the business 
and how to succeed in it (business beliefs), strategic actions (change in 
formal rules; change in organizational business beliefs) 
3 Transcribe interview 
4 Verify interview transcript and notes with respondent 
5 Collect milestone documents 
6 Index, code, and categorize data (summary forms) 
7 Develop case history  
8 Analyze data, replicate & refine theoretical ideas  
9 Cross-case analysis, explore propositions 
10 Theoretical saturation? 
  
11 Adjust framework  
 
Adopted from Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998 
Revise 
protocols 
 if necessary 
No 
Yes
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 Nederlandse samenvatting (Dutch summary) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deze dissertatie gaat over adaptatie van organisaties. Adaptatie betekent aanpassing aan 
veranderende omstandigheden. Omdat elke industrie in meer of meerdere mate gekenmerkt 
wordt door veranderingen in condities (bijvoorbeeld regelgeving, consumentengedrag, 
technologie) en omdat aanpassing hieraan lang niet altijd vanzelfsprekend en makkelijk 
blijkt te zijn voor organisaties, wordt adaptatie als sinds lange tijd beschouwd als een 
belangrijk onderwerp in de organisatieliteratuur. Ondanks het feit dat vele onderzoekers 
zich hebben beziggehouden met de vraag hoe succesvolle adaptatie gerealiseerd kan 
worden, is er nog steeds veel te leren op dit gebied. 
 
Het voorliggende onderzoek gaat specifiek in op de rol van cognitie in organisatie-
adaptatieprocessen. In de brede zin van het woord verwijst cognitie naar kennisneming. 
Als zodanig is het een intermediair in de relatie tussen omgeving en organisatie. Of en hoe 
van veranderingen in de omgeving kennis wordt genomen is bepalend voor de acties die 
vervolgens binnen organisaties ondernomen worden. Verschillende vormen van cognitie 
zijn besproken in de organisatieliteratuur waarvan percepties (perceptions) en 
basisovertuigingen (beliefs) met name van betekenis zijn.  
 
De rol van cognitie in organisatie-adaptatie is in toenemende mate onderkend in de 
afgelopen decennia. Dit promotie-onderzoek heeft als doel inzicht te genereren in de relatie 
tussen cognitie en adaptatie. De basisonderzoeksvraag luidt dan ook als volgt: 
 
Hoe zijn cognitie en adaptatie aan elkaar gerelateerd? 
 
Bij het beantwoorden van de onderzoeksvraag staat een aantal aandachtsgebieden centraal. 
De percepties en basisovertuigingen van topmanagers oftewel cognitie op 
besluitvormersniveau vormen een eerste set van variabelen. In het domein van 
organisatieverandering is vaak een belangrijke rol toegedicht aan deze variabelen. 
Topmanagers zijn verantwoordelijk voor en veelal direct betrokken bij de totstandkoming 
van strategische beslissingen, acties, en daarmee resultaten van organisaties. Naast de 
cognitie van topmanagers wordt ook gekeken naar de rol van cognitie op 
organisatieniveau. Om daadwerkelijk verandering te bewerkstelligen in het functioneren 
van mensen binnen een organisatie zullen niet alleen de percepties en daarmee 
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basisovertuigingen van het hoger management significant moeten veranderen, maar ook 
die van andere leden van de organisatie. Het onderzoek dient ertoe inzicht te krijgen in de 
wijze waarop veranderingen in de cognitie van topmanagers gerelateerd is aan de 
verandering in cognitie op organisatieniveau. Naast het in beschouwing nemen van de 
verschillende niveaus van analyse is voor een dergelijk inzicht ook een analyse over tijd 
van belang. Een derde aandachtsgebied in de studie is de interactie tussen cognitie en actie. 
Zoals in het onderzoek wordt beargumenteerd, tonen de effecten van cognitie in adaptatie 
zich in acties op besluitvormers- en organisatieniveau. Deze acties hebben ook invloed op 
cognitie.  
 
De bovengenoemde factoren worden bestudeerd in de context van organisatie-adaptaties 
waarbij een systeem van regels vervangen wordt door een geheel nieuw systeem, 
zogenaamde tweede-orde adaptaties3. Drie theorieën vormen gezamenlijk het theoretisch 
domein van de studie: strategic choice theorie, structuration theorie, en cognitieve theorie. 
Deze theorieën delen een aantal uitgangspunten dat de basis vormt van het 
onderzoekskader van de voorliggende studie. Daarnaast voegt elk van de theorieën een 
specifiek element toe aan het kader waarmee dan een nieuw perspectief op de rol van 
cognitie in adaptatie neergezet wordt. Het onderzoekskader is gebruikt voor de analyse van 
twee specifieke adaptatietrajecten; één traject dat heeft plaatsgevonden binnen ING –een 
grote Nederlandse financiële dienstverlener- in het midden van de jaren ’90 en een 
soortgelijk proces in dezelfde periode binnen Citigroup, een Amerikaans financieel 
conglomeraat. De keuze voor banken als studie-object werd gedreven door het feit dat de 
bankindustrie zich heeft ontwikkeld van een relatief stabiele tot een dynamische 
bedrijfsomgeving. Voor managers in deze industrie zijn onzekerheden en veranderingen 
onderdeel van de bedrijfsvoering geworden. Om aansluiting van hun organisatie bij de 
omgeving te waarborgen moeten besluitvormers in banken kennisnemen van de 
ontwikkelingen en aldus ontstane overtuigingen omtrent de industrie omzetten in 
beslissingen en acties. Dit maakt deze industrie bij uitstek een interessante context voor het 
bestuderen van de rol van cognitie in adaptatie.  
 
Theoretisch domein 
De drie theorieën die gezamenlijk het theoretisch domein vormen, behoeven enige verdere 
uitleg. Strategic choice theorie is ontstaan in het begin van de jaren ’70 als reactie op de 
overheersende deterministische opvatting van organisaties en van het gedrag van de 
mensen binnen deze organisaties. Uitgangspunt van deze theorie is dat managers in staat 
zijn de resultaten van hun organisaties te beïnvloeden door middel van strategische 
beslissingen en acties. In structuration theorie staat de relatie tussen structuur en actie 
                                                          
3 Eerste-orde adaptaties behelsen een aanpassing van regels binnen een systeem.  
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centraal. Om tot actie te komen, wordt gesteld dat managers gebruik maken van structuren. 
De structuurelementen die gemobiliseerd worden, worden tegelijkertijd geacht bevestigd te 
worden in deze acties en worden hiermee dus in stand gehouden. In andere woorden, 
structuur is zowel medium als uitkomst van actie. Structuur kan actie ook bemoeilijken. 
Dit is bijvoorbeeld het geval als voor een bepaalde actie een bestaande structuur niet 
voldoet. In structuration theorie worden managers in principe in staat geacht om bewust 
die structurele elementen te ontwikkelen en aan te wenden die de gewenste acties mogelijk 
maken.  
 
Hoewel het samenbrengen van strategic choice en structuration theorie een duidelijke stap 
is in de richting van een perspectief op adaptatie waarin zowel deterministische als 
voluntaristische elementen een plaats hebben, ontbreken er nog factoren die van belang 
worden geacht voor een dergelijk perspectief. Cognitieve theorie is in het onderzoek 
toegevoegd aan het theoretisch domein om invulling te geven aan drie specifieke factoren. 
Ten eerste brengt cognitieve theorie een bredere opvatting van cognitie in adaptatie met 
zich mee. Strategic choice en structuration theorie zijn met name gericht op 
besluitvormers binnen organisaties. Cognitieve theorie geeft ook inzicht in het belang van 
cognitie op organisatieniveau in veranderingsprocessen. Een tweede bijdrage is de kennis 
op het gebied van verandering van cognitie. Tenslotte draagt cognitieve theorie bij aan 
inzicht in beperkingen voortkomend uit cognitie zelf.  
 
De verschillende uitgangspunten van strategic choice, structuration, en cognitieve theorie 
zijn geïntegreerd in een raamwerk dat als basis dient voor het empirisch onderzoek (zie 
Figuur 1).  
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In het empirisch onderzoek wordt een aantal proposities onderzocht. De eerste betreft de 
relatie tussen omgevingsverandering en percepties van de omgeving op 
besluitvormersniveau. De verwachting bestond dat percepties van de omgeving op dit 
niveau veranderen als de omgeving verandert (P1). Een verandering in percepties zou 
vervolgens leiden tot een verandering in de basisovertuigingen van de besluitvormers 
betreffende de omgeving (P2). Uitgaande van de behoefte van besluitvormers om een 
nieuw beeld van de industrie en de consequenties hiervan voor de organisatie in te brengen 
in de organisatie, werd het waarschijnlijk geacht dat een verandering in de 
basisovertuigingen van besluitvormers verandering op gang brengt in middelen (P3) en 
basisovertuigingen (P4) op organisatieniveau. Tenslotte zullen deze aanpassingen in 
middelen en basisovertuigingen gezamenlijk resulteren in een werkelijke verandering in 
het gedrag van leden van de organisatie. Het raamwerk en de proposities geven aanleiding 
tot een integratief perspectief op de rol van cognitie in adaptatie dat stoelt op meerdere 
niveaus van analyse en analyse over tijd.  
 
Methodologie 
Het onderzoeksontwerp is afgestemd op het raamwerk en het bijbehorende type analyse. 
Voortbouwend op bestaand onderzoek is gekozen voor case studies als de methode van 
onderzoek. Hoewel het raamwerk en de proposities richting geven aan de studies is er ook 
expliciet ruimte gelaten voor bevindingen die niet binnen het gestelde kader vallen.  
 
Zoals gezegd is de bankenindustrie geselecteerd als context voor het onderzoek. De keuze 
voor één enkele industrie komt voort uit de wens om een zekere mate van homogeniteit te 
creëren. Om dezelfde reden zijn Nederland en Amerika geselecteerd als de nationale 
contexten in de studie. Nederlandse banken en hun Amerikaanse tegenhangers zijn in de 
literatuur bestempeld als relatief innovatieve organisaties. In de jaren ’90 hebben 
omgevingsveranderingen ervoor gezorgd dat de managers van veel van deze banken hun 
strategie en organisatiestructuur drastisch hebben aangepast. Om de rol van cognitie in 
adaptatie beter te kunnen begrijpen, zijn twee van deze trajecten bestudeerd; het ene traject 
heeft plaatsgevonden binnen een Nederlandse financiële dienstverlener, ING, en het andere 
is het Amerikaanse financieel conglomeraat Citicorp. Beide organisaties behoren tot de top 
financiële dienstverleners in de wereld; Citicorp –nu opererend onder naam Citigroup- is 
zelfs de grootste leverancier van financiële produkten en diensten ter wereld. Beide 
organisaties werden in het midden van de jaren ’90 –de tijd waarin de processen zich 
voltrokken- al gezien als voorlopers in hun industrie.  
 
In de case studies zijn drie typen factoren onderzocht: cognitieve elementen, 
gedragsfactoren en contextuele factoren. Interviews and kerndocumenten (bijvoorbeeld: 
formele actieplannen, notulen, evaluatierapporten) waren de belangrijkste bron van 
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informatie over percepties en basisovertuigingen op besluitvormers- en organisatieniveau. 
Voor het onderzoeken van gedrag –strategische en wederkerende acties- werd met name 
voortgangsdocumentatie gebruikt als bron. Tenslotte waren interviews en secundaire 
bronnen met name van belang voor het in kaart brengen van de contextuele factoren. Het 
feit dat kennisprocessen zich afspelen in de hoofden van mensen, en dus niet direct te 
observeren zijn, maakt het onderzoeken van cognitie een complexe aangelegenheid. In het 
voorliggende onderzoek is een aantal specifieke stappen genomen om de validiteit van de 
data betreffende cognitie te vergroten: (1) het systematisch vergelijken van informatie uit 
interviews met informatie uit kerndocumenten; (2) het stellen van follow-up vragen in 
interviews; en (3) het laten verifiëren van de procesbeschrijvingen door sleutelinformanten.  
 
Vier analyses vormden de kern van elke case studie. De eerste betreft de analyse van de 
belangrijkste percepties en basisovertuigingen op het besluitvormersniveau over tijd. 
Daarnaast is een reconstructie gemaakt van de strategische acties. De derde analyse betrof 
algehele veranderingen in organisatiegedrag (wederkerende acties). Tenslotte heeft een 
analyse plaatsgevonden van relevante organisationele en omgevingsfactoren. Patronen 
binnen een tussen cases zijn beide meegenomen in het onderzoek.  
 
Empirische resultaten 
Het adaptatietraject binnen ING Bank Nederland leverde een aantal interessante 
bevindingen op met betrekking tot de rol van cognitie in adaptatie. Percepties en 
basisovertuigingen op besluitvormersniveau hadden elk een specifieke rol maar waren 
tegelijkertijd sterk met elkaar verbonden over tijd en niveaus van analyse. Terwijl adaptatie 
werd geïnitieerd op besluitvormingsniveau binnen ING Bank Nederland, was het 
veranderingsproces niet puur een top-down process. De consensus-cultuur binnen de 
divisie werd gereflecteerd in de sterke betrokkenheid van middenmanagement. Terwijl 
sommige middenmanagers een bron van vernieuwing vormden, was er op dit niveau 
binnen de divisie ook weerstand. De verschillen tussen deze twee groepen managers waren 
in principe terug te leiden tot de structuren die zij aanwendden in acties. Het onderzoeken 
van de relatie tussen cognitie en actie bracht een complexiteit aan het licht van interacties 
tussen onderliggende cognitieve structuren, middelen, en uitkomsten in de vorm van 
strategische en wederkerende acties. Dit was eveneens het geval in de Citibank case. In 
sommige gevallen kwamen de dynamieken tussen de case studies overeen, terwijl in 
andere gevallen sprake was van afwijkende patronen. De mate van fit tussen 
basisovertuigingen en middelen kwam naar voren uit de studies als een belangrijke 
determinant in adaptatie. Een goede fit tussen beide structuurelementen bleek een impuls 
voor adaptatieprocessen van de tweede orde. De consequenties van een minder goede fit 
tussen cognitie en middelen verschilden. Gedreven door nieuwe basisovertuigingen bleken 
managers in staat om acties te initiëren in lijn met deze cognitieve structuur ondanks het 
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ontbreken van passende middelen. Echter, wanneer nieuwe middelen ter beschikking 
stonden maar passende basisovertuigingen ontbraken, kwamen strategische acties en 
nieuwe wederkerende acties niet of nauwelijks tot stand.    
 
Uit het case-onderzoek komen drie thema’s naar voren met betrekking tot de rol van 
cognitie in adaptatie. Het eerste thema betreft de wijze waarop cognitie verandert in 
adaptatieprocessen. Binnen dit thema zijn twee kernpatronen geïdentificeerd: (1) de 
wederkerige relatie tussen percepties en basisovertuigingen over besluitvormersniveau; en 
(2) de wijze waarop nieuwe basisovertuigingen zich ontwikkelen en onderdeel uit gaan 
maken van de organisatierealiteit. Met betrekking tot het eerste patroon was het interessant 
te zien dat percepties invloed hebben op de manier waarop basisovertuigingen zich 
ontwikkelen binnen een organisatie. Het type perceptie speelt hierbij een specifieke rol. 
Percepties gebaseerd op opgedane ervaringen (en daarmee op bestaande 
basisovertuigingen) hebben een bevestigend effect, terwijl percepties gebaseerd op 
informatie direct genomen uit de omgeving een potentieel vernieuwende invloed hebben. 
Daarnaast blijkt uit de cases dat percepties ook dienen ter bevestiging van opkomende 
basisovertuigingen. Basisovertuigingen worden niet alleen beïnvloed door percepties; 
inzicht in de rol van basisovertuigingen in adaptatie was van belang voor het begrijpen hoe 
en waarom bepaalde percepties opkwamen op besluitvormingsniveau.  
 
Het tweede patroon betreft vier typen activiteiten in de vernieuwing van basisovertuigen 
die uit de cases naar voren zijn gekomen: reflecteren op bestaande basisovertuigingen, 
recreëren van basisovertuigingen, implementeren van nieuwe basisovertuigingen, en 
behouden van de nieuwe ‘organisatierealiteit’. Deze typen zijn tot op bepaalde hoogte 
terug te vinden in andere organisatiestudies maar het verbinden van de activiteiten aan 
elkaar in de context van veranderende cognitie is een bijdrage van dit onderzoek.  
 
Een tweede thema dat is opgekomen in de case studies is de interactie van structuur en 
actie over tijd en op verschillende niveaus van analyse als de kern van adaptatie. Structuur 
refereert naar de basisovertuigen en middelen die actoren aanwenden in acties. Er is een 
onderscheid gemaakt naar twee typen acties in dit onderzoek: strategische en 
wederkerende acties. Twee patronen zijn beschreven in het kader van het tweede thema: 
(1) het effect van structuur op actie; en (2) het effect van actie op structuur. In de case 
studies zijn er twee effecten van structuur op actie die zich herhalen. Ten eerste geeft het 
onderzoek inzicht in de wijze waarop structuur het ondernemen van actie bemoeilijkt. 
Daarentegen maakt structuur actie juist ook vaak mogelijk. Of er sprake is van het eerste of 
het tweede effect blijkt veelal afhankelijk te zijn van de fit tussen basisovertuigingen en 
middelen. Uit het onderzoek komt voren dat het managen van middelen makkelijker 
aandacht krijgt in adaptatieprocessen dan het managen van basisovertuigingen. Anders 
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gezegd, besluitvormers richten zich in het algemeen eerder op uitkomsten dan op de regels 
die ten grondslag liggen aan deze uitkomsten. Naast de effecten van structuur op actie zijn 
er ook twee basiseffecten van actie op structuur. Enerzijds kan actie een onderliggende 
structuur bevestigen, anderzijds kan het zo’n structuur ook ter discussie stellen. In het 
tweede thema komt middenmanagement op als een niveau van belang in adaptatie. Om 
nieuwe basisovertuigingen deel te kunnen maken van de organisatierealiteit lijkt het voor 
besluitvormers essentieel om middenmanagers actief te betrekken in dit proces. 
Strategische acties gericht op de middelen en basisovertuigingen op dit niveau kunnen de 
bijdragen van middenmanagement sterk beïnvloeden.  
 
De rol van middenmanagement in adaptatieprocessen is ook direct het derde thema dat is 
voortgekomen uit het onderzoek. Drie typen bijdragen van middenmanagers zijn 
onderkend: (1) weerstand bieden aan organisatieverandering; (2) bewaken van de 
continuiteit van de organisatie; en (3) vergemakkelijken van en voortbouwen op top-down 
adaptatieprocessen. De rollen die middenmanagers spelen in een veranderingstraject 
blijken onder meer af te hangen van de basisovertuigingen en middelen (structuur) die zij 
aanwenden –en waar zij dus in eerste instantie over moeten kunnen beschikken- om te 
komen tot strategische en wederkerende acties. Managers die zichzelf sterk associëren met 
de bestaande regels en systemen hebben veelal een type-1 of –2 rol, terwijl managers die 
zich sterk vereenzelvigen met de nieuwe conceptie van de business vooral een 
versterkende invloed zullen hebben.  
 
Conclusies 
Op basis van het onderzoek kan geconcludeerd worden dat cognitie op verschillende 
wijzen en over verschillende niveaus een belangrijke rol speelt in adaptatieprocessen 
binnen organisaties. Het toepassen van een integratief raamwerk, gebaseerd op inzichten 
uit strategic choice, structuration, en cognitieve theorie, op twee verschillende 
adaptatietrajecten leverde een aantal nieuwe inzichten op in de relatie tussen cognitie en 
adaptatie. Ten eerste heeft de interpretatie van percepties en basisovertuigingen als twee 
afzonderlijke maar nauw verbonden elementen van cognitie geholpen om de ontwikkeling 
van nieuwe cognitie in adaptatie beter in beeld te brengen en te begrijpen. Een tweede 
kernresultaat van de studie is de onderkenning van vier typen activiteiten in het eigenlijke 
vernieuwingsproces van cognitie. Met het in kaart brengen van deze activiteiten werd de 
duidelijk dat dit proces zowel een sterke strategische als organisatorische component 
bevat. Ten derde kwam uit het beeld van adaptatie als interacties van structuur en actie 
over tijd en niveaus van analyse naar voren dat een fit tussen basisovertuigingen en 
middelen van groot belang is voor de mate van effectiviteit van adaptatie. De rol van het 
middenmanagement bleek hierbij belangrijker dan in eerste instantie –op basis van 
literatuuronderzoek- verwacht. Niet alleen fungeerden middenmanagers als een bron van 
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continuïteit in organisaties, ook hielpen zij actief mee aan het realiseren van de benodigde 
vernieuwingen. Alleen wanneer de basisovertuigingen van middenmanagers sterk afweken 
van het te implementeren business model ontstond weerstand tegen de beoogde 
verandering.  
 
De studie geeft in verschillende opzichten een nieuw perspectief op de rol van cognitie in 
adaptatie. De bouwstenen van dit perspectief waren het onderscheid tussen verschillende 
typen cognitie, het beeld van adaptatie als interacties tussen structuur en actie, en van 
adaptatie als een cognitief proces over meerdere organisatieniveaus. Het managen van 
adaptatie is een proces waarin onderliggende cognitieve structuren, middelen, en 
uitkomsten een evenredig deel moeten innemen. Toekomstig onderzoek is nodig om de 
inzichten die dit perspectief heeft opgeleverd verder te verdiepen. Dit zal niet alleen de 
kennis van wetenschappers op dit gebied vergroten, maar vooral ook managers helpen om 
de adaptatieprocessen in hun organisaties op effectieve wijze te managen.  
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Intelligent Adaptation: Organizational dynamics of
cognition and action in the changing Dutch and U.S.
banking industries 
The ability to anticipate environmental developments is crucial for
firms to survive in the long run. Despite a ubiquity of research into
how adaptation takes place, there is still a lot to be understood. This
study applies a cognitive perspective to explore the dynamics of
adaptation within two large financial services providers in different
national contexts. From the cases emerge a number of patterns
concerning the link between perceptions and business beliefs of
decision-makers, interrelations between structure and action, and
the role of middle managers in top-down organizational adaptation
processes. The study suggests that the explicit multi-level consideration
of both surface-level actions and underlying cognitive dynamics can
help managers adapt their organizations effectively to changing
environments. 
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